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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1 CURRENT AIR TRAFFIC SITUATION PICTURE 
 
The Italian National Airspace System is predominately a hub-and-spoke network, with only two 
main hub airports (Milan Malpensa and Rome Fiumicino) and lots (at least 15) of “minor” airports with 
an overall capacity of about 2 million operations per year. Current forecasts predict that demand for 
these airports will soon exceed capacity (e.g., ATAG 2000, Donohue and Shaver 2000, 
EUROCONTROL 2006-2007). 
Closely coupled with the issue of Capacity is the issue of Safety. Flying airplanes closer together 
has the potential to increase the likelihood of an accident. Thus, any increase in capacity must be 
accompanied by a demonstration that such an increase will be safe. As capacity increases, the relative 
safety must decrease to achieve the same absolute accident rate over time. In fact, the commercial 
accident rate has remained relatively stable over the last two decades (Barnett and Higgins 1989, 
Machol 1995), but the absolute number of accidents has increased due to more operations. 
In this thesis, we will try to evaluate the Safety of a proposed system where airplanes land at high 
volume at small airports with small amount of control from the control tower, but with presence of 
state of the art System Technologies on A-SMGCS (to be read ‘smigs’), acronym standing for 
Advanced-Surface Movement Guidance and Control System, i.e. the ensemble of all the radio-electric 
equipment installed on-board and devices on the ground in order to perform Air Traffic Control over 
an Airport. 
Evaluating the safety of a new system is difficult. First, historical data may not directly apply to 
the new system, so it is generally not possible to extrapolate existing data to get a safety estimate of the 
new system. Second, since events like collisions are so rare (Van Es 2001 estimates the rate of plane-to-
plane collisions for commercial aviation between 1980 and 1999 to be about 0.3 collisions per million 
flights), simply observing the new system does not provide a safety estimate. Finally, new systems have 
new safety hazards that may have not existed before. Thus, a critical part of safety analysis is 
understanding what these hazards are, how they interact with and influence pilot/controller behaviour, 
airplane trajectories, etc., and how to numerically quantify their impact on the Total System Level Of 
Safety. The results will illustrate that this new methodology supports also safety-based ATM design. 
By now, Safety is recognised [ATC-1] as a key quality on which to select/design advanced ATM 
concepts, even when capacity and efficiency are the drivers of the development. The Safety target is 
often described as ‘equal or better’ in comparison with existing practice, allowing a large freedom in 
how safety is expressed, let alone measured. In effect, new CNS (Communications Navigation and 
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Surveillance)/ATM concept developments are typically accomplished without the use of feedback from 
appropriate Safety Assessments. 
ATM concept design teams (e.g. of Free Flight, or 4D-ATM) try to realise capacity-efficiency 
enhancements by exploiting new technology, changing human controller roles and introducing new 
procedures, while relying on the established safety-related indicators in ATM such as conflict rates and 
types, workload of human operators and failure rates and effects of technical systems. 
ATM, however, is the result of complex interactions between multiple human operators, procedures 
and technical systems, all highly distributed. This yields that providing safety is more than making sure 
that each of the ATM elements functions properly safe; it is the complex interaction between them that 
determines safety. The assessment of isolated indicators falls short in covering the complex interactions 
between procedures, human operators and technical systems in safety-critical non-nominal situations. 
In order to improve this situation, this thesis outlines a novel probabilistic risk assessment methodology 
which has specifically been developed for application to Airport Traffic Control.  
The demand for air transport has been increasing rapidly over the years and this trend is 
expected to continue in the future. Therefore, it is of great practical importance to develop, verify and 
validate simple, yet powerful dynamic models that help in design and retrofit air traffic management 
systems (ATM). ATM can be divided into two parts: air traffic flow management (ATFM), and air 
traffic services (ATS) including air traffic control (ATC) where the subject of this thesis belongs to. 
One of the recent problems in ATC is to minimize the delays of arriving and departing flights, where 
the dynamic modelling of runways and scheduling strategies based thereon are the critical issues. There 
are different approaches to this problem: for instance, decision support systems based on a stochastic 
analytic model for the estimation of the capacity envelope of an airports runway system. Besides the 
analytical and mathematical programming techniques applied to ATM problems, combinatorial 
methods for scheduling various operations on airfields are also used. It has recently been accepted that 
the relatively recent formalization of concepts of discrete event systems (DES) may well lead to more 
powerful analysis techniques suited to ATC analysis. 
Coloured Petri nets (CPNs) belong to the area of discrete event system methodology, where 
CPNs are well known for their capability in simulating and analyzing discrete event systems. There are 
useful extensions of the original CPN concept that includes its timed and stochastic versions. 
Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets (DCPN) have already been used in ATM but applications are strictly 
limited to safety purposes. The same applies for DCPN representation of runways. 
The aim of this thesis is to propose a simple dynamic model that describes the traffic flow of a 
single runway Airport due to schedule (i.e. estimated times of arrivals and departures). The model is 
governed by elementary ATC principles (one aircraft at a time on RWY, arrivals priority on departures), 
and it is a subject of random disturbances (such as weather conditions, false alarms, low probability of 
detection, integrity over communications, etc.). Therefore, Timed CPNs have been selected as 
modelling and simulation tools to develop and analyze a dynamic model of a small Airport. 
Current crises in the air traffic industry demonstrate that changes are required to present 
systems. The levels of delay and poor safety standards being experienced around the world dictate the 
need for improved Air Navigation Services (ANS). A multitude of reasons explain these problems. For 
instance, fragmentation of national systems prevents optimum use of the world’s airspace. In addition, 
inherent limitations of present ANS technologies and procedures mean that it is usually not possible to 
separate numerous aircraft on random routings. Thus, aircraft must often plan their flights along routes 
and be channelled so that the necessary separation can be maintained. This results in fuel and time 
penalties, in addition to airspace capacity being consequently constrained. Accordingly, this thesis 
provides an analysis of changes that should occur to ANS during this decade by evaluating current and 
planned technologies and procedures. 
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2 CNS/ATM SYSTEMS 
 
As already stated, air traffic congestion problems in many areas of the world are well known 
and have been highly publicised in recent years. This airspace dilemma, which results in delays and 
other undesirable knock-on effects, is escalating at a phenomenal rate and requires immediate attention. 
Correspondingly, there is concern about safety standards in some worldwide airspace regions. It should 
be noted that congestion and poor safety levels affect all involved with aviation and, indeed, society in 
general. It is evident, therefore, that present methods are inefficient and unable to guarantee punctual 
or safe services now or in the future. It is imperative that the significant projected growth in air 
transport movements during this decade is accommodated. Thus, there is an urgent need to solve the 
current airspace problems and plan to meet forecast demand in a responsible manner. Solutions to 
these predicaments have been developed and are encompassed under the auspices of the terms, ‘future 
air navigation systems’ or ‘CNS/ATM systems’. 
Future air navigation systems use Communications, Navigation & Surveillance (CNS) 
technologies to provide enhanced Air Traffic Management (ATM) through continuous information on 
aircraft positions and intentions so that reductions in separation are possible without compromising 
safety. The systems include technologies and procedures that merge to optimise the potential of airport 
and airspace resources so that the capacity, flexibility and safety of these resources are maximised, while 
delays and their operating costs are minimised. 
However, there has been a significant lack of progress to date in implementing the new 
technologies and procedures. Indeed, the assured integration of many systems is currently uncertain 
and far from guaranteed. Therefore, we will try to summarize the evolution of Air Navigation Services 
(ANS) during this decade. Noting that the present systems will still fulfil many ANS roles in 2010, we 
will consider both current and future CNS/ATM, split into the Communications, Navigation & 
Surveillance (CNS) technologies and Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures. 
 
2.1 PRESENT CNS/ATM TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES 
 
Although current ANS is based on CNS technologies and ATM procedures that were 
developed many years ago, their applications have been continually modified to suit the different types 
of airspace that exist around the world in an attempt to satisfy the various capacity requirements and 
specific operating environments [ATC-1]. However, the levels of delay now being experienced in many 
airspace sectors, and the lack of adequate safety standards in other regions, have necessitated further 
development of these systems. Thus, the present systems form the basis of many planned technologies 
and procedures. Indeed, improvements in the efficiency, flexibility and safety of the overall ANS will 
only occur if present systems evolve into more responsive elements. Accordingly, it should be noted 
that, as most new CNS/ATM systems will be phased in using an evolutionary approach, present 
technologies will continue to be employed in many situations at the end of this decade. In addition, a 
description of present CNS and ATM serves to identify the functional shortcomings of present systems 
and highlight the potential benefits of implementing new technologies. Therefore, apart from 
facilitating a contrasting analysis of ANS evolution, there is a need to describe present CNS/ATM 
methods. 
 
 
Current Communications Technology. Given that the main objective of an aeronautical communication 
service is to ensure that telecommunications and radio aids necessary for the safety, regularity and 
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efficiency of air navigation are continuously available and reliable, two categories of Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) communication are presently conducted. 
 
Air-ground. Very High Frequency (VHF) transceivers are used to provide voice contact between ATC 
and pilots when within line-of-sight coverage, which is invariably near or over land in dense traffic 
areas. Due to the nature of VHF signal propagation along the curvature of the Earth, it can be received 
and transmitted over greater distances from higher altitudes. However, the availability of VHF 
spectrum channels in the long-term is a concern. Europe recently implemented a narrowing of 
bandwidth to 8±33 KHz, which will soon be necessary in other parts of the world. High Frequency 
(HF) is used over areas exceeding VHF’s range, such as in oceanic or remote continental areas. The fact 
that HF requires its waves to be reflected from the ionospheric layers above the earth is often a 
drawback because destructive interference can occur, where the transmitted signals arrive at the 
receiver at different times because they were reflected at different ionospheric levels and consequently 
sent via different routes. Additionally, there is limited availability of frequencies that work reasonably 
on a given day. The need for pilots constantly to monitor their assigned HF frequency is removed if 
SELect CALling (SELCAL) is fitted on the aircraft. Since the early 1990s, a development of VHF 
technology, VHF DataLink (VDL), has enabled electronic messages such as ATC clearances to be sent 
from the ground to the cockpit, where they arrive in digital format. HF DataLink (HFDL) is also being 
used, albeit in fewer locations. Datalink applications are similar to Aircraft Communications, 
Addressing and Reporting Systems (ACARS), which are operated by four ground network providers, 
namely Air Canada in Canada, AVICOM in Japan, in addition to ARINC and SITA on a worldwide 
scale. Correspondingly, it should be noted that Inmarsat is an international organisation that provides 
satellite communications for the aviation, maritime and land shipping industries. ARINC and SITA use 
Inmarsat for the satellite portion of their services. 
 
Ground-ground. Adjacent Air Traffic Service (ATS) units are linked by dedicated telephone lines and telex 
systems between controllers and control centres. Many airlines are linked with the ATS units via the 
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network (AFTN). 
 
 
Current Navigation Technology. Navigation presently uses different aids in the following two categories of 
airspace types. 
 
Near or Over Land with Dense Traffic. The Flight Management Computer (FMC) on board the aircraft, 
part of its Flight Management System (FMS), employs lateral navigation concepts such as aRea 
NAVigation (RNAV) using Non-Directional Beacons (NDB), VHF Omni-directional radio Range 
(VOR) and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). These are ground-based navigational aids, many of 
which have been in use for decades. For instance, Basic-RNAV (B-RNAV) is in place over Europe, 
whereby flights must maintain a track keeping performance of within 5 nm of the centre-line trajectory 
for 95% of the time. Barometric altimetry is also employed, to provide vertical navigational guidance 
and separation. The terminal environment uses Instrument Landing Systems (ILS). A Microwave 
Landing System (MLS) has been operational for many years, but has had only limited introduction, 
even though it was previously envisaged that MLS would have replaced ILS at busy airports by 1998-
2000. Reasons for the lack of comprehensive implementation to date include the continued 
international standardisation of ILS as the definitive landing system and the consequently poorly 
perceived cost-benefit scenarios particularly as landing systems based on satellite navigation are now 
being developed. 
 
In Oceanic and Remote Areas. Long Range Navigation Systems (LRNS) are used, which include LORAN 
C and the self-contained Inertial Navigation System (INS). INS positioning errors increase with time 
and consequently limit the system’s accuracy. Although Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) 
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are primarily surveillance facilities, they are increasingly being developed for navigational purposes such 
as in-trail climbs and descents. The concept of Minimum Navigation Performance Specification 
Airspace (MNPSA), which requires that all flights in a designated region achieve high standards of 
navigational performance accuracy, is a method of navigational assurance frequently employed in 
oceanic and remote areas. Some carriers have started to introduce the Global Positioning System 
(GPS), the US constellation of navigation satellites, as a source of navigation reference in all airspace 
types. GPS is part of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), as envisaged by the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Because of concerns over integrity, GPS has not yet been 
accepted as a sole means of navigation, but it can be employed virtually anywhere on the globe. 
However, GPS has been approved as a primary means of navigation in a number of airspace regions 
around the world. It should be noted that Inmarsat has placed a set of navigational transponders on 
their Inmarsat-3 satellites, although use to date has only been for testing purposes. 
 
 
Current Surveillance Technology. Surveillance is the basic tool for the controller to monitor the maintenance 
of safe separation, manage the airspace efficiently and to assist pilots in navigating their aircraft safely. 
The following surveillance techniques are presently employed in the respective categories of airspace. 
 
Near or Over Land with Dense Traffic. The main means of surveillance by ATC in such areas is the use of 
radar, which is independent of the pilots’ cooperation. This is usually Secondary Surveillance Radar 
(SSR), which requires aircraft to be fitted with a (Mode A or C) transponder that automatically 
transmits information when ‘interrogated’ by ATC. Primary radar is also still in use. Airborne Collision 
Avoidance Systems (ACAS), such as Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS), are 
technologies that enable aircraft to avoid each other in the air. They are not dependent on any ground-
based system: the equipment interrogates SSR transponders of other aircraft in its vicinity, analyses the 
replies by computer to see which aircraft represent potential collision hazards and provides appropriate 
advisory information to the flight crew. TCAS has been mandatory in US airspace for many years and 
became requisite for aircraft with Maximum Take-Off Weights (MTOW) greater than 15 tonnes flying 
in Europe at the beginning of 2000. Other regions around the world are being actively encouraged to 
enforce its implementation on flight decks. 
 
In Oceanic and Remote Areas. Surveillance methods in these regions, where radar coverage is not available, 
are usually dependent on co-operation from pilots. Aircraft positioning is determined on board and is 
transmitted to ATC using VHF and/or HF radio contact, invariably through procedural voice position 
reporting, particularly in oceanic areas. This necessitates large separations between aircraft due to the 
slow nature of the process. Supplemental monitoring is now conducted by ATC using technologies 
such as Enhanced Traffic Management Systems (ETMS) and Flight Data Processing Systems (FDPS), 
which constantly work out estimates of aircraft locations and alert controllers of any impending 
conflicts. However, it should be noted that aircraft report their positions automatically using datalink 
technologies in some areas. For example, aircraft equipped with ‘FANS-1/A’ avionics packages, 
designed to enable aircraft to exploit early benefits from future systems, presently provide automatic 
reporting in the North Atlantic and Pacific oceanic regions. Additionally, aircraft users are encouraged 
to place some form of Ground-Proximity Warning System (GPWS) in their avionics for use in all 
airspace regions. GPWS monitors aircraft instruments and provides an audible warning of proximity to 
the ground. Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS) uses a world-wide digital terrain database to provide a visual 
display and advanced warning of threatening terrain to the pilots in a colour code to indicate the level 
of threat posed. EGPWS is being mandated in Europe and North America. 
 
 
Current Air Traffic Management Procedures. Current Air Navigation Services (ANS) provide international 
Air Traffic Services (ATS) based on the availability of CNS technology. ICAO is the agency responsible 
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for safe and orderly ATS operations at a worldwide level. ATS were formed to expedite the safe and 
orderly flow of air traffic. ATS usually consist of a flight information service, an alerting service and Air 
Traffic Control (ATC). The ATC service is further divided into aerodrome control at the airport, 
approach control in the vicinity of the airport and area control for en-route flights. Such services apply 
to both Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. ATC control centres 
employ Air Space Management (ASM) and Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) to provide Air 
Traffic Management (ATM). Ultimately, ATM is conducted through strategic and tactical planning 
from months in advance, in addition to real time monitoring and control of flights. It should be noted 
that the world is divided into many Flight Information Regions (FIR) for the purpose of providing 
ATS. Some only occupy small volumes of airspace because FIR boundaries are usually defined by 
national borders or by agreed lines of demarcation over water. Air navigation facilities and procedures 
of each region are referred to in ICAO Air Navigation Plans (ANP). The FIRs can span the boundaries 
of more than one nation, but each country’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) puts together its own ATS 
system. Controlled airspace areas are manifested as TerMinal control Areas (TMA), interconnecting 
airways and area-type control areas. The latter two are further divided into ATC sectors. Other than the 
aforementioned types of controlled airspace and ConTRol zones (CTR), which facilitate the separation 
of aircraft operating within the vicinity of busy airports, the airspace within FIRs is usually 
uncontrolled. Airspace is categorised into different classes, the exact composition being determined by 
each nation. The ATM procedures within an FIR are based on the types and densities of air traffic, the 
CNS technology and infrastructure that is available, in addition to the topography and economic 
conditions of the country involved. Thus, similar to the applications of the various types of CNS 
technology in the different categories of airspace, ATM is presently based on procedures and separation 
standards, which vary with operating environment. 
 
Near or Over Land with Dense Traffic. ATM in these situations uses ATC strips, based on the aircraft’s 
flight plan, which are colour-coded to denote the direction of the aircraft. Strips incorporate 
information about the flight such as its timings, desired route level and radar code. The controller 
places the strip on a flight progress board in geographical and time order. After taking the requirements 
of all other traffic in the sector airspace at that time and in the immediate future, the controller plans a 
safe Flight Level (FL) and route for the aircraft using an ATS route structure of Upper Airways (UA). 
The exact altitude of the FL is dependent on the aircraft track, whether between 0° and 179° or 
between 180° and 359°. Vertical separation between FLs is in the process of being reduced from 2,000 
ft to 1,000 ft in some worldwide areas above FL290. The programme is termed Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minima (RVSM); vertical separation is already at 1,000 ft below FL290. Horizontal 
separation minima, which are split into longitudinal (along the track) and lateral (across the track) 
components, vary and are dependent on the availability of ground-based navigational aids and radar 
surveillance. Horizontal separation can be based on time or distance. ATC presently enables automated 
functions such as short/medium-term conflict alert, trajectory prediction and flight progress 
monitoring. Central Flow Management Units (CFMU), such as that operated by Eurocontrol in 
Brussels and the Central Flow Control Facility by the US FAA in Washington DC, facilitate co-
ordination of flights. Efforts such as Eurocontrol’s Free Route Airspace Project (FRAP), which offers 
users direct routes through the upper airspace of eight European nations, are currently adding capacity 
to ATM systems. 
 
In Oceanic and Remote Areas. A lack of surveillance information due to absence of radar technology 
means that flights are often controlled using procedural ATC methods in such areas. These methods 
use very large separation criteria, which result in low system capacity and poor availability of efficient 
flight profiles. Flight tracks are based on route structures that are not necessarily the desired routings of 
aircraft. The aircraft are assigned slot entry times to a track and told to fly at a specific speed, to 
facilitate the application of the Mach Number Technique (MNT). Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
(RVSM) were successfully introduced in the North Atlantic in 1997-1998 and are presently being 
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implemented in the Pacific. The latter region facilitates Dynamic Airborne Re-routing Procedures 
(DARP), whilst the former is planning to implement direct routing and Reduced Horizontal Separation 
Minima (RHSM). 
 
In the Terminal Area. Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and STandard ARrival (STAR) routes are 
established at busy aerodromes to ensure that traffic departs and arrives at an airport in a safe, orderly 
and expeditious flow. SID and STAR routes link with significant points of ATS en-route tracks and are 
designed to take account of noise abatement procedures. Separation is maintained between aircraft in 
such a manner that wake vortices from larger, preceding aircraft do not affect the safe flight of other 
aircraft. Guidance is sometimes given by ATC using radar vectors, but routes are created for navigation 
using the ground-based VOR/DME radio navigation facilities. At some cities with more than one 
airport, aerodromes share SIDs, STARs and holding patterns. Many ATM programmes, such as 
staggered, dual runway approaches, attempt to maximise the approach capacity of slot-restricted 
airports. Due to the fragmented nature of ATC between countries, different systems and standards 
have resulted in poor harmonisation between adjacent units. Correspondingly, the lack of common air 
to ground data interchange systems means that current ATM is still based on a multitude of traditional 
methods. This is manifested by inflexible fixed route structures, which result in demand exceeding 
capacity levels, air traffic delays and increased operating costs for users. Coupled with poor ATC 
infrastructure in many countries, there are many FIRs that are considered unsafe. The future 
CNS/ATM concepts aim to alleviate such problems by introducing an interoperable, seamless system, 
with full global coverage for safe ATM. 
 
 
2.2 FUTURE CNS/ATM TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES 
 
The key to optimisation of air traffic flow in the various types of airspace is [ATC-1] the 
introduction of automated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) systems that can 
provide enhanced Air Traffic Management (ATM) with continuous information on aircraft position 
and intentions. Hence ICAO’s insistence that Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) be known as 
CNS/ATM, which aims to be a method of using technology to: 
(a) Enhance communication links between aircraft and air traffic controllers with computers selecting 
the optimum method of transmission; 
(b) Improve pilots’ ability to navigate their aircraft safely; and 
(c) Increase air traffic controllers’ capacity to monitor and survey flights. 
ICAO defined their envisaged CNS/ATM in terms of technologies and procedures of future ATC 
systems. Indeed, if their plans were adhered to, then ATC systems would evolve as listed below during 
this decade. 
 
Future Communications Technology. Use of data transmission will introduce many changes in air-ground 
communication. Future communications systems will allow more direct and efficient linkages between 
ground and airborne automated systems, thereby offering the possibility of the most routine pilot-
controller communication taking place via datalink. Such Controller Pilot DataLink Communications 
(CPDLC) use displays instead of voice and may be seen as the key to development of new ATM 
concepts. However, it is not currently expected that CPDLC will be used for urgent messages. It should 
be noted that CPDLC is already in use in the Pacific oceanic region. The transmission of voice will 
continue to take place over existing Very High Frequency (VHF) channels, certainly in 2010, with 
reduced channel spacing to 8±33 KHz in many areas. The continued use of VHF voice 
communications will be essential for safety-related communications and in high traffic density terminal 
areas, which both require high integrity and rapid response. Therefore, there is a need to safeguard 
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aviation’s current spectrum allocation and not lose frequencies to commercial, mobile 
telecommunications. Standards are also being developed for a time division multiple access digital radio 
as the medium-term solution to spectrum congestion and enhanced air-ground services. In addition to 
a new generation of Inmarsat satellites (Inmarsat-4), Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit 
(MEO) satellite constellations, such as Globalstar and New ICO, will provide additional 
communications facilities. The VHF channels will additionally be used to transmit digital data using 
enhanced modes of today’s VHF DataLink (VDL), such as VDL Modes 2, 3 and 4. VDL is presently 
employed to send electronic messages from the ground to the cockpit, where they appear in paper 
format. VDL Mode 2 has replaced Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System 
(ACARS) since 2004. VDL Mode 3, which is particularly suited to digital voice communications, is 
being developed in the US and is expected to be operational before end of 2008. VDL Mode 4, which 
is being developed in Europe, uses a Self-organising Time Division Multiple Access (STDMA) 
technique that, in addition to providing its intended data communication functions, makes navigation 
and surveillance datalink capabilities available. The implementation date for VDL Mode 4 is uncertain. 
It should be noted that, although ICAO is developing standards for both Mode 3 and Mode 4, there is 
an industry-wide debate regarding which mode to adopt. In addition, HF DataLink (HFDL) will 
continue to be employed at the end of this decade.  
Satellite data and voice communications, capable of global coverage, will be introduced using 
Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Services (AMSS). The introduction of satellite-based data and voice 
communication technology is not subject to the many limitations of today’s other communications 
infrastructure, thereby ensuring greater, global availability and integrity of such services. For example, 
AMSS may well become the primary method of obtaining weather reports, in lieu of the current 
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS). It will also be used on a more widespread basis for 
issuing clearances to aircraft, consequently removing the need for the present, lengthy methods. The 
benefits of satellite communications currently available should be maximised. Indeed, it is ironic that 
passengers are sitting in the cabin, talking in a crystal clear manner to their associates on the ground, 
while the cockpit crew is struggling to understand ATC instructions via poor quality HF 
communications. It is even more ironic that over 80% of the global wide-body fleet is now equipped 
with satellite communications technologies. 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Mode S, which will be used for surveillance in high-density 
airspace, will also have the capability of transmitting digital communications data. SSR Mode S will 
provide an air-ground datalink that is specifically suitable for limited data messaging in high-density 
airspace. Mode S should be integrated by 2010. 
The Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) will provide for the interchange of 
digital data between end users over dissimilar air-ground and ground-ground communication links by 
adopting common interface services and protocols based on the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model. It may be compared with 
the Internet. Automated ATM interaction between ground-based and aircraft-located computer 
systems will be supported using On-Line Data-Interchange (OLDI). Recent trials suggest that the ATN 
will be available in the next 5 years in Europe and in the US. However, noting that aircraft have been 
benefiting from the FANS-1/A package and CPDLC technologies in some airspace regions such as the 
Pacific Ocean, there is an issue regarding the choice of datalink platform as the ATN or FANS-1/A. 
Although the availability of several communication systems does provide a degree of flexibility 
to planning and implementation in the different types of airspace, the proliferation of sub-networks will 
undoubtedly add to the operational complexity of global communications. Thus, there is a need to 
translate all relevant operational requirements in a particular airspace into a series of communication 
performance parameters: the concept of Required Communication Performance (RCP) refers to a set 
of requirements such as capacity, availability, error-rate and transit delay. By 2010, the RCP will be 
specified by ICAO for operational scenarios in various airspace environments, indicating that any single 
communication system, or combination of systems, meeting the set parameters can be considered 
operationally acceptable. 
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Future Navigation Technology. Improvements in navigation will include the progressive introduction of 
aRea NAVigation (RNAV) capabilities and elements of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). 
These systems will provide worldwide en-route navigational coverage and, ultimately, precision 
approaches using a service with high integrity and accuracy. The implementation of these systems will 
eventually enable aircraft to navigate in all types of airspace around the world. For instance, more so-
called ‘FANS routes’ will proliferate. By 2010, based on the current situation, it is inevitable that 
ground-based equipment will still be used as navigational aids, although many nations will have 
dismantled at least a portion of their ground-based infrastructures. Aids such as Distance Measuring 
Equipment (DME) and VHF Omni-directional radio Range (VOR) will continue to be used for RNAV 
in a manner similar to today’s system or as a back-up to GNSS. In the future CNS/ATM system, 
however, RNAV will operate with a greater dependency on satellite-based systems to determine aircraft 
positions. This will facilitate a greater proportion of flights flying on direct routes, especially if RNAV is 
employed with Dynamic Aircraft Route Planning (DARP). The Flight Management Computer (FMC) 
will periodically download its 4D trajectory and expected routing to allow for automated negotiation of 
flight plans. It should be added that the B-RNAV presently in place over Europe has evolved in 2005 
to become Precision-RNAV (P-RNAV), where the tolerance is reduced to 1 nm. Indeed, the airspace 
will be designated as ‘RNP-1’. GNSS will be a worldwide position and time determination system that 
includes one or more satellite constellations, aircraft receivers, ground monitor stations and system 
integrity monitoring devices. Only three satellite constellations are currently available with navigational 
capabilities: the US Global Positioning System (GPS); GLONASS, which is provided by the Russian 
Federation and is similar to GPS; and Inmarsat-3 satellites which, as well as their comprehensive 
communications capability, are equipped with navigational transponders. In addition, it should be 
noted that Europe aims to declare its proposed constellation of ‘Galileo’ satellites operational by 2008. 
GNSS will be the key feature of the future navigation system and will evolve to be a sole means of 
navigation with the intent that it eventually replaces current systems. This will occur, in certain cases, by 
2010. Integration of GPS and the Inertial Navigation System (INS) may be seen as a step towards full 
GNSS. To overcome inherent system limitations and to meet the performance accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity requirements for all phases of flight, GNSS will require varying degrees of 
augmentation to support the actual phase of operation. Such systems, which monitor signal reliability 
and enhance accuracy to make GNSS suitable for civilian use, are still being developed and may be 
broadly categorised as space-based (SBAS), aircraft-based (ABAS) and ground-based (GBAS). Based on 
GPS, Inmarsat and planned Japanese satellite systems, three SBAS should be operational by 2005: the 
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) in the US, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay 
Service (EGNOS) and the Multifunctional transport Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) in Japan. 
ABAS either use Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM), where satellite signals over and 
above the four required to provide a three-dimensional fix are used to check the integrity of those used 
in this positioning solution, or the same integrity function is achieved using other aircraft sensors such 
as INS or VOR/DME. GBAS are being designed primarily to provide high integrity and accuracy for 
airfield approach systems as described below. The standard non-visual aids to precision approach and 
landing that will be used in 2010 include a continuation of Instrument Landing System (ILS) operations 
as long as they are operationally acceptable. Microwave Landing Systems (MLS) will be implemented in 
cases where they are operationally required and economically beneficial. Based on current progression 
of its development, Differential GPS (DGPS) should be available in the near future. DGPS uses GPS 
signals, augmented on a local basis using a Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), to guide the 
aircraft on its approach to landing; these systems are becoming known as Satellite Landing Systems 
(SLS). Other technologies are being developed, such as a completely airborne system, Autonomous 
Precision Approach and Landing System (APALS), Head-Up Displays (HUD) and Multi-Mode 
Receivers (MMR) to enable the flexibility for aircraft to use ILS, MLS or SLS. Similar to the 
aforementioned RCP concept, Required Navigation Performance (RNP) recognises that aircraft 
navigation systems are capable of achieving predictable levels of performance accuracy within a defined 
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airspace. RNP types for operations are identified by a single accuracy value, defined as the minimum 
navigation performance accuracy required within a specified containment level. Noting that success to 
date with RNP has been better than RCP, the navigational requirements for many airspace 
environments will be stated in RNP terms by 2010. 
 
Future Surveillance Technology. Over the next 5 to 10 years, it is expected that both Primary and Secondary 
Surveillance Radar (PSR and SSR) will continue  to be used, with the gradual introduction of Mode S 
(Selective) datalink in both terminal areas and high-density continental airspace started in 2003 in 
Europe; 2008 in the US. SSR Mode S will be used in high-density airspace regions to provide high 
accuracy, reliable surveillance capable of providing conflict alerts. Accordingly, more advanced versions 
of the current Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS), such as TCAS 2, has become standard 
recently in 2005. In addition, TCAS 4 will be developed, which uses satellite-based position data to 
provide better conflict detection and resolution advisories. The major breakthrough, however, will be 
the more widespread implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS), which allows 
aircraft automatically to transmit their position and other data, such as heading, speed and intentions. 
This will be performed via satellite or some other air-ground communication link to an Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) unit, where the position of the aircraft will be displayed as on conventional radar 
screens. ADS is particularly appropriate to oceanic and remote regions. It may be seen as a beneficial 
merging of communication and navigation technology, which enables oceanic airspace to make use of 
the Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Services (AMSS). Software is being developed to allow ground 
computers to use ADS digital data to detect and resolve conflicts through conformance monitoring. 
Eventually, this could lead to clearances being negotiated between airborne and ground-based 
computers, with little or no human intervention. 
ADS-B (Broadcast) is an application of ADS technology that enables an aircraft to broadcast its 
position, altitude and vector information for display by other aircraft and also by ground users, such as 
ATS providers. ADS-B has become available starting from 2003 in the US, and current interest remains 
high in widely implementing this technology before the end of the decade. ADS-B information can also 
be used as a basis for a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). In addition to CDTI, other 
Situational Awareness Systems (SAS) will provide flight crews with wake vortex hazard prediction and 
avoidance; synthetic vision with HUDs; and enhanced meteorological awareness. On the ground, ADS-
B will be implemented with ground movement radar and airport surface detection equipment such as 
Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS). Indeed, it should also be noted that 
parallel precision runway monitors will increase approach traffic capacity at airports with closely spaced 
parallel runways. 
As with the communications and navigational elements of CNS/ATM, although the availability 
of a plethora of surveillance systems provides planning flexibility, it complicates the harmonisation of 
surveillance functions. To facilitate the planning, it is necessary to translate the relevant operational 
requirements into a series of surveillance performance parameters, termed Required Surveillance 
Performance (RSP). Once ICAO has specified the RSP for an operational scenario for a given airspace, 
any single system or combination of surveillance systems meeting the set parameters can be considered 
operationally acceptable. This will occur before 2010. 
 
Future Air Traffic Management Procedures. The objectives to be reached through the envisaged, 
evolutionary ATM system include: 
(a) To meet evolving air traffic demand; 
(b) To support a safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation; 
(c) To enhance safety, regularity and efficiency; 
(d) To optimise benefits through global integration; 
(e) To enhance economy of commercial air transport. 
Specifically, it is how each country and worldwide region will achieve these aims that 
differentiates the concepts being developed and determines the ATM procedures that will be in place 
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by 2010. Within this timeframe, the controller will still play a pivotal role using skills such as spatial 
perception, information processing, reason and decision making, which are presently employed. Indeed, 
many of today’s ATM procedures will still be used in the latter half of this decade. Significant 
improvement will only be achieved through the development of powerful decision support software 
tools. The creation of automated ATM will provide an enhanced set of such tools that will assist the 
controller with conflict prediction, detection and resolution. The introduction of the future CNS 
technologies described in the previous sections will enable the evolution of more sophisticated ATM. 
This particularly applies to technologies that facilitate the automatic sending of aircraft position data. 
The combined benefits from the aforementioned advances in CNS technologies will serve as tools to 
support ATM. Indeed, according to ICAO, the integrated benefits and technical attributes of CNS 
technology will amalgamate to improve ATM, as portrayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Benefits of CNS technologies to improve ATM 
 
The ultimate expectation is that accuracy could be improved through the rapid calculations associated 
with automation. Conflict prediction and detection, based on advanced computational methods, should 
allow more direct routings. These systems will be introduced in an evolutionary manner, and it is the 
rate of implementation that will determine the standard of ATM procedures by 2010. Nonetheless, 
some success is evident, such as the ‘Direct-To’ tool, which automatically searches for aircraft eligible 
for shorter trajectories to downstream fixes. Since software completion in 1999, it has been operating in 
shadow mode. The new Canadian Automated Air Traffic System (CAATS), which offers a paper-free 
environment with functions such as 4-D conflict probe and clearance validation, is also an example of 
advances in automated systems. Similarly, The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS), 
which became fully operational in 2000, incorporates new technology that links ground ATM 
automation systems with airborne avionics, thereby increasing flight path flexibility and providing more 
time for decision making. 
Based on the current activity around the world regarding future ATM, the expected status of ATM by 
the end of the decade varies for different regions, but will ultimately be the result of many capacity 
enhancing programmes. For instance, regions that are capacity constrained will continue to see the 
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implementation of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) above FL290 and implementation of 
the Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) concepts. Also, the fragmentation of airspace structures will be 
simplified, in order to provide seamless systems with greater capacity. For example, Europe’s “Single 
Sky” must be achieved in this decade. Additionally, mandatory requirements to have Airborne Collision 
Avoidance Systems (ACAS) will complement future ATM. 
ATM solutions will be brought about by ATM operational concepts, which are intended to assist and 
guide airspace planners with ATM design, in order to provide efficient and safe operations for all 
phases of flight. For instance, ICAO’s operational concept in the “Global ATM plan” is still being 
developed. The concept will be complete when consensus has been obtained on issues such as 
autonomy of flight, separation assurance, situational awareness and collision avoidance. The concept 
will be functionally integrated with Air Traffic Services (ATS), Air Space Management (ASM) and Air 
Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) on the part of the providers, in addition to ATM aspects of flight 
operations from the airspace users. The concept will provide the means to quantify and assure 
performance in terms of safety, efficiency and regularity. There is an urgent need for ICAO to finish 
developing this concept. 
The USA is implementing a programme for its operational concept of Free Flight, which aims to add 
levels of autonomous flight. The latest version of the programme, the Operational Evaluation Plan 
(OEP), was released recently. The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) completed Free Flight, 
Phase 1 in 2002. This is mostly ground-based and involves making existing, but not widely used, ATM 
capabilities quickly available to airspace users so that short-term benefits can be achieved in a desperate 
attempt to alleviate the country's air traffic congestion. Phase 2 aims to deploy decision-support 
systems for ATM between 2003 and 2007. Phase 3 will take place thereafter, when the FAA aims to 
complete the required infrastructure and integration of new automation to enable limited Free Flight 
operations. The FAA has found that the best method of achieving advanced ATM procedures is to 
work in conjunction with industry. Indeed, industry is conducting many trials itself, particularly in the 
area of new technologies. 
Eurocontrol’s gate-to-gate operational concept, “ATM Strategy for 2000”, expects to meet capacity 
needs until 2015. In contrast with the US notion that future ATM will enable aircraft to navigate more 
cost-efficient routes, the European idea of future ATM is more concerned with being able to satisfy 
demand through improved airspace organisation and flow management. Noting the escalation of delays 
in recent times, Eurocontrol aims to provide greater levels of capacity by 2008. Indeed, there is need 
for serious short-term action in Europe. Thus, Eurocontrol is targeting the Area Control Centres 
(ACC) that were highlighted in recent performance review reports as having created many ATC delays 
over the last few years. Specific improvements in the ATM procedures of these centres should bring 
benefits. Accordingly, Eurocontrol’s implementation programmes, which are discussed in previous 
sections of this paper, should increase capacity if they are conducted in a timely manner. They include, 
among others, RVSM, 8±33 KHz, SSR Mode S, PRNAV and FRAP. In addition, Collaborative 
Decision Making (CDM) will aid procedural ATM in terms of better slot co-ordination, airspace 
management and information management. 
Another integral aspect of improving ATM in this region is the increased cooperation of member 
nations in sharing the ATM of their upper airspace, with a view to creating a uniform region. 
Therefore, ventures such as the Central European ATS (CEATS) centre in Vienna should also act as 
suitable solutions to the predicament. 
The European Commission (EC) is involved, having created a High Level Group on ATM reform. In 
order that the ATM 2000­ Strategy may be implemented, the EC believes that the European Union, not 
Eurocontrol, should be given greater powers based on new decision-making mechanisms and 
regulatory frameworks. Ultimately, attaining the goal of an integrated, global ATM system requires 
harmonisation and standardisation of regional and national system elements, which, in turn, must be 
based on plans that are specific to the different airspace types. It is the evolutionary implementation of 
the CNS elements and their orchestrated interaction that will form the backbone of the integrated 
ATM system in 2010. 
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To maximise use of CNS technologies for airspace planning purposes, given a region’s ATM 
requirements, each of the three categories will be based on their required performance criteria, thus: 
Required Communications Performance (RCP); Required Navigation Performance (RNP); and 
Required Surveillance Performance (RSP). 
The introduction of these performance criteria (RCP, RNP and RSP) will help simplify the basis of 
ATM in the various types of airspace in addition to enabling the appropriate technologies and 
procedures to be developed. Many limitation factors of the present CNS system will inhibit the 
development of ATM throughout the world unless the more advanced technologies described in this 
thesis are implemented. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Relationships between CNS and RCP, RNP and RSP 
 
Accordingly, Figure 2 summarises suitable CNS systems upon which ATM will most likely be based in 
2010 for different airspace types. Hence, there is a need for the new technologies and ATM approaches 
that will lead to reductions in separation between aircraft and allow for increases in airspace capacity, 
cost-effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility and safety. Indeed, CNS/ATM systems provide an opportunity 
to overcome the present system’s shortcomings and accommodate forecast traffic levels. However, 
there are many issues that affect their rate of introduction, which incorporate political, management, 
regulatory, technical, certification, liability, financial and institutional aspects. Therefore, in order to 
implement CNS/ATM successfully, these different issues must be addressed. For instance, institutional 
problems relating to ATS providers may often be solved through (part) privatisation or corporatisation, 
whereby commercialisation is seen as a means of improving their investment capability and institutional 
efficiency. It is thought that ATS organisations become more competitive with such status and that 
they do not possess the apparent hindrances associated with being government departments. Similarly, 
ATS providers are encouraged by ICAO to partake in “international co-operation in the provision and 
operation of air navigation services where this is beneficial for the providers and users concerned”. 
Thus, changing the structure of ATS providers can reduce adverse institutional issues. Ultimately, 
mixed opinion exists about where Air Navigation Services (ANS) will be at the end of this decade in 
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terms of CNS/ATM technologies and procedures. This particularly applies to when the satellite-based 
systems will replace ground-based aids, noting that there will be greater advances in some nations and 
regions than others. Indeed, concepts such as Free Flight per se will be more applicable to specific 
types of airspace. Nonetheless, it may be observed that the present dilemmas would not exist if the 
future air navigation systems had already been sufficiently applied around the world. However, many 
technologies and procedures are nearly ready for mainstream implementation, advances have been 
made with datalink applications and satellite-based communications facilities, GPS enhanced navigation 
procedures in all flight phases are becoming more mature, while the concept of RNP is aiding airspace 
planning and facilitating adherence to standards in many regions. Correspondingly, the success of 
surveillance systems, such as ADS and ADS-B, is encouraging, and enhanced ATM procedures, such as 
automated sequencing tools and dynamic aircraft re-routing, are currently operational. Therefore, it 
would appear that the evolution of ANS is at a crossroads and that this decade will witness profound 
changes, which will hopefully alleviate many of the existing air traffic problems. 
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Table 1 – Summary of Future Air Navigation Systems [ATC-1] 
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CHAPTER 2 
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
 
 
 
 
Every National Airspace System (NAS) is the network of: air navigation facilities, equipment, 
services, airports or landing areas, aeronautical charts, information/services, rules, regulations, 
procedures, technical information, manpower, and material. Included are system components shared 
jointly with the military. The system’s present configuration is a reflection of the technological advances 
concerning the speed and altitude capability of jet aircraft, as well as the complexity of microchip and 
satellite-based navigation equipment. To conform to international aviation standards, every country 
adopted the primary elements of the classification system developed by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). 
This chapter discusses also airspace classification; en route, terminal, approach procedures, and 
operations within every NAS. It will cover the communication equipment, communication procedures, 
and air traffic control (ATC) facilities and services available for a flight under instrument flight rules 
(IFR) in the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Since no single procedure can be outlined that is applicable to the planning and preparation 
involved with all flights conducted  under instrument flight rules (IFR). Once you’ll have understood 
the overall operation of IFR flight, the many procedural details can be put into the appropriate 
sequence. Hence, this chapter explains also the sources for flight planning, the conditions associated 
with instrument flight, and the procedures used for each phase of IFR flight: departure, en route, and 
approach. 
 
1 AIRSPACE CLASSIFICATION 
 
Airspace is internationally designated as follows (Figure 1 and Table 1): 
 
Class A—Generally, that airspace from 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) up to and including flight 
level (FL) 600, including the airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles (NM) of the coast of 
the 48 contiguous states and Alaska. Unless otherwise authorized, all pilots must operate their aircraft 
under instrument flight rules (IFR). 
Class B—Generally, that airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL surrounding the nation’s busiest 
airports in terms of airport operations or passenger enplanements. The configuration of each Class B 
airspace area is individually tailored and consists of a surface area and two or more layers (some Class B 
airspace areas resemble upside-down wedding cakes), and is designed to contain all published 
instrument procedures once an aircraft enters the airspace. An air traffic control (ATC) clearance is 
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required for all aircraft to operate in the area, and all aircraft that are so cleared receive separation 
services within the airspace. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Airspace Classification 
 
 
Table 1 – Airspace Classification 
 
Class C—Generally, that airspace from the surface to 4,000 feet above the airport elevation (charted in 
MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower, are serviced by a radar 
approach control, and have a certain number of IFR operations or passenger enplanements. Although 
  
XIX ciclo di Dottorato in Ingegneria Elettrica 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA 
 
 2-3
 
the configuration of each Class C area is individually tailored, the airspace usually consists of a surface 
area with a 5 NM radius, an outer circle with a 10 NM radius that extends from 1,200 feet to 4,000 feet 
above the airport elevation and an outer area. Each person must establish two way radio 
communications with the ATC facility providing air traffic services prior to entering the airspace and 
thereafter maintain those communications while within the airspace. 
Class D—Generally, that airspace from the surface to 2,500 feet above the airport elevation (charted in 
MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower. The configuration of each 
Class D airspace area is individually tailored and when instrument procedures are published, the 
airspace will normally be designed to contain the procedures. Arrival extensions for instrument 
approach procedures (IAPs) may be Class D or Class E airspace. Unless otherwise authorized, each 
person must establish two-way radio communications with the ATC facility providing air traffic 
services prior to entering the airspace and thereafter maintain those communications while in the 
airspace. 
Class E—Generally, if the airspace is not Class A, Class B, Class C, or Class D, and it is controlled 
airspace, it is Class E airspace. Class E airspace extends upward from either the surface or a designated 
altitude to the overlying or adjacent controlled airspace. When designated as a surface area, the airspace 
will be configured to contain all instrument procedures. Also in this class are airways, airspace 
beginning at either 700 or 1,200 feet above ground level (AGL) used to transition to and from the 
terminal or en route environment, en route domestic, and offshore airspace areas designated below 
18,000 feet MSL.  
Class G—That airspace not designated as Class A, B, C, D, or E. Class G airspace is essentially 
uncontrolled by ATC except when associated with a temporary control tower. 
 
1.1 SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE 
 
Special use airspace is the designation for airspace in which certain activities must be confined, 
or where limitations may be imposed on aircraft operations that are not part of those activities. Certain 
special use airspace areas can create limitations on the mixed use of airspace. The special use airspace 
depicted on instrument charts includes the area name or number, effective altitude, time and weather 
conditions of operation, the controlling agency, and the chart panel location. 
On National Aeronautical Charting Office (NACO) en route charts, this information is available on the 
panel opposite the air/ground (A/G) voice communications.  
Prohibited areas contain airspace of defined dimensions within which the flight of aircraft is 
prohibited. Such areas are established for security or other reasons associated with the national welfare. 
These areas are published in the Federal Register and are depicted on aeronautical charts. The area is 
charted as a “P” with a number (e.g., “P-123”). As the name implies, flight through this airspace is not 
permitted. 
Restricted areas are areas where operations are hazardous to non participating aircraft and contain 
airspace within which the flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is subject to restrictions. 
Activities within these areas must be confined because of their nature, or limitations imposed upon 
aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities, or both. Restricted areas denote the existence 
of unusual, often invisible, hazards to aircraft (e.g., artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or guided missiles). 
IFR flights may be authorized to transit the airspace and are routed accordingly. Penetration of 
restricted areas without authorization from the using or controlling agency may be extremely hazardous 
to the aircraft and its occupants. ATC facilities apply the following procedures when aircraft are 
operating on an IFR clearance (including those cleared by ATC to maintain visual flight rules (VFR)-
On-Top) via a route that lies within joint-use restricted airspace: 
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1. If the restricted area is not active and has been released to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), the ATC facility will allow the aircraft to operate in the restricted airspace without issuing 
specific clearance for it to do so. 
2. If the restricted area is active and has not been released to the FAA, the ATC facility will issue a 
clearance which will ensure the aircraft avoids the restricted airspace.  
Restricted areas are charted with an “R” followed by a number (e.g., “R-5701”) and are depicted on the 
en route chart appropriate for use at the altitude or FL being flown. 
Warning areas are similar in nature to restricted areas; however, the government does not have 
sole jurisdiction over the airspace. The purpose of such areas is to warn non participating pilots of the 
potential danger. A warning area may be located over domestic or international waters or both. The 
airspace is designated with a “W” and a number (e.g., “W-123”). 
Military operations areas (MOAs) consist of airspace of defined vertical and lateral limits 
established for the purpose of separating certain military training activities from IFR traffic. Whenever 
an MOA is being used, non participating IFR traffic may be cleared through an MOA if IFR separation 
can be provided by ATC. Otherwise, ATC will reroute or restrict non participating IFR traffic. MOAs 
are depicted on sectional, VFR terminal area, and en route low altitude charts and are named rather 
than numbered (e.g., “Boardman MOA”). 
Alert areas are depicted on aeronautical charts with an “A” and a number (e.g., “A-123”) to 
inform non participating pilots of areas that may contain a high volume of pilot training or an unusual 
type of aerial activity. Pilots should exercise caution in alert areas. All activity within an alert area shall 
be conducted in accordance with regulations, without waiver, and pilots of participating aircraft, as well 
as pilots transiting the area shall be equally responsible for collision avoidance. 
Military Training Routes (MTRs) are routes used by military aircraft to maintain proficiency in 
tactical flying. These routes are usually established below 10,000 feet MSL for operations at speeds in 
excess of 250 knots. Some route segments may be defined at higher altitudes for purposes of route 
continuity. Routes are identified as IFR (IR), and VFR (VR), followed by a number. MTRs with no 
segment above 1,500 feet AGL are identified by four number characters (e.g., IR1206, VR1207, etc.). 
MTRs that include one or more segments above 1,500 feet AGL are identified by three number 
characters (e.g., IR206, VR207, etc.). IFR Low Altitude En Route Charts depict all IR routes and all VR 
routes that accommodate operations above 1,500 feet AGL. IR routes are conducted in accordance 
with IFR regardless of weather conditions. 
Temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) are put into effect when traffic in the airspace would endanger 
or hamper air or ground activities in the designated area. For example, a forest fire, chemical accident, 
flood, or disaster-relief effort could warrant a TFR, which would be issued as a Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM). 
National Security Areas (NSAs) consist of airspace of defined vertical and lateral dimensions 
established at locations where there is a requirement for increased security and safety of ground 
facilities. Flight in NSAs may be temporarily prohibited by regulation under the provisions of Title 14 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 99, and prohibitions will be disseminated via 
NOTAM. 
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1.2 AIRWAYS 
 
The primary navigational aid (NAVAID) for routing aircraft operating under IFR is the airways 
system. Each airway is based on a centreline that extends from one NAVAID or intersection to 
another NAVAID specified for that airway. An airway includes the airspace within parallel boundary 
lines 4 NM to each side of the centreline. As in all instrument flight, courses are magnetic, and 
distances are in NM. The airspace of an airway has a floor of 1,200 feet AGL, unless otherwise 
specified. An airway does not include the airspace of a prohibited area.  
Victor airways include the airspace extending from 1,200 feet AGL up to, but not including 
18,000 feet MSL. The airways are designated on sectional and IFR low altitude en route charts with the 
letter “V” followed by a number (e.g., “V23”). Typically, Victor airways are given odd numbers when 
oriented north/south and even numbers when oriented east/west. If more than one airway coincides 
on a route 
segment, the numbers are listed serially (e.g., “V287-495-500”).  
Jet routes exist only in Class A airspace, from 18,000 feet MSL to FL450, and are depicted on 
high-altitude en route charts. The letter “J” precedes a number to label the airway (e.g., J12). 
Preferred IFR routes have been established between major terminals to guide pilots in planning 
their routes of flight, minimizing route changes and aiding in the orderly management of air traffic on 
airways. Low and high altitude preferred routes are listed in the Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD). 
Tower En Route Control (TEC) is an ATC program that uses overlapping approach control radar 
services to provide IFR clearances. By using TEC, you are routed by airport control towers. Some 
advantages include abbreviated filing procedures, fewer delays, and reduced traffic separation 
requirements. TEC is dependent upon the ATC’s workload and the procedure varies among locales. 
The latest version of Advisory Circular (AC) 90-91, National Route Program, provides guidance to 
users of the NAS for participation in the National Route Program (NRP). All flights operating at or 
above FL290 are eligible to participate in the NRP, the primary purpose of which is to allow operators 
to plan minimum time/ cost routes that may be off the prescribed route structure. NRP aircraft are not 
subject to route-limiting restrictions (e.g., published preferred IFR routes) beyond a 200 NM radius of 
their point of departure or destination. 
 
2 AIR TRAFFIC PUBLICATIONS 
 
2.1 IFR EN ROUTE CHARTS 
 
The objective of IFR en route flight is to navigate within the lateral limits of a designated airway 
at an altitude consistent with the ATC clearance. Your ability to fly instruments in the system, safely 
and competently, is greatly enhanced by understanding the vast array of data available to the pilot 
within the instrument charts. The NACO maintains the database and produces the charts for the U.S. 
government. En route high-altitude charts provide aeronautical information for en route instrument 
navigation (IFR) at or above 18,000 feet MSL. Information includes the portrayal of jet routes, 
identification and frequencies of radio aids, selected airports, distances, time zones, special use airspace, 
and related information. Established routes from 18,000 feet MSL to FL450 use NAVAIDs not more 
than 260 NM apart. Scales vary from 1 inch = 45 NM to 1 inch = 18 NM. The charts are revised every 
56 days. 
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To effectively depart from one airport and navigate en route under instrument conditions you 
need the appropriate IFR en route low-altitude chart(s). The IFR low altitude en route chart is the 
instrument equivalent of the sectional chart. When folded, the cover of the NACO en route chart 
displays a map of the U.S. showing the coverage areas. Cities near congested airspace are shown in 
black type and their associated area chart is listed in the box in the lower left-hand corner of the map 
coverage box. Also noted is the highest off-route obstruction clearance altitude. The effective date of 
the chart is printed on the other side of the folded chart. Information concerning MTRs are also 
included on the chart cover. Scales vary from 1 inch = 5 NM to 1 inch = 20 NM. The en route charts 
are revised every 56 days. When the NACO en route chart is unfolded, the legend is displayed and 
provides information concerning airports, NAVAIDs, air traffic services, and airspace. 
Area navigation (RNAV) routes, including routes using global positioning system (GPS) for 
navigation, are not normally depicted on IFR en route charts. However, a number of RNAV routes 
have been established in the high-altitude structure and are depicted on the RNAV en route high 
altitude charts. RNAV instrument departure procedures (DPs) and standard terminal arrival routes 
(STARs) are contained in the U.S. Terminal Procedures booklets. The Graphic Notices and 
Supplemental Data also contains a tabulation of RNAV routes. 
In addition to the published routes, one may fly a random RNAV route under IFR if it is 
approved by ATC. Random RNAV routes are direct routes, based on area navigation capability, 
between waypoints defined in terms of latitude/longitude coordinates, degree-distance fixes, or offsets 
from established routes/airways at a specified distance and direction. 
Radar monitoring by ATC is required on all random RNAV routes. These routes can only be 
approved in a radar environment. Factors that will be considered by ATC in approving random RNAV 
routes include the capability to provide radar  monitoring, and compatibility with traffic volume and 
flow. ATC will radar monitor each flight; however, navigation on the random RNAV route is the 
responsibility of the pilot. 
Reliance on RNAV systems for instrument approach operations is becoming more 
commonplace as new systems, such as GPS and wide area augmentation system (WAAS) are developed 
and deployed. In order to foster and support full integration of RNAV into the NAS, the FAA has 
developed a charting format for RNAV approach charts. 
 
2.2 AIRPORT INFORMATION 
 
Airport information is provided in the legend, and the symbols used for the airport name, 
elevation, and runway length are  similar to the sectional chart presentation. Instrument approaches can 
be found at airports with blue or green symbols, while the brown airport symbol denotes airports that 
do not have approved instrument approaches. Asterisks are used to indicate the part-time nature of 
tower operations, lighting facilities, and airspace classifications (consult the communications panel on 
the chart for primary radio frequencies and hours of operation). The asterisk could also indicate that 
approaches are not permitted during the non-operating hours, and/or filing as an alternate is not 
approved during specified hours. A box after an airport name with a “C” or “D” inside indicates Class 
C and D airspace, respectively. 
 
2.3 TERMINAL PROCEDURES PUBLICATIONS 
 
While the en route charts provide the information necessary to safely transit broad regions of 
airspace, the Terminal Procedures Publication (TPP) enables pilots to guide their aircraft into airports. 
Terminal routes feed aircraft to a point where IAPs can be flown to a minimum altitude for landing. 
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Whether for departing or arriving, these procedures exist to make the controllers’ and pilots’ jobs safer 
and more efficient. Available in booklets by region (published by the NACO), the TPP includes 
approach procedures, arrival and DPs, and airport diagrams. 
 
2.4 DEPARTURE PROCEDURES (DPS) 
 
Departure procedures (DPs) provide obstacle clearance protection to aircraft in instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC), while reducing communications and departure delays. DPs are 
published in text and/or charted graphic form. Regardless of the format, all DPs provide a way to 
depart the airport and transition to the en route structure safely. When available, pilots are strongly 
encouraged to file and fly a DP at night, during marginal visual meteorological conditions (VMC), and 
IMC. All DPs provide obstacle clearance provided the aircraft crosses the end of the runway at least 35 
feet AGL; climbs to 400 feet above airport elevation before turning; and climbs at least 200 feet per 
nautical mile (FPNM), unless a higher climb gradient is specified to the assigned altitude. ATC may 
vector an aircraft off a previously assigned DP; however, the 200 FPNM or the FPNM specified in the 
DP, is required. Textual DPs are listed by airport in the IFR Take-Off Minimums and Departure 
Procedures Section, Section C, of the TPP. Graphic DPs are depicted in the TPP following the 
approach procedures for the airport.  
 
2.5 STANDARD TERMINAL ARRIVAL ROUTES (STARS) 
 
Standard terminal arrival routes (STARs) depict prescribed routes to transition the instrument 
pilot from the en route structure to a fix in the terminal area from which an instrument approach can 
be conducted. If you do not have the appropriate STAR in your possession, you can write “No STAR” 
in the flight plan. However, if the controller is busy, you might be cleared along the same route and, if 
necessary, the controller will have you copy the entire text of the procedure. 
Textual DPs and STARs are listed alphabetically at the beginning of the NACO booklet, and 
graphic DPs (charts) are included after the respective airport’s IAP.  
 
2.6 INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES CHARTS (IAPS) 
 
The IAPs chart provides the method to descend and land safely in low visibility conditions. The 
FAA has established the IAPs after thorough analyses of obstructions, terrain features, and navigational 
facilities. Manoeuvres, including altitude changes, course corrections, and other limitations, are 
prescribed in the IAPs. The approach charts reflect the criteria associated with the Standard for 
Terminal Instrument Approach Procedures (TERPs), which prescribes standardized methods for use in 
designing instrument flight procedures. 
 
2.7 TERMINAL ARRIVAL AREA (TAA) 
 
The design objective of the Terminal Arrival Area (TAA) procedure is to provide a transition 
method for arriving aircraft with GPS/RNAV equipment. TAAs will also eliminate or reduce the need 
for feeder routes, departure extensions, and procedure turns or course reversal. The TAA is controlled 
airspace established in conjunction with the standard or modified RNAV approach configurations. 
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The standard TAA has three areas: straight-in, left base, and right base. The arc boundaries of 
the three areas of the TAA are published portions of the approach and allow aircraft to transition from 
the en-route structure direct to the nearest IAF. When crossing the boundary of each of these areas or 
when released by ATC within the area, the pilot is expected to proceed direct to the appropriate 
waypoint IAF for the approach area being flown. A pilot has the option in all areas of proceeding 
directly to the holding pattern. 
The TAA provides the pilot and air traffic controller with an efficient method for routing traffic 
from the en-route to the terminal structure. The basic “T” contained in the TAA normally aligns the 
procedure on runway centreline, with the missed approach point (MAP) located at the threshold, the 
FAF 5 NM from the threshold, and the intermediate fix (IF) 5 NM from the FAF. 
In order to accommodate descent from a high en route altitude to the initial segment altitude, a 
hold in lieu of a procedure turn provides the aircraft with an extended distance for the necessary 
descent gradient. The holding pattern constructed for this purpose is always established on the centre 
IAF waypoint. Other modifications may be required for parallel runways, or due to operational 
requirements. When published, the RNAV chart will depict the TAA through the use of “icons” 
representing each TAA associated with the RNAV procedure. These icons will be depicted in the plan 
view of the approach plate, generally arranged on the chart in accordance with their position relative to 
the aircraft’s arrival from the en route structure. 
 
2.8 AIRPORT DIAGRAM 
 
The airport diagram, located on the bottom right side of the chart, includes many helpful 
features. IAPs for some of the larger airports devote an entire page to an airport diagram. Information 
concerning runway orientation, lighting, final approach bearings, airport beacon, and obstacles all serve 
to guide the pilot in the final phases of flight. The diagram shows the runway configuration in solid 
black, while the taxiways and aprons are shaded gray. Other runway environment features are shown, 
such as the runway identification, dimensions, magnetic heading, displaced threshold, arresting gear, 
usable length, and slope. The airport elevation is indicated in a separate box at the top of the airport 
diagram box. The touch down zone elevation (TDZE), which is the highest elevation within the first 
3,000 feet of the runway, is designated at the approach end of the procedure’s runway. Beneath the 
airport diagram is the time and speed table. The table provides the distance and the amount of time 
required to transit the distance from the FAF to the MAP for selected groundspeeds. The approach 
lighting systems and the visual approach lights are depicted on the approach chart. White on black 
symbols are used for identifying pilot-controlled lighting (PCL). Runway lighting aids are also noted 
(e.g., REIL, HIRL), as is the runway centreline lighting (RCL). 
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Figure 2 – Airport diagram legend 
 
2.9 RNAV INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHARTS 
 
Instrument approach charts are being converted to a charting format similar to the format 
developed for RNAV IAP. This format avoids unnecessary duplication and proliferation of instrument 
approach charts. The approach minimums for unaugmented GPS, Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS), Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), will be published on the same approach chart as 
lateral navigation/vertical navigation (LNAV/VNAV). Other types of equipment may be authorized to 
conduct the approach based on the minima notes in the front of the TPP approach chart books. 
Approach charts titled “RNAV RWY XX” may be used by aircraft with navigation systems that meet 
the required navigational performance (RNP) values for each segment of the approach. The chart may 
contain as many as four lines of approach minimums: Global landing system (GLS); WAAS and LAAS; 
LNAV/VNAV; LNAV; and circling. LNAV/VNAV is an instrument approach with lateral and vertical 
guidance with integrity limits similar to barometric vertical navigation (BARO VNAV). 
RNAV procedures that incorporate a final approach step-down fix may be published without 
vertical navigation, on a separate chart, also titled RNAV. During a transition period when GPS 
procedures are undergoing revision to a new title, both RNAV and GPS approach charts and formats 
will be published. ATC clearance for the RNAV procedure will authorize a properly-certificated pilot to 
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utilize any landing minimums for which the aircraft is certified. The RNAV chart will include formatted 
information required for quick pilot or flight crew reference located at the top of the chart. This 
portion of the chart was developed based on a study by the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre. 
Chart terminology will change slightly to support the new procedure types: 
1. DA replaces the term DH. DA conforms to the international convention where altitudes relate to 
MSL and heights relate to AGL. DA will eventually be published for other types of IAPs with vertical 
guidance, as well. DA indicates to the pilot that the published descent profile is flown to the DA 
(MSL), where a missed approach will be initiated if visual references for landing are not established. 
Obstacle clearance is provided to allow a momentary descent below DA while transitioning from the 
final approach to the missed approach. The aircraft is expected to follow the missed approach 
instructions while continuing along the published final approach course to at least the published 
runway threshold waypoint or MAP (if not at the threshold) before executing any turns. 
2. MDA will continue to be used for the LNAV-only and circling procedures. 
3. Threshold crossing height (TCH) has been traditionally used in precision approaches as the height of 
the glide slope above threshold. With publication of LNAV/VNAV minimums and RNAV descent 
angles, including graphically depicted descent profiles, TCH also applies to the height of the “descent 
angle,” or glidepath, at the threshold. Unless otherwise required for larger type aircraft which may be 
using the IAP, the typical TCH will be 30 to 50 feet. 
The minima format changes slightly: 
1. Each line of minima on the RNAV IAP will be titled to reflect the RNAV system applicable (e.g., 
GLS, LNAV/VNAV, and LNAV.) Circling minima will also be provided. 
2. The minima title box will also indicate the nature of the minimum altitude for the IAP. For example: 
DA will be published next to the minima line title for minimums supporting vertical guidance, and 
MDA will be published where the minima line supports only lateral guidance. During an approach 
where an MDA is used, descent below MDA is not authorized. 
3. Where two or more systems share the same minima, each line of minima will be displayed separately. 
 
3 NAVIGATION/COMMUNICATION (NAV/COM) EQUIPMENT 
 
Civilian pilots communicate with ATC on frequencies in the very high frequency (VHF) range 
between 118.000 and 136.975 MHz. To derive full benefit from the ATC system, radios capable of 25 
kHz spacing are required (e.g., 134.500, 134.575, 134.600, etc.). If ATC assigns a frequency that cannot 
be selected on your radio, one can ask for an alternative frequency. Many radios allow the pilot to have 
one or more frequencies stored in memory and one frequency active for transmitting and receiving 
(called simplex operation). It is possible to communicate with some automated flight service stations 
(AFSS) by transmitting on 122.1 MHz (selected on the communication radio) and receiving on a VHF 
omnidirectional range (VOR) frequency (selected on the navigation radio). This is called duplex 
operation. It should be necessary to select a receiver, communication or navigation, only when you 
want to monitor one communications frequency while communicating on another. One example is 
listening to automatic terminal information service (ATIS) on one receiver while communicating with 
ATC on the other. Monitoring a navigation receiver to check for proper identification is another reason 
to use the switch panel. Most audio switch panels also include a marker beacon receiver; all marker 
beacons transmit on 75 MHz, so there is no frequency selector. 
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3.1 RADAR AND TRANSPONDERS 
 
ATC radars have a limited ability to display primary returns, which is energy reflected from an 
aircraft’s metallic structure. Their ability to display secondary returns (transponder replies to ground 
interrogation signals) makes possible the many advantages of automation. A transponder is a radar 
beacon transmitter/receiver installed in the instrument panel. ATC beacon transmitters send out 
interrogation signals continuously as the radar antenna rotates. When an interrogation is received by a 
transponder, a coded reply is sent to the ground station where it is displayed on the controller’s scope. 
A “Reply” light on the transponder panel flickers every time it receives and replies to a radar 
interrogation. Transponder codes are assigned by ATC. When a controller asks the pilot to “ident” and 
you push the ident button, pilot’s return on the controller’s scope is intensified for precise identification 
of the flight. When requested, briefly push the ident button to activate this feature. It is good practice 
to verbally confirm you have changed codes or pushed the ident button. 
 
3.2 MODE C (ALTITUDE REPORTING) 
 
Primary radar returns indicate only range and bearing from the radar antenna to the target; 
secondary radar returns can display altitude Mode C on the control scope if the aircraft is equipped 
with an encoding altimeter or blind encoder. In either case, when the transponder’s function switch is 
in the ALT position the aircraft’s pressure altitude is sent to the controller. Adjusting the altimeter’s 
Kollsman window has no effect on the altitude read by the controller. Transponders must be ON at all 
times when operating in controlled airspace; altitude reporting is required by regulation in Class B and 
Class C airspace and inside of a 30-mile circle surrounding the primary airport in Class B airspace. 
Altitude reporting should also be ON at all times. 
 
3.3 COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES 
 
Clarity in communication is essential for a safe instrument flight. This requires pilots and 
controllers to use terms that are understood by both—the Pilot/Controller Glossary in the 
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) is the best source of terms and definitions. The AIM is revised 
twice a year and new definitions are added, so the Glossary should be reviewed frequently. Because 
clearances and instructions are comprised largely of letters and numbers, a phonetic pronunciation 
guide has been developed for both. Air traffic controllers must follow the guidance of the Air Traffic 
Control Manual when communicating with pilots. The manual presents the controller with different 
situations and prescribes precise terminology that must be used. This is advantageous for pilots, 
because once they have recognized a pattern or format they can expect future controller transmissions 
to follow that format. Controllers are faced with a wide variety of communication styles based on pilot 
experience, proficiency, and professionalism. 
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3.4 COMMUNICATION FACILITIES 
 
The controller’s primary responsibility is separation of aircraft operating under IFR. This is 
accomplished with ATC facilities which include the AFSS, airport traffic control tower (ATCT), 
terminal radar approach control (TRACON), and air route traffic control centre (ARTCC).  
 
3.4.1 AUTOMATED FLIGHT SERVICE STATIONS (AFSS) 
 
A pilot’s first contact with ATC will probably be through AFSS,  either by radio or telephone. 
AFSS’s provide pilot briefings, receives and processes flight plans, relays ATC clearances, originates 
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), and broadcasts aviation weather. Some facilities provide En Route 
Flight Advisory Service (EFAS), take weather observations, and so on. 
 
3.4.2 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWERS 
 
Several controllers in the tower cab will be involved in handling an instrument flight. Where 
there is a dedicated clearance delivery position, that frequency will be found in the A/FD and on the 
instrument approach chart for the departure airport. Where there is no clearance delivery position, the 
ground controller will perform this function. At the busiest airports, pre-taxi clearance is required; the 
frequency for pre-taxi clearance can be found in the A/FD. Taxi clearance should be requested not 
more than 10 minutes before proposed taxi time. Instrument clearances can be overwhelming if you try 
to copy them verbatim, but they follow a format that allows you to be prepared when you say “Ready 
to copy.” The format is: Clearance limit (usually the destination airport); Route, including any departure 
procedure; initial Altitude; Frequency (for departure control); and Transponder code. With the 
exception of the transponder code, pilots will know most of these items before engine start. 
One technique for clearance copying is writing C-R-A-F-T: 
 
C learance limit 
R oute (including DP, if any) 
A ltitude 
F requency 
T ransponder code. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Flight strip 
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Assume you are the pilot and you have filed an IFR flight plan from Seattle, Washington to 
Sacramento, California via V-23 at 7,000 feet. You note traffic is taking off to the north from Seattle-
Tacoma (Sea-Tac) airport and, by monitoring the clearance delivery frequency, you note the departure 
procedure being assigned to southbound flights. Your clearance limit will be the destination airport, so 
you can write “SAC” after the letter C. Write “SEATTLE TWO – V23” after R for Route, because you 
heard departure control issue this departure to other flights (you could also call the tower on the 
telephone to ask what departure is in use). Write “7” after the A, the departure control frequency 
printed on the approach charts for Sea-Tac after F, and leave the space after T blank—the transponder 
code is generated by computer and can seldom be determined in advance. Now call clearance delivery 
and report ready to copy. 
The last clearance received supersedes all previous clearances. For instance, if the DP says 
“Climb and maintain 2,000 feet, expect higher in 6 miles” and upon contacting the departure controller 
you hear “Climb and maintain 8,000 feet,” the 2,000-foot restriction has been cancelled. This rule 
applies in both terminal and Centre airspace. 
The “local” controller is responsible for operations in the Class D airspace and on the active 
runways. At some towers, designated as IFR towers, the local controller has vectoring authority. At 
visual flight rules (VFR) towers, the local controller accepts inbound IFR flights from the terminal 
radar facility and cannot provide vectors. The local controller also coordinates flights in the local area 
with radar controllers. Although Class D airspace normally extends 2,500 feet above field elevation, 
towers frequently release the top 500 feet to the radar controllers to facilitate overflights. Accordingly, 
when your flight is vectored over an airport at an altitude that appears to enter the tower controller’s 
airspace, there is no need for you to contact the tower controller—all coordination is handled by ATC. 
The departure radar controller may be in the same building as the control tower, but it is more 
likely that the departure radar position is remotely located. The tower controller will not issue a takeoff 
clearance until the departure controller issues a release. 
 
3.4.3 TERMINAL RADAR APPROACH CONTROL (TRACON) 
 
TRACONs are considered terminal facilities because they provide the link between the 
departure airport and the en route structure of the NAS. Terminal airspace normally extends 30 
nautical miles (NM) from the facility, with a vertical extent of 10,000 feet; however, dimensions vary 
widely. Class B and Class C airspace dimensions are provided on aeronautical charts. At terminal radar 
facilities the airspace is divided into sectors, each with one or more controllers, and each sector is 
assigned a discrete radio frequency. All terminal facilities are approach controls, and should be 
addressed as “Approach” except when directed to do otherwise (“Contact departure on 120.4”). 
Terminal radar antennas are located on or adjacent to the airport. Figure 4 shows a typical 
configuration. Terminal controllers can assign altitudes lower than published procedural altitudes called 
minimum vectoring altitudes (MVAs). These altitudes are not published and accessible to pilots, but are 
displayed at the controller’s position, as shown in Figure 5.  
After receiving and accepting a clearance and reporting ready for takeoff, a controller in the 
tower contacts the TRACON for a release—one will not be released until the departure controller can 
fit the flight into the departure flow. One may have to hold for release. When you receive takeoff 
clearance, the departure controller is aware of your flight and is waiting for your call. All of the 
information the controller needs is on the departure strip or the computer screen, so you need not 
repeat any portion of your clearance to that controller; simply establish contact with the facility when 
instructed to do so by the tower controller. The terminal facility computer will pick up your 
transponder and initiate tracking as soon as it detects the assigned code; for this reason, the 
transponder should remain on standby until takeoff clearance has been received. 
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Your aircraft will appear on the controller’s radar as a target with an associated data block that 
moves as your aircraft moves through the airspace. The data block includes aircraft identification, 
aircraft type, altitude, and airspeed. 
 
Figure 4 – Combined radar and beacon antenna 
 
 
Figure 5 – Minimum Vectoring Altitude Chart 
 
A TRACON controller uses Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) to detect primary targets and 
Automated Radar Terminal Systems (ARTS) to receive transponder signals; the two are combined on 
the controller’s scope. 
  
XIX ciclo di Dottorato in Ingegneria Elettrica 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA 
 
 2-15
 
 
 
Figure 6 – What the approach controller sees, from the  A-SMGCS console in tower 
 
At facilities with ASR-3 equipment, radar returns from precipitation are not displayed as varying 
levels of intensity, and controllers must rely on pilot reports and experience to provide weather 
avoidance information. With ASR-9 equipment, the controller can select up to six levels of intensity. 
Level 1 precipitation does not require avoidance tactics, but the presence of levels 2 or 3 should cause 
pilots to investigate further. The returns from higher levels of intensity may obscure aircraft data 
blocks, and controllers may select the higher levels only on pilot request. When you are uncertain about 
the weather ahead, ask the controller if  the facility can display intensity levels—pilots of small aircraft 
should avoid intensity levels 3 or higher. 
 
3.4.4 TOWER EN ROUTE CONTROL (TEC) 
 
At many locations, instrument flights can be conducted entirely in terminal airspace. These 
TEC routes are generally for aircraft operating below 10,000 feet, and they can be found in the A/FD. 
Pilots desiring to use TEC should include that designation in the remarks section of the flight plan. 
Pilots are not limited to the major airports at the city pairs listed in the A/FD. A valuable service 
provided by the automated radar equipment at terminal radar facilities is the Minimum Safe Altitude 
Warnings (MSAW). This equipment predicts your aircraft’s position in 2 minutes based on present path 
of flight—the controller will issue a safety alert if the projected path will encounter terrain or an 
obstruction. An unusually rapid descent rate on a nonprecision approach can trigger such an alert. 
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Figure 7 – Surface Movement Radar Display, Integrated with Approach and Multilateration 
 
3.4.5 AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTRES (ARTCC) 
 
Air route traffic control centre facilities are responsible for maintaining separation between IFR 
flights in the en route structure. Centre radars (Air Route Surveillance Radar) acquire and track 
transponder returns using the same basic technology as terminal radars. 
Earlier Centre radars display weather as an area of slashes (light precipitation) and H’s 
(moderate rainfall). Because the controller cannot detect higher levels of precipitation, pilots should be 
wary of areas showing moderate rainfall. Newer radar displays show weather as three levels of blue. 
Controllers can select the level of weather to be displayed. Weather displays of higher levels of intensity 
can make it difficult for controllers to see aircraft data blocks, so pilots should not expect ATC to keep 
weather displayed continuously. 
Centre airspace is divided into sectors in the same manner as terminal airspace; additionally, 
most Centre airspace is divided by altitudes into high and low sectors. Each sector has a dedicated team 
of controllers and a selection of radio frequencies, because each Centre has a network of remote 
transmitter/receiver sites. You will find all Centre frequencies in the back of the A/FD; they are also 
found on en route charts. 
Each ARTCC’s area of responsibility covers several states; as you fly from the vicinity of one 
remote communication site toward another, expect the same controller to talk to you on different 
frequencies. 
 
3.4.6 CENTRE APPROACH/DEPARTURE CONTROL 
 
The majority of airports with instrument approaches do not lie within terminal radar airspace, 
and when operating to or from these airports pilots will communicate directly with the Centre 
controller. Imagine to be a pilot. If you are departing a tower-controlled airport, the tower controller 
will provide instructions for contacting the appropriate Centre controller. When you depart an airport 
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without an operating control tower, your clearance will include instructions such as “Upon entering 
controlled airspace, contact Houston Centre on 126.5.” Pilots are responsible for terrain clearance until 
they reach the controller’s MVA. Simply hearing “Radar contact” is not sufficient to relieve pilots of 
this responsibility. 
If obstacles in the departure path require a steeper-than standard climb gradient (200 feet per 
NM), pilots should be so advised by the controller. However, they should check the departure airport 
listing in the A/FD to determine if there are trees or wires in the departure path just to be sure; when 
in doubt, ask the controller for the required climb gradient. 
A common clearance in these situations is “When able, proceed direct to the Astoria VOR…” 
The words “when able” mean to proceed when you can do so while maintaining terrain and 
obstruction clearance—they do not mean to proceed as soon as a signal suitable for navigation is 
received from the NAVAID. Using the standard climb gradient, you will be 2 miles from the departure 
end of the runway before it is safe to turn (400 feet above ground level (AGL)). When a Centre 
controller issues a heading, a direct route, or says “direct when able,” the controller becomes 
responsible for terrain and obstruction clearance. 
Another common Centre clearance is “Leaving (altitude) fly (heading) or proceed direct when 
able.” This keeps the terrain/obstruction clearance responsibility in the cockpit until above the 
minimum IFR altitude. A controller cannot issue an IFR clearance until you are above the minimum 
IFR altitude unless you are able to climb in VFR conditions. 
On a Centre controller’s scope, 1 NM is about 1/28 of an inch; when a Centre controller is 
providing Approach/Departure  control services at an airport many miles from the radar antenna, 
estimating headings and distances is very difficult. Controllers providing vectors to final must set the 
range on their scopes to not more than 125 NM; this is to provide the greatest possible accuracy for 
intercept headings. Accordingly, at locations more distant from a Centre radar antenna, pilots should 
expect a minimum of vectoring. 
 
4 CONTROL SEQUENCE 
 
The IFR system is flexible and accommodating if you have done your homework, have as many 
frequencies as possible written down before they are needed, and have an alternate in mind if your 
flight cannot be completed as planned. Pilots always have to know where the nearest VFR conditions 
can be found, and be prepared to head in that direction if your situation deteriorates. 
 
A typical IFR flight, with departure and arrival at airports with control towers, would use the ATC 
facilities and services in the following sequence: 
1. AFSS: Obtain a weather briefing for departure, destination and alternate airports, and en route 
conditions, then pilots have to file their flight plan. 
2. ATIS: Pre-flight complete, listen for present conditions and the approach in use. 
3. Clearance Delivery: Prior to taxiing, obtain departure clearance. 
4. Ground Control: Noting that you are IFR, receive taxi instructions. 
5. Tower: Pre-takeoff checks complete, receive clearance to takeoff. 
6. Departure Control: Once the transponder “tags up” with the ARTS, the tower controller will instruct 
to contact Departure to establish radar contact. 
7. ARTCC: After departing the departure controller’s airspace, aircrafts will be handed off to Centre 
who will coordinate the flight while en route. You may be in contact with multiple ARTCC facilities; 
they will coordinate the hand-offs. 
8. EFAS/HIWAS: Coordinate with ATC before leaving their frequency to obtain in-flight weather 
information. 
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9. ATIS: Coordinate with ATC before leaving their frequency to obtain ATIS information. 
10. Approach Control: Centre will hand you off to approach control where you will receive additional 
information and clearances. 
11. Tower: Once cleared for the approach, pilots will be instructed to contact tower control; the flight 
plan will be cancelled by the tower controller upon landing. 
 
4.1 IFR FLIGHT 
 
In addition to current IFR en route charts, area charts, and United States (U.S.) Terminal 
Procedures Publications (TPP) published by the National Aeronautical Charting Office (NACO), the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) publishes the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), the 
Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD), and the Notices to Airmen Publication (NTAP) for flight planning 
in the National Airspace System (NAS). Pilots should also consult the Pilot’s Operating 
Handbook/Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM) for flight planning information pertinent to the 
aircraft to be flown. 
 
4.1.1 AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL (AIM) 
 
The AIM provides the aviation community with basic flight information and air traffic control 
(ATC) procedures used in the U.S. NAS. An international version called the Aeronautical Information 
Publication contains parallel information, as well as specific information on the international airports 
used by the international community. 
 
4.1.2 AIRPORT/FACILITY DIRECTORY (A/FD) 
 
The A/FD contains information on airports, communications, and navigation aids pertinent to 
IFR flight. It also includes very-high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) receiver checkpoints, 
automated flight service station (AFSS), weather service telephone numbers, and air route traffic 
control centre (ARTCC) frequencies. Various special notices essential to IFR flight are also included, 
such as land and hold short (LAHSO) data, the civil use of military fields, continuous power facilities, 
and special flight procedures. 
In the major terminal and en route environments, preferred routes have been established to 
guide pilots in planning their routes of flight, to minimize route changes, and to aid in the orderly 
management of air traffic using the federal airways. The A/FD lists both high and low altitude 
preferred routes. 
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Table 2 – ATC facilities, services, and radio call signs 
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4.1.3 IFR FLIGHT PLAN 
 
As specified in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91, no person may 
operate an aircraft in controlled airspace under IFR unless that person has filed an IFR flight plan. 
Flight plans may be submitted to the nearest AFSS or air traffic control tower (ATCT) either in person, 
by telephone, by computer (using the direct user access terminal system (DUATS)), or by radio if no 
other means are available. Pilots should file IFR flight plans at least 30 minutes prior to estimated time 
of departure to preclude possible delay in receiving a departure clearance from ATC. The AIM 
provides guidance for completing and filing FAA Form 7233-1, Flight Plan. These forms are available 
at flight service stations (FSS’s), and are generally found in flight planning rooms at airport terminal 
buildings. Operating on an IFR flight plan to an airport with an operating control tower, your flight 
plan is cancelled automatically upon landing. 
 
4.1.4 CLEARANCES 
 
An ATC clearance allows an aircraft to proceed under specified traffic conditions within 
controlled airspace for the purpose of providing separation between known aircraft. Once the clearance 
is accepted, you are required to comply with ATC instructions. You may request a clearance different 
from that issued if you consider another course of action more practicable or if your aircraft equipment 
limitations or other considerations make acceptance of the clearance inadvisable. 
Pilots should also request clarification or amendment, as appropriate, any time a clearance is not fully 
understood or considered unacceptable because of safety of flight. The pilot is responsible for 
requesting an amended clearance if ATC issues a clearance that would cause a pilot to deviate from a 
rule or regulation or would place the aircraft in jeopardy. 
 
Clearance Separations: ATC will provide the pilot on an IFR clearance with separation from other IFR 
traffic. This separation is provided: 
1. Vertically—by assignment of different altitudes. 
2. Longitudinally—by controlling time separation between aircraft on the same course. 
3. Laterally—by assignment of different flight paths. 
4. By radar—including all of the above. 
 
ATC does not provide separation for an aircraft operating: 
1. Outside controlled airspace; 
2. On an IFR clearance: 
a. With “VFR-On-Top” authorized instead of a specific assigned altitude. 
b. Specifying climb or descent in “VFR conditions.” 
c. At any time in VFR conditions, since uncontrolled VFR flights may be operating in the same 
airspace. 
 
In addition to heading and altitude assignments, ATC will occasionally issue speed adjustments to 
maintain the required separations. At times, ATC may also employ visual separation techniques to keep 
aircraft safely separated. A pilot who obtains visual contact with another aircraft may be asked to 
maintain visual separation or to follow the aircraft. 
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In the absence of radar contact, ATC will rely on position reports to assist in maintaining proper 
separation. Using the data transmitted by the pilot, the controller follows the progress of your flight. 
ATC must correlate your reports with all the others to provide separation; therefore, the accuracy of 
your reports can affect the progress and safety of every other aircraft operating in the area on an IFR 
flight plan. 
 
4.1.5 DEPARTURE PROCEDURES (DPS) 
 
DPs are designed to expedite clearance delivery, to facilitate transition between takeoff and en 
route operations, and to ensure adequate obstacle clearance. They furnish pilots’ departure routing 
clearance information in both graphic and textual form. To simplify clearances, DPs have been 
established for the most frequently used departure routes in areas of high traffic activity. A DP will 
normally be used where such departures are available, since this is advantageous to both users and 
ATC. 
 
4.1.6 RADAR CONTROLLED DEPARTURES 
 
On IFR departures from airports in congested areas, one will normally receive navigational 
guidance from departure control by radar vector. When departure is to be vectored immediately 
following takeoff, pilots will be advised before takeoff of the initial heading to be flown. This 
information is vital in the event one may experience a loss of two way radio communications during 
departure. The radar departure is normally simple. Following takeoff, you contact departure control on 
the assigned frequency when advised to do so by the control tower. At this time departure control 
verifies radar contact, and gives headings, altitude, and climb instructions to move you quickly and 
safely out of the terminal area. Fly the assigned headings and altitudes until the controller tells you your 
position with respect to the route given in your clearance, whom to contact next, and to “resume your 
own navigation”. Departure control will vector you to either a navigation facility or an en route 
position appropriate to your departure clearance, or you will be transferred to another controller with 
further radar surveillance capabilities.  
A radar controlled departure does not relieve you of your responsibilities as pilot in command. 
You should be prepared before takeoff to conduct your own navigation according to your ATC 
clearance, with navigation receivers checked and properly tuned. While under radar control, monitor 
your instruments to ensure that you are continuously oriented to the route specified in your clearance, 
and record the time over designated checkpoints. 
 
4.1.7 EN ROUTE PROCEDURES 
 
Procedures en route will vary according to the proposed route, the traffic environment, and the 
ATC facilities controlling the flight. Some IFR flights are under radar surveillance and controlled from 
departure to arrival and others rely entirely on pilot navigation. 
Where ATC has no jurisdiction, it does not issue an IFR clearance. It has no control over the flight; nor 
does the pilot have any assurance of separation from other traffic.  
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4.1.8 ATC REPORTS 
 
All pilots are required to report unforecast weather conditions or other information related to 
safety of flight to ATC. 
 
4.1.9 POSITION REPORTS 
 
Unless in radar contact with ATC, pilots are required to furnish a position report over certain 
reporting points. Position reports are required over each compulsory reporting point (shown on the 
chart as solid triangle figures) along the route being flown regardless of altitude, including those with a 
VFR-On-Top clearance. Along direct routes, reports are required of all IFR flights over each point 
used to define the route of flight. Reports at reporting points (shown as open triangle figures) are made 
only when requested by ATC. 
Position reports should include the following items: 
1. Identification. 
2. Position. 
3. Type of flight plan, if your report is made to an AFSS. 
4. The estimated time of arrival (ETA) over next reporting point. 
5. The name only of the next succeeding (required) reporting point along the route of flight. 
6. Pertinent remarks. 
En route position reports are submitted normally to the ARTCC controllers via direct 
controller-to-pilot communications channels, using the appropriate ARTCC frequencies listed on the 
en route chart. 
Whenever an initial Centre contact is to be followed by a position report, the name of the 
reporting point should be included in the call-up. This alerts the controller that such information is 
forthcoming. 
 
4.1.10 PLANNING THE DESCENT AND APPROACH 
 
ATC arrival procedures and cockpit workload are affected by weather conditions, traffic 
density, aircraft equipment, and radar availability. 
When landing at airports with approach control services and where two or more IAPs are 
published, you will be provided in advance of arrival with information on the type of approach to 
expect or if you will be vectored for a visual approach. This information will be broadcast either on 
automated terminal information service (ATIS) or by a controller. It will not be furnished when the 
visibility is 3 miles or better and the ceiling is at or above the highest initial approach altitude 
established for any low altitude IAP for the airport. 
The purpose of this information is to help you in planning arrival actions; however, it is not an 
ATC clearance or commitment and is subject to change. Fluctuating weather, shifting winds, blocked 
runway, etc., are conditions that may result in changes to the approach information you previously 
received. It is important to advise ATC immediately if you are unable to execute the approach, or if you 
prefer, another type of approach. 
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4.1.11 STANDARD TERMINAL ARRIVAL ROUTES (STARS) 
 
Standard terminal arrival routes have been established to simplify clearance delivery procedures 
for arriving aircraft at certain areas having high density traffic. A STAR serves a purpose parallel to that 
of a DP for departing traffic. 
The following points regarding STARs are important to remember: 
1. All STARs are contained in the TPP, along with the IAP charts for the destination airport. The AIM 
also describes STAR procedures. 
2. If the destination is a location for which STARs have been published, pilots may be issued a 
clearance containing 
a STAR whenever ATC deems it appropriate. Pilots must possess at least the approved textual 
description. 
3. It is pilot’s responsibility to either accept or refuse an issued STAR. If you do not wish to use a 
STAR, you should advise ATC by placing “NO STAR” in the remarks section of your filed flight plan 
or by advising ATC. 
4. If you accept a STAR in your clearance, you must comply with it. 
 
4.1.12 APPROACHES 
 
Compliance with Published Standard Instrument Approach Procedures shown on the approach charts 
provides necessary navigation guidance information for alignment with the final approach courses, as 
well as obstruction clearance. Under certain conditions, a course reversal manoeuvre or procedure turn 
may be necessary. However, this procedure is not authorized when: 
1. The symbol “NoPT” appears on the approach course on the plan view of the approach chart. 
2. Radar vectoring is provided to the final approach course. 
3. A holding pattern is published in lieu of a procedure turn. 
4. Executing a timed approach from a holding fix. 
5. Otherwise directed by ATC. 
 
4.1.13 INSTRUMENT APPROACHES TO CIVIL AIRPORTS 
 
Unless otherwise authorized, when an instrument letdown to an airport is necessary, pilots 
should use a standard IAP prescribed for that airport. IAPs are depicted on IAP charts and are found 
in the TPP. 
ATC approach procedures depend upon the facilities available at the terminal area, the type of 
instrument approach executed, and the existing weather conditions. The ATC facilities, navigation aids 
(NAVAIDs), and associated frequencies appropriate to each standard instrument approach are given 
on the approach chart. Individual charts are published for standard approach procedures associated 
with the following types of facilities: 
 
1. Non-directional beacon (NDB) 
2. Very-high frequency omni-directional range (VOR) 
3. Very-high frequency omni-directional range with distance measuring equipment (VORTAC or 
VOR/DME) 
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4. Localizer (LOC) 
5. Instrument landing system (ILS) 
6. Localizer-type directional aid (LDA) 
7. Simplified directional facility (SDF) 
8. Area navigation (RNAV) 
9. Global positioning system (GPS) 
 
An IAP can be flown in one of two ways: as a full approach or with the assistance of radar 
vectors. When the IAP is flown as a full approach, pilots conduct their own navigation using the routes 
and altitudes depicted on the instrument approach chart. A full approach allows the pilot to transition 
from the en route phase, to the instrument approach, and then to a landing with minimal assistance 
from ATC. This type of procedure may be requested by the pilot but is most often used in areas 
without radar coverage. A full approach also provides the pilot with a means of completing an 
instrument approach in the event of a communications failure. 
When an approach is flown with the assistance of radar vectors, ATC provides guidance in the 
form of headings and altitudes which positions the aircraft to intercept the final approach. From this 
point, the pilot resumes navigation, intercepts the final approach course, and completes the approach 
using the IAP chart. This is often a more expedient method of flying the approach, as opposed to the 
full approach, and allows ATC to sequence arriving traffic. A pilot operating in radar contact can 
generally expect the assistance of radar vectors to the final approach course. 
 
4.1.14 APPROACH TO AN AIRPORT WITH AN OPERATING TOWER, WITH 
AN APPROACH CONTROL 
 
Where radar is approved for approach control service, it is used to provide vectors in 
conjunction with published IAPs. Radar vectors can provide course guidance and expedite traffic to the 
final approach course of any established IAP. 
Approach control facilities that provide this radar service operate in the following manner: 
1. Arriving aircraft are either cleared to an outer fix most appropriate to the route being flown with 
vertical separation and, if required, given holding information; or, 
2. When radar hand-offs are effected between ARTCC and approach control, or between two approach 
control facilities, aircraft are cleared to the airport, or to a fix so located that the hand-off will be 
completed prior to the time the aircraft reaches the fix. 
a. When the radar hand-offs are utilized, successive arriving flights may be handed-off to approach 
control with radar separation in lieu of vertical separation. 
b. After hand-off to approach control, aircraft are vectored to the appropriate final approach course. 
3. Radar vectors and altitude/flight levels will be issued as required for spacing and separating aircraft; 
therefore, you must not deviate from the headings issued by approach control. 
4. You will normally be informed when it becomes necessary to vector you across the final approach 
course for spacing or other reasons. If you determine that approach course crossing is imminent and 
you have not been informed that you will be vectored across it, you should question the controller. You 
should not turn inbound on the final approach course unless you have received an approach clearance. 
Approach control will normally issue this clearance with the final vector for interception of the final 
approach course, and the vector will be such as to enable you to establish your aircraft on the final 
approach course prior to reaching the final approach fix. In the event you are already inbound on the 
final approach course, you will be issued approach clearance prior to reaching the final approach fix. 
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5. After you are established inbound on the final approach course, radar separation will be maintained 
between you and other aircraft, and you will be expected to complete the approach using the NAVAID 
designated in the clearance (ILS, VOR, NDB, GPS, etc.) as the primary means of navigation. 
6. After passing the final approach fix inbound, you are expected to proceed direct to the airport and 
complete the approach, or to execute the published missed approach procedure. 
7. Radar service is automatically terminated when the landing is completed or the tower controller has 
your aircraft in sight, whichever occurs first. 
 
4.1.15 RADAR APPROACHES 
 
With a radar approach, the pilot is “talked down” while a controller monitors the progress of 
the flight with radar. This is an option should the pilot experience an emergency or distress situation. 
These approaches require a radar facility and a functioning airborne radio. 
Initial radar contact for either a surveillance or precision approach radar (PAR) is made with 
approach control. Pilots must comply promptly with all instructions when conducting either type of 
procedure. They can determine the radar approach facilities (surveillance and/or precision) available at 
a specific airport by referring to the appropriate En route Low Altitude Chart and IAP chart. 
Surveillance and precision radar minimums are listed alphabetically by airport on pages with the 
heading, “Radar Instrument Approach Minimums”, in each TPP. Note that both straight-in and 
circling minimums are listed. 
When an instrument approach is being radar monitored, the radar advisories serve only as a 
secondary aid. Since pilots would have selected a NAVAID such as the ILS or VOR as the primary aid 
for the approach, the minimums listed on the approach chart apply. 
 
4.1.16 SURVEILLANCE APPROACH 
 
On an airport surveillance radar approach (ASR), the controller will vector the pilots to a point 
where they can begin a descent to the airport or to a specific runway. During the initial part of the 
approach, they will be given communications failure/missed approach instructions. Before they begin 
their descent, the controller will give them the published straight-in minimum descent altitude (MDA). 
Pilots will not be given the circling MDA unless they request it and tell the controller their aircraft 
category. 
During the final approach, the controller will provide navigational guidance in azimuth only. 
Guidance in elevation is not possible, but you will be advised when to begin descent to the MDA, or if 
appropriate, to the intermediate “step-down fix” MDA and subsequently to the prescribed MDA. In 
addition, you will be advised of the location of the missed approach point (MAP) and your position 
each mile from the runway, airport, or MAP as appropriate. If you so request, the controller will issue 
recommended altitudes each mile, based on the descent gradient established for the procedure, down to 
the last mile that is at or above the MDA. 
Pilots will normally be provided navigational guidance until they reach the MAP. The controller 
will terminate guidance and instruct you to execute a missed approach at the MAP, if at that point they 
do not have the runway or airport in sight, or if they are on a point-in-space approach in a helicopter, 
the prescribed visual reference with the surface is not established. If at any time during the approach 
the controller considers that safe guidance cannot be provided for the remainder of the approach, the 
approach will be terminated, and pilots will be instructed to execute a missed approach. Guidance 
termination and missed approach will be effected upon pilot request, and the controller may terminate 
guidance when the pilot reports the runway, airport/heliport, or visual surface route (point-in-space 
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approach) in sight or otherwise indicates that continued guidance is not required. Radar service is 
automatically terminated at the completion of the radar approach. 
 
4.1.17 PRECISION APPROACH 
 
The installations that have PAR are joint civil/military airports and usually provide service to 
civilian pilots flying IFR only with prior permission, except in an emergency.  
A PAR serves the same purpose as an ILS, except that guidance information is presented to the 
pilot through aural rather than visual means. If a PAR is available, it is normally aligned with an ILS. 
During a PAR approach, pilots are provided highly accurate guidance in both azimuth and elevation. 
The precision approach begins when the aircraft is within range of the precision radar and 
contact has been established with the PAR controller. Normally this occurs approximately 8 miles from 
touchdown, a point to which aircrafts  are vectored by surveillance radar or are positioned by a non-
radar approach procedure. Pilots will be given headings to fly, to direct them to, and to keep their 
aircraft aligned with, the extended centreline of the landing runway. 
Before intercepting the glidepath, you pilots be advised of communications failure/missed 
approach procedures and told not to acknowledge further transmissions. Pilots will be told to anticipate 
glidepath interception approximately 15 to 30 seconds before it occurs and when to start their descent. 
The published decision altitude/decision height (DA/DH) will be given only if you request it. 
During the final approach, the controller will give elevation information as “slightly/well 
above” or “ slightly/well below” glidepath, and course information as “slightly/well right” or 
“slightly/well left” of course. Extreme accuracy in maintaining and correcting headings and rate of 
descent is essential. The controller will assume the last assigned heading is being maintained and will 
base further corrections on this assumption. Range from touchdown is given at least once each mile. If 
the aircraft is observed by the controller to proceed outside of specified safety zone limits in azimuth 
and/or elevation and continue to operate outside these prescribed limits, the pilots will be directed to 
execute a missed approach or to fly a specified course unless they have the runway environment in 
sight. Pilots will be provided navigational guidance in azimuth and elevation to the DA/DH. Advisory 
course and glidepath information will be furnished by the controller until the aircraft passes over the 
runway threshold, at which point they will be advised of any deviation from the runway centreline. 
Radar service is automatically terminated at the completion of the approach. 
 
4.1.18 APPROACHES TO PARALLEL RUNWAYS 
 
Procedures permit ILS instrument approach operations to dual or triple parallel runway 
configurations. Parallel approaches are an ATC procedure that permits parallel ILS approaches to 
airports with parallel runways separated by at least 2,500 feet between centrelines. Wherever parallel 
approaches are in progress, pilots are informed that approaches to both runways are in use. 
Simultaneous approaches are permitted to runways: 
1. With centrelines separated by 4,300 to 9,000 feet; 
2. That are equipped with final monitor controllers; 
3. That require radar monitoring to ensure separation between aircraft on the adjacent parallel approach 
course. 
 
The approach procedure chart will include the note i.e. “simultaneous approaches authorized 
RWYS 14L and 14R”, identifying the appropriate runways. When advised that simultaneous parallel 
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approaches are in progress, pilots must advise approach control immediately of malfunctioning or 
inoperative components. 
Parallel approach operations demand heightened pilot situational awareness. The close 
proximity of adjacent aircraft conducting simultaneous parallel approaches mandates strict compliance 
with all ATC clearances and approach procedures. Pilots should pay particular attention to the 
following approach chart information: name and number of the approach, localizer frequency, inbound 
course, glide-slope intercept altitude, DA/DH, missed approach instructions, special notes/procedures, 
and the assigned runway location and proximity to adjacent runways. Pilots also need to exercise strict 
radio discipline, which includes continuous monitoring of communications and the avoidance of 
lengthy, unnecessary radio transmissions. 
 
4.1.19 SIDE‐STEP MANOEUVRE 
 
ATC may authorize a side-step manoeuvre to either one of two parallel runways that are 
separated by 1,200 feet or less, followed by a straight-in landing on the adjacent runway. Aircraft 
executing a side-step manoeuvre will be cleared for a specified nonprecision approach and landing on 
the adjacent parallel runway. For example, “Cleared ILS runway 7 left approach, side-step to runway 7 
right.” Pilots are expected to commence the side-step manoeuvre as soon as possible after the runway 
or runway environment is in sight. Landing minimums to the adjacent runway will be based on 
nonprecision criteria and therefore higher than the precision minimums to the primary runway, but will 
normally be lower than the published circling minimums. 
 
4.1.20 CIRCLING APPROACHES 
 
Landing minimums are listed on the approach chart under “CIRCLING.” Circling minimums 
apply when it is necessary to circle the airport or manoeuvre for landing, or when no straight-in 
minimums are specified on the approach chart like in Figure 8. 
The circling minimums published on the instrument approach chart provide a minimum of 300 
feet of obstacle clearance in the circling area. During a circling approach, pilots should maintain visual 
contact with the runway of intended landing and fly no lower than the circling minimums until they are 
in position to make a final descent for a landing. Remember—circling minimums are just that—
minimums. If the ceiling allows it, it is better to fly at an altitude that more nearly approximates the 
VFR traffic pattern altitude. This will make any manoeuvring safer and bring the view of the landing 
runway into a more normal perspective. 
Figure 9 shows patterns that can be used for circling approaches. Pattern “A” can be flown 
when your final approach course intersects the runway centreline at less than a 90° angle, and you sight 
the runway early enough to establish a base leg. If you sight the runway too late to fly pattern “A,” you 
can circle as shown in “B.” You can fly pattern “C” if it is desirable to land opposite the direction of 
the final approach, and the runway is sighted in time for a turn to downwind leg. If the runway is 
sighted too late for a turn to downwind, you can fly pattern “D.” Regardless of the pattern flown, the 
pilot must manoeuvre the aircraft so as to remain within the designated circling area.  
Sound judgment and knowledge of pilots’ capabilities and the performance of their aircraft are 
the criteria for determining the pattern to be flown in each instance, since they must consider all 
factors: airport design, ceiling and visibility, wind direction and velocity, final approach course 
alignment, distance from the final approach fix to the runway, and ATC instructions. 
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Figure 8 – Circling approach area radii 
 
 
Figure 9 – Circling approaches 
 
4.1.21 IAP MINIMUMS 
 
Pilots may not operate an aircraft at any airport below the authorized MDA or continue an 
approach below the authorized DA/DH unless: 
1. The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway 
can be made at a normal descent rate using normal manoeuvres; 
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2. The flight visibility is not less than that prescribed for the approach procedure being used; and 
3. At least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is visible and identifiable to 
the pilot: 
a. Approach light system 
b. Threshold 
c. Threshold markings 
d. Threshold lights 
e. Runway end identifier lights (REIL) 
f. Visual approach slope indicator (VASI) 
g. Touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings 
h. Touchdown zone lights 
i. Runway or runway markings 
j. Runway lights 
 
4.1.22 MISSED APPROACHES 
 
A missed approach procedure is formulated for each published instrument approach and allows 
the pilot to return to the airway structure while remaining clear of obstacles. The procedure is shown 
on the approach chart in text and graphic form. Since the execution of a missed approach occurs when 
your cockpit workload is at a maximum, the procedure should be studied and mastered before 
beginning the approach. When a MAP is initiated, a climb pitch attitude should be established while 
setting climb power. Pilots should configure the aircraft for climb, turn to the appropriate heading, 
advise ATC that they are executing a missed approach, and request further clearances. If the missed 
approach is initiated prior to reaching the MAP, unless otherwise cleared by ATC, pilots should 
continue to fly the IAP as specified on the approach plate to the MAP at or above the MDA or 
DA/DH before beginning a turn. 
If visual reference is lost while circling-to-land from an instrument approach, pilots should 
execute the appropriate MAP. They should make the initial climbing turn toward the landing runway 
and then manoeuvre to intercept and fly the missed approach course. 
Pilots should immediately execute the missed approach procedure: 
1. Whenever the requirements for operating below DA/DH or MDA are not met when the aircraft is 
below MDA, or upon arrival at the MAP and at any time after that until touchdown; 
2. Whenever an identifiable part of the airport is not visible to the pilot during a circling manoeuvre at 
or above MDA; 
3. When so directed by ATC. 
 
The missed approach procedures are related to the location of the FAF. When the FAF is not 
located on the field, the missed approach procedure will specify the distance from the facility to the 
MAP. The airport diagram on the IAP shows the time from the facility to the missed approach at 
various groundspeeds, which pilots must determine from airspeed, wind, and distance values. This time 
determines when they report and execute a missed approach if they do not have applicable minimums. 
Missed approach instructions will be provided prior to starting the final approach of either an ASR or 
PAR approach. 
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4.1.23 LANDING 
 
According to part 91, no pilot may land when the flight visibility is less than the visibility 
prescribed in the standard IAP being used. ATC will provide the pilot with the current visibility reports 
appropriate to the runway in use. This may be in the form of prevailing visibility, runway visual value 
(RVV), or runway visual range (RVR). However, only the pilot can determine if the flight visibility 
meets the landing requirements indicated on the approach chart. If the flight visibility meets the 
minimum prescribed for the approach, then the approach may be continued to a landing. If the flight 
visibility is less than that prescribed for the approach, then the pilot must execute a missed approach, 
regardless of the reported visibility. 
The landing minimums published on IAP charts are based on full operation of all components 
and visual aids associated with the instrument approach chart being used. Higher minimums are 
required with inoperative components or visual aids. For example, if the approach lighting system were 
inoperative, the visibility minimums for an ILS must be increased by one-quarter mile. If more than 
one component is inoperative, each minimum is raised to the highest minimum required by any single 
component that is inoperative. ILS glide-slope inoperative minimums are published on instrument 
approach charts as localizer minimums. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FUNDAMENTALS OF 
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides first of all an introduction to Navigation. Hence the basic radio principles 
applicable to navigation equipment, as well as an operational knowledge of how to use these systems in 
instrument flight. This information provides the framework for all instrument procedures, including 
departure procedures (DPs), holding patterns, and approaches, because each of these manoeuvres 
consist mainly of accurate attitude instrument flying and accurate tracking using navigation systems. 
They will be the basis of understanding navigation procedures on the ground. Navigation is the process 
of piloting an airplane from one geographic position to another while monitoring one’s position as the 
flight progresses. It introduces the need for planning, which includes plotting the course on an 
aeronautical chart, selecting checkpoints, measuring distances, obtaining pertinent weather information, 
and computing flight time, headings, and fuel requirements. The methods used in this chapter include 
pilotage—navigating by reference to visible landmarks, dead reckoning—computations of direction and 
distance from a known position, and radio navigation—by use of radio aids. 
 
1 POSITION IN SPACE AND TIME 
 
1.1 LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE (MERIDIANS ANS PARALLELS) 
 
The Equator is an imaginary circle equidistant from the poles of the Earth. Circles parallel to 
the Equator (lines running east and west) are parallels of latitude. They are used to measure degrees of 
latitude north or south of the Equator. The angular distance from the Equator to the pole is one-fourth 
of a circle or 90°. The arrows in Figure 1 labelled “LATITUDE” point to lines of latitude. Meridians of 
longitude are drawn from the North Pole  to the South Pole and are at right angles to the Equator. The 
“Prime Meridian” which passes through Greenwich, England, is used as the zero line from which 
measurements are made in degrees east and west to 180°. The arrows in Figure 1 labelled 
“LONGITUDE” point to lines of longitude. Any specific geographical point can thus be located by 
reference to its longitude and latitude. Washington, DC for example, is approximately 39° N. latitude, 
77° W. longitude. Chicago is approximately 42° N. latitude, 88°W. longitude. 
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Figure 1 – Meridians and parallels—the basis of measuring time, distance, and direction 
 
1.2 TIME ZONES 
 
The meridians are also useful for designating time zones. A day is defined as the time required 
for the Earth to make one complete rotation of 360°. Since the day is divided into 24 hours, the Earth 
revolves at the rate of 15° an hour. Noon is the time when the Sun is directly above a meridian; to the 
west of that meridian is morning, to the east is afternoon. In most aviation operations, time is 
expressed in terms of the 24-hour clock. Air traffic control instructions, weather reports and 
broadcasts, and estimated times of arrival are all based on this system. For example: 9 a.m. is expressed 
as 0900, 1 p.m. is 1300, and 10 p.m. is 2200. Because a pilot may cross several time zones during a 
flight, a standard time system has been adopted. It is called Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) and is 
often referred to as Zulu time. UTC is the time at the 0° line of longitude which passes through 
Greenwich, England. All of the time zones around the world are based on this reference. For daylight 
saving time, 1 hour should be subtracted from the calculated times. 
 
1.3 MEASUREMENT OF DIRECTION 
 
By using the meridians, direction from one point to another can be measured in degrees, in a 
clockwise direction from true north. To indicate a course to be followed in flight, draw a line on the 
chart from the point of departure to the destination and measure the angle which this line forms with a 
meridian. Direction is expressed in degrees, as shown by the compass rose in following Figure 2. 
Because meridians converge toward the poles, course measurement should be taken at a meridian near 
the midpoint of the course rather than at the point of departure. The course measured on the chart is 
known as the true course. This is the direction measured by reference to a meridian or true north. It is 
the direction of intended flight as measured in degrees clockwise from true north. 
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Figure 2 – Compass rose 
 
1.3.1 VARIATION 
 
Variation is the angle between true north and magnetic north [ATC-3]. It is expressed as east 
variation or west variation depending upon whether magnetic north (MN) is to the east or west of true 
north (TN). The north magnetic pole is located close to 71° N. latitude, 96° W. longitude and is about 
1,300 miles from the geographic or true north pole, as indicated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Isogonic chart 
 
In Figure 3, magnetic meridians are in black; geographic meridians and parallels are in blue. 
Variation is the angle between a magnetic and geographic meridian. If the Earth were uniformly 
magnetized, the compass needle would point toward the magnetic pole, in which case the variation 
between true north (as shown by the geographical meridians) and magnetic north (as shown by the 
magnetic meridians) could be measured at any intersection of the meridians. Actually, the Earth is not 
uniformly magnetized. In the United States, the needle usually points in the general direction of the 
magnetic pole, but it may vary in certain geographical localities by many degrees. Consequently, the 
exact amount of variation at thousands of selected locations in the United States has been carefully 
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determined. The amount and the direction of variation, which change slightly from time to time, are 
shown on most aeronautical charts as broken magenta lines, called isogonic lines, which connect points 
of equal magnetic variation. (The line connecting points at which there is no variation between true 
north and magnetic north is the agonic line.) An isogonic chart is shown in Figure 4. Minor bends and 
turns in the isogonic and agonic lines are caused by unusual geological conditions affecting magnetic 
forces in these areas. Because courses are measured in reference to geographical meridians which point 
toward true north, and these courses are maintained by reference to the compass which points along a 
magnetic meridian in the general direction of magnetic north, the true direction must be converted into 
magnetic direction for the purpose of flight. This conversion is made by adding or subtracting the 
variation which is indicated by the nearest isogonic line on the chart. The true heading, when corrected 
for variation, is known as magnetic heading. 
 
 
Figure 4 – A typical isogonic chart 
 
In Figure 4, the black lines are isogonic lines which connect geographic points with identical 
magnetic variation. Remember, to convert true course or heading to magnetic course or heading, note 
the variation shown by the nearest isogonic line. If variation is west, add; if east, subtract. One method 
for remembering whether to add or subtract variation is the phrase “east is least (subtract) and west is 
best (add).” 
 
1.3.2 DEVIATION 
 
Determining the magnetic heading is an intermediate step necessary to obtain the correct 
compass heading for the flight. To determine compass heading, a correction for deviation [ATC-3] 
must be made. Because of magnetic influences within the airplane such as electrical circuits, radio, 
lights, tools, engine, and magnetized metal parts, the compass needle is frequently deflected from its 
normal reading. This deflection is deviation. The deviation is different for each airplane, and it also may 
vary for different headings in the same airplane. For instance, if magnetism in the engine attracts the 
north end of the compass, there would be no effect when the plane is on a heading of magnetic north. 
On easterly or westerly headings, however, the compass indications would be in error, as shown in 
Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 – Effect of variation on the compass 
 
 
Figure 6 – Magnetized portions of the airplane cause the compass to deviate from its normal indications 
 
Magnetic attraction can come from many other parts of the airplane; the assumption of 
attraction in the engine is merely used for the purpose of illustration. Some adjustment of the compass, 
referred to as compensation, can be made to reduce this error, but the remaining correction must be 
applied by the pilot. Proper compensation of the compass is best performed by a competent technician. 
Since the magnetic forces within the airplane change, because of landing shocks, vibration, mechanical 
work, or changes in equipment, the pilot should occasionally have the deviation of the compass 
checked. The procedure used to check the deviation (called “swinging the compass”) is briefly outlined. 
The airplane is placed on a magnetic compass rose, the engine started, and electrical devices normally 
used (such as radio) are turned on. Tail wheel-type airplanes should be jacked up into flying position. 
The airplane is aligned with magnetic north indicated on the compass rose and the reading shown on 
the compass is recorded on a deviation card. The airplane is then aligned at 30° intervals and each 
reading is recorded. If the airplane is to be flown at night, the lights are turned on and any significant 
changes in the readings are noted. If so, additional entries are made for use at night. The accuracy of 
the compass can also be checked by comparing the compass reading with the known runway headings. 
The following method is used by many pilots to determine compass heading: After the true 
course (TC) is measured, and wind correction applied resulting in a true heading (TH), the sequence 
TH ± variation (V) = MH ± deviation (D) = compass heading (CH) is followed to arrive at compass 
heading. 
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Figure 7 – Relationship between true, magnetic, and compass headings for a particular instance 
 
2 RADIO WAVES 
 
2.1 GROUND RADIO WAVE 
 
The ground wave travels across the surface of the Earth. You can best imagine the ground 
wave’s path as being in a tunnel or alley bounded by the surface of the Earth and by the ionosphere, 
which keeps it from going out into space. Generally, the lower the frequency, the farther the signal will 
travel. 
Ground waves are usable for navigation purposes because they reliably and predictably travel 
the same route, day after day, and are not influenced by too many outside factors. The ground wave 
frequency range is generally from the lowest frequencies in the radio range (perhaps as low as 100 Hz) 
up to approximately 1,000 kHz (1 MHz). Although there is a ground wave component to frequencies 
above this, even to 30 MHz, the ground wave at these higher frequencies loses strength over very short 
distances. 
 
2.2 SKY RADIO WAVE 
The sky wave, at frequencies of 1 to 30 MHz, is good for long distances because these 
frequencies are refracted or “bent” by the ionosphere, causing the signal to be sent back to Earth from 
high in the sky and received great distances away, as shown in Figure 8. 
Used by high frequency (HF) radios in aircraft, messages can be sent across oceans using only 
50 to 100 watts of power. Frequencies that produce a sky wave are not used for navigation because the 
pathway of the signal from transmitter to receiver is highly variable. The wave is “bounced” off of the 
ionosphere, which is always changing due to the varying amount of the sun’s radiation reaching it 
(night/day and seasonal variations, sunspot activity, etc.). The sky wave is not reliable for navigation 
purposes. 
For aeronautical communication purposes, the sky wave (HF) is about 80 to 90 percent reliable. 
HF is being gradually replaced by satellite communication which is more reliable. 
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Figure 8 – Ground, space, and sky wave propagation [ATC-3] 
 
2.3 SPACE WAVE 
Radio waves of 15 MHz and above (all the way up to many GHz), when able to pass through 
the ionosphere, are considered space waves. Most navigation systems operate with their signals 
propagating as space waves. Frequencies above 100 MHz have nearly no ground or sky wave 
components. They are space waves, but (except for global positioning system (GPS)) the navigation 
signal is used before it reaches the ionosphere so the effect of the ionosphere, which can cause some 
propagation errors, is minimal. GPS errors caused by passage through the ionosphere are significant 
and are corrected for by the GPS receiver system. Space waves have another characteristic of concern 
to users. Space waves reflect off hard objects and may be blocked if the object is between the 
transmitter and the receiver. Site and terrain error, as well as propeller/rotor modulation error in very-
high omnidirectional range (VOR) systems is caused by this bounce. Instrument landing system (ILS) 
course distortion is also the result of this phenomenon, which led to the need for establishment of ILS 
critical areas. 
Generally, space waves are “line of sight” receivable, but those of lower frequencies will “bend” 
over the horizon somewhat. Since the VOR signal at 108 to 118 MHz is a lower frequency than 
distance measuring equipment (DME) at 962 to 1213 MHz, when an aircraft is flown “over the 
horizon” from a VOR/DME station, the DME will normally be the first to stop functioning. 
 
2.4 DISTURBANCES TO RADIO WAVE RECEPTION 
 
Static distorts the radio wave and interferes with normal reception of communications and 
navigation signals. Low frequency airborne equipment such as automatic direction finder (ADF) and 
long range navigation (LORAN) are particularly subject to static disturbance. Using very-high 
frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) frequencies avoids many of the discharge noise 
effects. Static noise heard on navigation or communication radio frequencies may be a warning of 
interference with navigation instrument displays. Some [ATC-3] of the problems caused by 
precipitation static (P-static) are: 
• Complete loss of VHF communications. 
• Erroneous magnetic compass readings. 
• Aircraft flies with one wing low while using the autopilot. 
• High-pitched squeal on audio. 
• Motorboat sound on audio. 
• Loss of all avionics. 
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• Very-low frequency (VLF) navigation system inoperative. 
• Erratic instrument readouts. 
• Weak transmissions and poor radio reception. 
• St. Elmo’s Fire. 
 
3 RADIO ELECTRIC NAVIGATION FACILITIES  
 
3.1 NON‐DIRECTIONAL RADIO BEACON (NDB) AND ADF 
The non-directional beacon (NDB) is a ground-based radio transmitter [ATC-4] that transmits 
radio energy in all directions. The ADF, when used with an NDB, determines the bearing from the 
aircraft to the transmitting station. The indicator may be mounted in a separate instrument in the 
aircraft panel, as shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9 – ADF indicator instrument and receiver [ATC-4] 
 
The ADF needle points to the NDB ground station to determine the relative bearing (RB) to 
the transmitting station. Magnetic heading (MH) plus RB equals the magnetic bearing (MB) to the 
station.  
The ground equipment, the NDB, transmits in the frequency range of 190 to 535 kHz. Most 
ADFs will also tune the AM broadcast band frequencies above the NDB band (550 to 1650 kHz). 
However, these frequencies are not approved for navigation because stations do not continuously 
identify themselves, and they are much more susceptible to sky wave propagation especially from dusk 
to dawn. NDB stations are capable of voice transmission and are often used for transmitting the 
automated weather observing system (AWOS). The aircraft must be in operational range of the NDB. 
Coverage depends on the strength of the transmitting station. Before relying on ADF indications, 
identify the station by listening to the Morse code identifier. NDB stations are usually two letters or an 
alpha-numeric combination. 
The airborne equipment includes two antennas, a receiver, and the indicator instrument. The 
“sense” antenna (non-directional) receives signals with nearly equal efficiency from all directions. The 
“loop” antenna receives signals better from two directions (bidirectional). When the loop and sense 
antenna inputs are processed together in the ADF radio, the result is the ability to receive a radio signal 
well in all directions but one, thus resolving all directional ambiguity. The indicator instrument can be 
one of three kinds: the fixed card ADF, movable-card ADF, or the radio magnetic indicator (RMI). 
The fixed-card ADF (also known as the relative bearing indicator (RBI)), always indicates zero at the 
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top of the instrument, and the needle indicates the RB to the station. The movable-card ADF allows 
the pilot to rotate the aircraft’s present heading to the top of the instrument so that the head of the 
needle indicates MB to the station, and the tail indicates MB from the station. 
The ADF can be used to plot your position, track inbound and outbound, and intercept a 
bearing. These procedures are used to execute holding patterns and non-precision instrument 
approaches. 
 
3.2 VERY‐HIGH FREQUENCY OMNIDIRECTIONAL RANGE (VOR) 
 
VOR is the primary navigational aid (NAVAID) used by civil aviation in the National Airspace 
System (NAS). The VOR ground station [ATC-4] is oriented to magnetic north and transmits azimuth 
information to the aircraft, providing 360 courses TO or FROM the VOR station. When DME is 
installed with the VOR, it is referred to as a VOR/DME and provides both azimuth and distance 
information. When military equipment is installed with the VOR, it is known as a VORTAC and 
provides both azimuth and distance information. The courses oriented FROM the station are called 
radials. The VOR information received by an aircraft is not influenced by aircraft attitude or heading. 
(Figure 10). For example, aircraft A (heading 180°) is inbound on the 360° radial; after crossing the 
station, the aircraft is outbound on the 180° radial at A-1. Aircraft B is shown crossing the 225° radial. 
Similarly, at any point around the station, an aircraft can be located somewhere on a VOR radial. 
 
 
Figure 10 – VOR radials [ATC-4] 
 
The VOR receiver measures and presents information to indicate bearing TO or FROM the 
station. In addition to the navigation signals transmitted by the VOR, a Morse code signal is 
transmitted concurrently to identify the facility, as well as voice transmissions for communication and 
relay of weather and other information. VORs are classified according to their operational uses. The 
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standard VOR facility has a power output of approximately 200 watts, with a maximum usable range 
depending upon the aircraft altitude, class of facility, location and siting of the facility, terrain 
conditions within the usable area of the facility, and other factors. Above and beyond certain altitude 
and distance limits, signal interference from other VOR facilities and a weak signal make it unreliable. 
Coverage is typically at least 40 miles at normal minimum instrument flight rules (IFR) altitudes. VORs 
with accuracy problems in parts of their service volume are listed in Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and 
in the Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD) under the name of the NAVAID. 
The ground equipment consists of a VOR ground station, which is a small, low building topped 
with a flat white disc, upon which are located the VOR antennas and a fibreglass cone-shaped tower, as 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 – VOR transmitter (ground station) [ATC-4] 
 
The station includes an automatic monitoring system. The monitor automatically turns off defective 
equipment and turns on the standby transmitter. Generally, the accuracy of the signal from the ground 
station is within 1°. VOR facilities are aurally identified by Morse code, or voice, or both. The VOR can 
be used for ground-to-air communication without interference with the navigation signal. VOR 
facilities operate within the 108.0 to 117.95 MHz frequency band and assignment between 108.0 and 
112.0 MHz is in even-tenth decimals to preclude any conflict with ILS localizer frequency assignment, 
which uses the odd tenths in this range. 
The airborne equipment includes an antenna, a receiver, and the indicator instrument. The 
receiver has a frequency knob to select any of the frequencies between 108.0 to 117.95 MHz. The 
ON/OFF/volume control turns on the navigation receiver and controls the audio volume. The volume 
has no effect on the operation of the receiver. One should listen to the station identifier before relying 
on the instrument for navigation. 
The effectiveness of the VOR depends upon proper use and adjustment of both ground and 
airborne equipment. The accuracy of course alignment of the VOR is generally plus or minus 1°. On 
some VORs, minor course roughness may be observed, evidenced by course needle or brief flag alarm. 
At a few stations, usually in mountainous terrain, the pilot may occasionally observe a brief course 
needle oscillation, similar to the indication of “approaching station.” Pilots flying over unfamiliar routes 
are cautioned to be on the alert for these vagaries, and in particular, to use the TO/FROM indicator to 
determine positive station passage. Certain propeller revolutions per minute (RPM) settings or 
helicopter rotor speeds can cause the VOR CDI to fluctuate as much as plus or minus 6°. Slight 
changes to the RPM setting will normally smooth out this roughness. Pilots are urged to check for this 
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modulation phenomenon prior to reporting a VOR station or aircraft equipment for unsatisfactory 
operation. 
 
 
Figure 12 – VOR Indicator [ATC-4] 
 
3.3 DISTANCE MEASURING EQUIPMENT (DME) 
 
When used in conjunction with the VOR system, DME makes it possible for pilots to 
determine an accurate geographic position of the aircraft [ATC-4], including the bearing and distance 
TO or FROM the station. The aircraft DME transmits interrogating radio frequency (RF) pulses, which 
are received by the DME antenna at the ground facility. The signal triggers ground receiver equipment 
to respond back to the interrogating aircraft. The airborne DME equipment measures the elapsed time 
between the interrogation signal sent by the aircraft and reception of the reply pulses from the ground 
station. This time measurement is converted into nautical miles (NMs) distance from the station. 
Some DME receivers provide a groundspeed in knots by monitoring the rate of change of the aircraft’s 
position relative to the ground station. Groundspeed values are only accurate when tracking directly to 
or from the station. 
VOR/DME, VORTAC, ILS/DME, and LOC/DME navigation facilities established by the 
FAA provide course and distance information from collocated components under a frequency pairing 
plan. DME operates on frequencies in the UHF spectrum between 962 MHz and 1213 MHz. Aircraft 
receiving equipment which provides for automatic DME selection assures reception of azimuth and 
distance information from a common source when designated VOR/DME, VORTAC, ILS/DME, and 
LOC/DME are selected. Some aircraft have separate VOR and DME receivers each of which must be 
tuned to the appropriate navigation facility. 
The airborne equipment includes an antenna and a receiver. 
A DME is used for determining the distance from a ground DME transmitter. Compared to 
other VHF/UHF NAVAIDs, a DME is very accurate. The distance information can be used to 
determine the aircraft position or flying a track that is a constant distance from the station. This is 
referred to as a DME arc. 
DME/DME fixes (a location based on two DME lines of position from two DME stations) 
provide a more accurate aircraft location than using a VOR and a DME fix. 
DME signals are line-of-sight; the mileage readout is the straight line distance from the aircraft to the 
DME ground facility and is commonly referred to as slant range distance. Slant range refers to the 
straight line distance from the aircraft antenna to the ground station, which differs somewhat from the 
distance from the station to the point on the ground beneath the aircraft. This error is smallest at low 
altitude and long range. It is greatest when the aircraft is over the ground facility, at which time the 
DME receiver will display altitude (in NM) above the facility. Slant-range error is negligible if the 
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aircraft is 1 mile or more from the ground facility for each 1,000 feet of altitude above the elevation of 
the facility. 
 
3.4 AREA NAVIGATION (RNAV) EQUIPMENT 
 
Area navigation (RNAV) equipment includes VOR/DME, LORAN, GPS, and inertial 
navigation systems (INS). RNAV equipment is capable of computing the aircraft position, actual track, 
groundspeed, and then presenting meaningful information to the pilot [ATC-3]. This information may 
be in the form of distance, cross track error, and time estimates relative to the selected track or 
waypoint. In addition, the RNAV equipment installations must be approved for use under IFR. The 
Pilot’s Operating Handbook/Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM) will report what equipment is 
installed, the operations that are approved, and the details of how to use the equipment. Some aircraft 
may have equipment that allows input from more than one RNAV source thereby providing a very 
accurate and reliable navigation source. 
 
3.4.1 VOR/DME RNAV 
 
VOR RNAV is based on information generated by the present VORTAC or VOR/DME 
systems to create a waypoint using an airborne computer [ATC-3]. As shown in the next Figure 13, the 
value of side A is the measured DME distance to the VOR/DME. Side B, the distance from the 
VOR/DME to the waypoint, angle 1 (VOR radial or the bearing from the VORTAC to the waypoint), 
are values set in the cockpit control. The bearing from the VOR/DME to the aircraft, angle 2, is 
measured by the VOR receiver. The airborne computer continuously compares angles 1 and 2 and 
determines angle 3 and side C, which is the distance in NMs and magnetic course from the aircraft to 
the waypoint. This is presented as guidance information on the cockpit display. 
 
 
Figure 13 – RNAV computation [ATC-3] 
 
Although RNAV cockpit instrument displays vary among manufacturers, most are connected to 
the aircraft CDI with a switch or knob to select VOR or RNAV guidance. There is usually a light or 
indicator to inform the pilot whether VOR or RNAV is selected, like in Figure 14. The display includes 
the waypoint, frequency, mode in use, waypoint radial and distance, DME distance, groundspeed, and 
time to station. 
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Most VOR/DME RNAV systems have the following airborne controls: 
1. Off/On/Volume control to select the frequency of the VOR/DME station to be used. 
2. MODE select switch used to select VOR/DME mode, with: 
a. Angular course width deviation (standard VOR operation); or 
b. Linear cross track deviation as standard (±5 NM full scale CDI). 
3. RNAV mode, with direct to waypoint with linear cross track deviation of ±5 NM. 
4. RNAV/APPR (approach mode) with linear deviation of ±1.25 NM as full scale CDI deflection. 
5. Waypoint select control. Some units allow the storage of more than one waypoint; this control allows 
selection of any waypoint in storage. 
6. Data input controls. These controls allow user input of waypoint number or ident, VOR or LOC 
frequency, waypoint radial and distance. 
 
While DME groundspeed readout is accurate only when tracking directly to or from the station in 
VOR/DME mode, in RNAV mode the DME groundspeed readout is accurate on any track. 
 
Figure 14 – Typical RNAV display [ATC-4] 
 
The advantages of the VOR/DME RNAV system stem from the ability of the airborne 
computer to locate a waypoint wherever it is convenient, as long as the aircraft is within reception range 
of both a nearby VOR and DME facility. A series of these waypoints make up an RNAV route. In 
addition to the published routes, a random RNAV route may be flown under IFR if it is approved by 
air traffic control (ATC). RNAV DPs and standard terminal arrival routes (STARs) are contained in the 
DP and STAR booklets. VOR/DME RNAV approach procedure charts are also available. Note that in 
the VOR/DME RNAV chart, that the waypoint identification boxes contain the following 
information: waypoint name, coordinates, frequency, identifier, radial distance (facility to waypoint), 
and reference facility elevation. The initial approach fix (IAF), final approach fix (FAF), and missed 
approach point (MAP) are labelled. To fly either a route or to execute an approach under IFR, the 
RNAV equipment installed in the aircraft must be approved for the appropriate IFR operations. In 
Vertical Nav mode, vertical, as well as horizontal guidance is provided in some installations. A waypoint 
is selected at a point where the descent begins, and another waypoint is selected where the descent 
ends. The RNAV equipment computes the rate of descent relative to the groundspeed, and on some 
installations, displays vertical guidance information on the glide-slope indicator. When using this type 
of equipment during an instrument approach, the pilot must keep in mind the vertical guidance 
information provided is not part of the non-precision approach. Published non-precision approach 
altitudes must be observed and complied with, unless otherwise directed by ATC. 
The limitation of this system is the reception volume. Published approaches have been tested to 
ensure this is not a problem. Descents/approaches to airports distant from the VOR/DME facility 
may not be possible because during the approach, the aircraft may descend below the reception altitude 
of the facility at that distance. 
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3.4.2 LONG RANGE NAVIGATION (LORAN) 
 
LORAN uses a network of land-based transmitters to provide an accurate long range navigation 
system [ATC-3]. The FAA and the United States (U.S.) Coast Guard (USCG) arranged the stations into 
chains. The signals from these stations are a carefully structured sequence of brief RF pulses centred at 
100 kHz. At that frequency, signals travel considerable distances as ground waves, from which accurate 
navigation information is available. The airborne receiver monitors all of the stations within the 
selected chain, then measures the arrival time difference (TD) between the signals. All of the points 
having the same TD from a station pair create a line of position (LOP). The aircraft position is 
determined at the intersection of two or more LOPs. Then the computer converts the known location 
to latitude and longitude coordinates. While continually computing latitude/longitude fixes, the 
computer is able to determine and display: 
1. Track over the ground since last computation; 
2. Groundspeed by dividing distance covered since last computation by the time since last 
computation (and averaging several of these); 
3. Distance to destination; 
4. Destination time of arrival; and 
5. Cross track error. 
The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) provides a detailed explanation of how LORAN works. 
LORAN is a very accurate navigation system if adequate signals are received. There are two types of 
accuracy that must be addressed in any discussion of LORAN accuracy.  
Repeatable accuracy is the accuracy measured when a user notes the LORAN position, moves 
away from that location, then uses the LORAN to return to that initial LORAN position. Distance 
from that initial position is the error. Propagation and terrain errors will be essentially the same as when 
the first position was taken, so those errors are factored out by using the initial position. Typical 
repeatable accuracy for LORAN can be as good as 0.01 NM, or 60 feet, if the second position is 
determined during the day and within a short period of time (a few days). 
Absolute accuracy refers to the ability to determine present position in space independently, and is 
most often used by pilots. When the LORAN receiver is turned on and position is determined, 
absolute accuracy applies. Typical LORAN absolute accuracy will vary from about 0.1 NM to as much 
as 2.5 NM depending on distance from the station, geometry of the TD LOP crossing angles, terrain 
and environmental conditions, signal-to-noise ratio (signal strength), and some design choices made by 
the receiver manufacturer. 
The LORAN receiver incorporates a radio receiver, signal processor, navigation computer, 
control/display, and antenna. When turned on, the receivers go through an initialization or warm-up 
period, then inform the user they are ready to be programmed. LORAN receivers vary widely in their 
appearance, how they are programmed by the user, and how they display navigation information. 
Therefore, it is necessary to become familiar with the unit, including how to program it, and how to 
interpret output from it. The LORAN operating manual should be in the aircraft at all times and 
available to the pilot. IFR-approved LORAN units require that the manual be aboard and that the pilot 
is familiar with the unit’s functions, before flight. 
After initialization, you select for the present location waypoint (the airport), and select GO TO 
in order to determine if the LORAN is functioning properly. Proper operation is indicated by a low 
distance reading (0 to 0.5 NM). The simplest mode of navigation is referred to as GO TO: you select a 
waypoint from one of the databases and choose the GO TO mode. Before use in flight, you should 
verify that the latitude and longitude of the chosen waypoint is correct by reference to another 
approved information source. An updatable LORAN database that supports the appropriate operations 
(e.g., en route, terminal, and instrument approaches), is required when operating under IFR. In addition 
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to displaying bearing, distance, time to the waypoint, and track and speed over the ground, the LORAN 
receiver may have other features such as flight planning (waypoint sequential storage), emergency 
location of several nearest airports, vertical navigation capabilities, and more. 
LORAN is subject to interference from many external sources, which can cause distortion of, 
or interference with LORAN signals. LORAN receiver manufacturers install “notch filters” to reduce 
or eliminate interference. Proximity to 60 Hz alternating current power lines, static discharge, 
precipitation static, electrical noise from generators, alternators, strobes, and other onboard electronics 
may decrease the signal-to-noise ratio to the point where the LORAN receiver’s performance is 
degraded. Proper installation of the antenna, good electrical bonding, and an effective static discharge 
system are the minimum requirements for LORAN receiver operation. Most receivers have internal 
tests that verify the timing alignment of the receiver clock with the LORAN pulse, and measure and 
display signal-to-noise ratio. A signal will be activated to alert the pilot if any of the parameters for 
reliable navigation are exceeded on LORAN sets certified for IFR operations. 
LORAN is most accurate when the signal travels over sea water during the day, and least accurate when 
the signal comes over land and large bodies of fresh water or ice at night; furthermore, the accuracy 
degrades as distance from the station increases. However, LORAN accuracy is generally better than 
VOR accuracy. 
 
3.4.3 GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS) 
 
GNSS refers to the use of one or more satellite navigation systems. The U.S. GPS (Global 
Positioning System) is one such system, as are the Russian GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite 
System) and the proposed GALILEO system, a project funded by the EU (European Union). Recently 
developed augmentation satellite systems such as the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) WAAS 
(Wide Area Augmentation System) and EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System) 
also provide supplementary capability. Several of these systems are described, beginning with GPS since 
it is the core of the system developed in this research, as are some of the factors that affect satellite 
positioning performance [AIRP-16]. Some information about clock and height augmentations of 
normal satellite positioning are also described. 
GPS is a satellite based radio-navigation system designed by the U.S. DoD (Department of 
Defence). It is a spread spectrum CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) system that broadcasts bi-
phase modulated RHCP (Right Hand Circularly Polarized) signals centred at about 1.2 (L2) and 1.6 
GHz (L1). This makes it an all weather system since there is little atmospheric absorption at these 
frequencies, and because it is spread spectrum, it is also resistant to jamming (Spilker 1996). Due mainly 
to geometrical spreading, the signal strength at the Earth’s surface is only around –160 dbW, so the 
system operates basically through LOS (Line Of Sight). 
The satellite constellation nominally consists of 24 satellites on 6 orbital planes with an 
inclination of 55° to the equator (U.S. JPO 1995). The satellites are in near circular orbit at a height of 
about 20,000 km above the surface, with a nominal period of just under 12 hours. The specifications 
call for a minimum of 21 operational satellites and three spares to provide a minimum of four visible 
satellites at any place and any time on the planet. At present, the constellation has 27 satellites and 
unobstructed visibility is always seven or more satellites in the European region. Each satellite 
broadcasts a unique C/A (Coarse Acquisition) PRN (Pseudo-Random Noise) code modulated on to 
the L1 carrier. SA (Selective Availability) was used until May 1, 2000, to degrade the performance of 
civilian users in single-point mode through dithering of the satellite clock offset. A 50 bps navigation 
message, which gives the time of transmission of the PRN sequence and other necessary information, 
and a second code (P) are modulated on both the L1 and L2 carriers. These P code is intended 
primarily for military users and provides better resolution (less receiver noise) and immunity from SA, 
but is encrypted through a procedure known as AS (Anti-Spoofing). Civilians can still make use of the 
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P code, but a loss is suffered through correlation techniques used to sidestep the encryption, and SA if 
not removed. 
The MCS (Master Control Station) processes range measurements taken at the five monitoring 
stations and develops predictions for the orbits and satellite clock behavior. The MCS then sends this 
data to the monitor stations for upload of the navigation message to the satellites. The navigation 
message also includes the health of the satellites and an almanac that can be used to predict the visibility 
of satellites for any time and place. 
 
 
Figure 15 – GPS Segments [AIRP-16] 
 
The GPS Space Segment consists of 24 Navstar satellites in semi-synchronous (approximately 
12hour) orbits. The satellites are arranged in six orbital planes with four satellites in each plane. The 
orbital planes have an inclination angle of 55 degrees relative to the earth's equator. The satellites have 
an average orbit altitude of 20200 kilometres (10900 nautical miles) above the surface of the earth. 
Figure 16 illustrates the GPS satellite constellation. 
 
 
Figure 16 – GPS Satellites Constellation [AIRP-16] 
 
The Control Segment primarily consists of a Master Control Station (MCS), at Falcon Air Force 
Base (AFB) in Colorado Springs, USA, plus monitor stations (MS) and ground antennas (GA) at 
various locations around the world. The monitor stations are located at Falcon AFB, Hawaii, 
Kwajalein, Diego Garcia, and Ascension. All monitor stations except Hawaii and Falcon AFB are also 
equipped with ground antennas. The Control Segment includes a Prelaunch Compatibility Station 
(PCS) located at Cape Canaveral, USA, and a back-up MCS capability. 
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The user segment is the largest and the most widely influenced of the three segments. It 
consists mainly of GPS receivers belonging to a wide spectrum of user requirements. All these receivers 
use the satellite ranging signals to determine their position and time with the accuracy specified by the 
Joint Program Office (JPO). The user segment can be broadly classified into military users and civilian 
users. Military users have access to the high accuracy Precise Positioning Service (PPS), whereas the 
civilian users have access to the less precise Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code. Civilian users constitute a 
major portion of the user segment market, the estimated users in the civilian segment is approximately 
a few million and is growing every year. The GPS market in the user segment is currently a $2 
billion/year market and is expected to grow to $30 billion/year market by 2008. GPS receivers 
compute the range by measuring the transit time of the signal from the satellite to the receiver antenna. 
To compute position and time, the receivers perform triangulation using range measurements from at 
least 3 satellites. However, since the receiver local clock is not in synchronism with satellite clocks, an 
additional measurement is required to solve for the clock offset. 
 
 
Figure 17 – GPS Navigation Message [AIRP-16] 
 
The ranging codes broadcast by the satellites enable a GPS receiver to measure the transit time 
of the signals and thereby determine the range between a satellite and the user. The navigation message 
provides data to calculate the position of each satellite at the time of signal transmission. From this 
information, the user position coordinates and the user clock offset are calculated using simultaneous 
equations. Four satellites are normally required to be simultaneously "in view" of the receiver for 3-D 
positioning purposes. 
Two levels of service are provided by the GPS, the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) and the 
Standard Positioning Service (SPS). 
Precise Positioning Service. The PPS is an accurate positioning velocity and timing service which is 
available only to authorized users. The PPS is primarily intended for military purposes. Authorization to 
use the PPS is determined by the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD), based on internal U.S. defence 
requirements or international defence commitments. Authorized users of the PPS include U.S. military 
users, NATO military users, and other selected military and civilian users such as the Australian 
Defence Forces and the U.S. Defence Mapping Agency. The PPS is specified to provide 16 metres 
Spherical Error Probable (SEP) (3-D, 50%) positioning accuracy and 100 nanosecond (one sigma) 
Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) time transfer accuracy to authorized users. This is approximately 
equal to 37 metres (3-D, 95%) and 197 nanoseconds (95%) under typical system operating conditions. 
PPS receivers can achieve 0.2 metres per second 3-D velocity accuracy, but this is somewhat dependent 
on receiver design. 
Standard Positioning Service. The SPS is a less accurate positioning and timing service which is available to 
all GPS users. In peacetime before May 2001, the level of SA is controlled to provide 100 metre (95%) 
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horizontal accuracy which is approximately equal to 156 metres 3D (95%). SPS receivers can achieve 
approximately 337 nanosecond (95%) UTC time transfer accuracy. Selective Availability (SA) was the 
intentional degradation of the signal by DoD. SA could be implemented in two different ways 1) 
introducing error into the satellite broadcast orbit (known as the e-process), and 2) dithering the 
satellite clock frequency (known as the d-process). SA was switched off on May 1, 2000 by a 
Presidential directive. Actual performances of the SPS is 8.1 m (1s), considering all errors contained in 
the broadcasting of the GPS message. The SPS is primarily intended for civilian purposes, although it 
has potential peacetime military use. 
 
3.4.4 DIFFERENTIAL GPS (D‐GPS) 
 
Differential GPS (D-GPS) was developed to meet the needs of positioning and distance measuring 
applications that required higher accuracies than stand-alone GPS could deliver [AIRP-16]. A typical 
differential GPS architecture (see Figure 18, where an installation for a precise landing approach station 
is depicted) consists of one or more reference receivers located at a surveyed, known location, and one 
or more D-GPS user receivers. The user receivers are often called “mobile” receivers because they are 
not confined to a fixed location like the reference receiver. Both sets of receivers either collect and 
store the necessary data for later processing (typical geodetic or general surveying application), or send 
them to the desired location in real time via the data link. 
 
 
Figure 18 – Typical Differential System Architecture [AIRP-16] 
 
This overview outlines some of the fundamental issues of DGPS. These issues should be 
considered by any user considering the need for a positioning system that can give accuracies better 
than the absolute PPS or SPS performance. 
DGPS is based on the principle that receivers in the same vicinity will simultaneously 
experience common errors on a particular satellite ranging signal. In general, the user (mobile) receivers 
use measurements from the reference receiver to remove the common errors. In order to accomplish 
this, the user (mobile) receivers must simultaneously use a subset or the same set of satellites as the 
reference station. The DGPS positioning equations are formulated so that the common errors cancel. 
The common errors include signal path delays through the atmosphere, and satellite clock and 
ephemeris errors. For PPS users, the common satellite errors are residual system errors that are 
normally present in the PVT solution. For SPS users, the common satellite errors also include the 
intentionally added errors from SA. Errors that are unique to each receiver, such as receiver 
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measurement noise and multipath, cannot be removed without additional recursive processing (by the 
reference receiver, user receiver, or both) to provide an averaged, smoothed, or filtered solution. 
Various DGPS techniques are employed depending on the accuracy desired, where the data processing 
is to be performed, and whether real-time results are required. If real-time results are required then a 
data link is also required. For applications without a real-time requirement, the data can be collected 
and processed later. The accuracy requirements usually dictate which measurements are used and what 
algorithms are employed. Under normal conditions, DGPS accuracy is independent of whether SPS or 
PPS is being used, although real-time PPS DGPS can have a lower data rate than SPS DGPS because 
the rate of change of the nominal system errors is slower than the rate of change of SA. However, the 
user and the Reference Station must be using the same service (either PPS or SPS). 
The accepted standard for SPS DGPS was developed by the Radio Technical Commission for 
Maritime Services (RTCM) Special Committee-104 (SC-104). The RTCM developed standards for the 
use of differential corrections, and defined the data format to be used between the reference station 
and the user. The standards are primarily intended for real time operational use and cover a wide range 
of DGPS measurement types. Most SPS DGPS receivers are compatible with the RTCM SC-104 
differential message formats. DGPS standards have also been developed by the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) for special Category I precision approach using ranging-code 
differential. The standards are contained in RTCA document DO-217. This document is intended only 
for limited use until an international standard can be developed for precision approach. 
 
3.4.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (INS) 
 
INS is a system that navigates precisely by dead reckoning, without any input from outside of 
the aircraft [ATC-4]. It is fully self-contained. The INS is initialized by the pilot, who enters into the 
system its exact location while the aircraft is on the ground before the flight. The INS is also 
programmed with waypoints along the desired route of flight. 
INS is considered a stand-alone navigation system, especially when more than one independent 
unit is onboard. The airborne equipment consists of an accelerometer to measure acceleration—which, 
when integrated with time, gives velocity—and gyros to measure direction. Later versions of the INS, 
called IRS (inertial reference systems) utilize laser gyros and more powerful computers; therefore, the 
accelerometer mountings no longer need to be kept level and aligned with true north. The computer 
system can handle the added workload of dealing with the computations necessary to correct for 
gravitational and directional errors. Consequently, these newer systems are sometimes called strap 
down systems, as the accelerometers and gyros are strapped down to the airframe, rather than being 
mounted on a structure that stays fixed with respect to the horizon and true north. 
The principal error associated with INS is degradation of position with time. INS computes 
position by starting with an accurate position input which is changed continuously as accelerometers 
and gyros provide speed and direction inputs. Both the accelerometers and the gyros are subject to very 
small errors; as time passes, those errors likely will accumulate. While the best INS/IRS display errors 
of 0.1 to 0.4 NM after flights across the North Atlantic of 4 to 6 hours, smaller and less expensive 
systems are being built that show errors of 1 to 2 NM per hour. This accuracy is more than sufficient 
for a navigation system that can be combined with and updated by GPS. The synergy of a navigation 
system consisting of an INS/IRS unit in combination with a GPS resolves the errors and weaknesses of 
both systems. The GPS is accurate all the time it is working but may be subject to short and periodic 
outages. The INS is made more accurate because it is  continually updated and will continue to function 
with good accuracy if the GPS has moments of lost signal. 
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3.5 INSTRUMENT APPROACH SYSTEMS 
 
Most navigation systems approved for en route and terminal operations under IFR, such as 
VOR, NDB, and GPS, may also be approved to conduct IAPs. The most common systems in use in 
the world are the ILS, simplified landing facility (SDF), localizer directional aid (LDA), and microwave 
landing system (MLS). These systems operate independently of other navigation systems. There are 
new systems being developed, such as wide area augmentation system (WAAS), local area augmentation 
system (LAAS), and other systems have been developed for special use [ATC-4]. 
 
3.6 INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEMS (ILS) 
 
The ILS system provides both course and altitude guidance to a specific runway [ATC-4]. The 
ILS system is used to execute a precision instrument approach procedure or precision approach (Figure 
19). The system consists of the following components: 
1. A localizer provides horizontal (left/right) guidance along the extended centreline of the 
runway. 
2. A glide slope provides vertical (up/down) guidance toward the runway touchdown point, 
usually at a 3° slope. 
3. Marker beacons provide range information along the approach path. 
4. Approach lights assist in the transition from instrument to visual flight. 
 
The following supplementary elements, though not specific components of the system, may be 
incorporated to increase safety and utility: 
1. Compass locators provide transition from en route NAVAIDs to the ILS system; they assist in 
holding procedures, tracking the localizer course, identifying the marker beacon sites, and providing a 
FAF for ADF approaches. 
2. DME colocated with the glide-slope transmitter provide positive distance-to-touchdown 
information or DME associated with another nearby facility (VOR or standalone), if specified in the 
approach procedure. 
 
ILS approaches are categorized into three different types of approaches, based on the 
equipment at the airport and the experience level of the pilot. Category I approaches provide for 
approach height above touchdown of not less than 200 feet. Category II approaches provide for 
approach to a height above touchdown of not less than 100 feet. Category III approaches provide 
lower minimums for approaches without a decision height minimum. While pilots must only be 
instrument rated and the aircraft be equipped with the appropriate airborne equipment to execute 
Category I approaches, Category II and III approaches require special certification for the pilots, 
ground equipment, and airborne equipment. 
The ILS uses a number of different ground facilities. These facilities may be used as a part of 
the ILS system, as well as part of another approach. For example, the compass locator may be used 
with NDB approaches. 
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3.6.1 LOCALIZER 
 
The localizer (LOC) ground antenna array is located on the extended centreline of the 
instrument runway of an airport, remote enough from the opposite (approach) end of the runway to 
prevent it from being a collision hazard.  
 
 
Figure 19 – Instrument Landing Systems [ATC-4] 
 
This unit radiates a field pattern, which develops a course down the centreline of the runway 
toward the middle markers (MMs) and outer markers (OMs), and a similar course along the runway 
centreline in the opposite direction. These are called the front and back courses, respectively. The 
localizer provides course guidance, transmitted at 108.1 to 111.95 MHz (odd tenths only), throughout 
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the descent path to the runway threshold from a distance of 18 NM from the antenna to an altitude of 
4,500 feet above the elevation of the antenna site. 
The localizer course width is defined as the angular displacement at any point along the course between 
a full “fly-left” (CDI needle fully deflected to the left) and a full “fly-right” indication (CDI needle fully 
deflected to the right.) Each localizer facility is audibly identified by a three-letter designator, 
transmitted at frequent regular intervals. The ILS identification is preceded by the letter “I” (two dots). 
For example, the ILS localizer at Springfield, Missouri transmits the identifier ISGF. The localizer 
includes a voice feature on its frequency for use by the associated ATC facility in issuing approach and 
landing instructions. The localizer course is very narrow, normally 5°. This results in high needle 
sensitivity. With this course width, a full-scale deflection shows when the aircraft is 2.5° to either side 
of the centreline. This sensitivity permits accurate orientation to the landing runway. With no more 
than one-quarter scale deflection maintained, the aircraft will be aligned with the runway (Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 20 – Localizer Coverage Limits [ATC-4] 
 
 
Figure 21 – Localizer Receiver Indications and Aircraft Displacement [ATC-4] 
 
3.6.2 GLIDE SLOPE 
 
Glide slope (GS) describes the systems that generate, receive, and indicate the ground facility 
radiation pattern [ATC-4]. The glidepath is the straight, sloped line the aircraft should fly in its descent 
from where the glide slope intersects the altitude used for approaching the FAF, to the runway 
touchdown zone. The glide-slope equipment is housed in a building approximately 750 to 1,250 feet 
down the runway from the approach end of the runway, and between 400 and 600 feet to one side of 
the centreline. The course projected by the glide-slope equipment is essentially the same as would be 
generated by a localizer operating on its side. The glide-slope projection angle is normally adjusted to 
2.5° to 3.5° above horizontal, so it intersects the MM at about 200 feet and the OM at about 1,400 feet 
above the runway elevation. At locations where standard minimum obstruction clearance cannot be 
obtained with the normal maximum glide-slope angle, the glide-slope equipment is displaced farther 
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from the approach end of the runway if the length of the runway permits; or, the glideslope angle may 
be increased up to 4°. 
Unlike the localizer, the glide-slope transmitter radiates signals only in the direction of the final 
approach on the front course. The system provides no vertical guidance for approaches on the back 
course. The glidepath is normally 1.4° thick. At 10 NM from the point of touchdown, this represents a 
vertical distance of approximately 1,500 feet, narrowing to a few feet at touchdown. 
 
3.6.3 MARKER BEACONS 
 
Two VHF marker beacons, outer and middle, are normally used in the ILS system [ATC-4]. A 
third beacon, the inner, is used where Category II operations are certified. A marker beacon may also 
be installed to indicate the FAF on the ILS back course. The OM is located on the localizer front 
course 4 to 7 miles from the airport to indicate a position at which an aircraft, at the appropriate 
altitude on the localizer course, will intercept the glidepath. The MM is located approximately 3,500 feet 
from the landing threshold on the centreline of the localizer front course at a position where the glide-
slope centreline is about 200 feet above the touchdown zone elevation. The inner marker (IM), where 
installed, is located on the front course between the MM and the landing threshold. It indicates the 
point at which an aircraft is at the decision height on the glidepath during a Category II ILS approach. 
The back-course marker, where installed, indicates the back-course FAF. 
 
3.6.4 ILS AIRBORNE COMPONENTS 
 
Airborne equipment for the ILS system includes receivers for the localizer, glide slope, marker 
beacons, ADF, DME, and the respective indicator instruments [ATC-4]. The typical VOR receiver is 
also a localizer receiver with common tuning and indicating equipment. Some receivers have separate 
function selector switches, but most switch between VOR and LOC automatically by sensing if odd 
tenths between 108 and 111.95 MHz have been selected. Otherwise, tuning of VOR and localizer 
frequencies is accomplished with the same knobs and switches, and the CDI indicates “on course” as it 
does on a VOR radial. 
Though some glide-slope receivers are tuned separately, in a typical installation the glide slope is 
tuned automatically to the proper frequency when the localizer is tuned. Each of the 40 localizer 
channels in the 108.10 to 111.95 MHz band is paired with a corresponding glide-slope frequency. 
When the localizer indicator also includes a glide-slope needle, the instrument is often called a 
cross-pointer indicator. The crossed horizontal (glide slope) and vertical (localizer) needles are free to 
move through standard five-dot deflections to indicate position on the localizer course and glidepath. 
When the aircraft is on the glidepath, the needle is horizontal, overlying the reference dots. 
Since the glidepath is much narrower than the localizer course (approximately 1.4° from full up to full 
down deflection), the needle is very sensitive to displacement of the aircraft from on-path alignment. 
With the proper rate of descent established upon glide-slope interception, very small corrections keep 
the aircraft aligned. 
The localizer and glide-slope warning flags disappear from view on the indicator when sufficient 
voltage is received to actuate the needles. The flags show when an unstable signal or receiver 
malfunction occurs. 
The OM is identified by a low-pitched tone, continuous dashes at the rate of two per second, 
and a purple/blue marker beacon light. The MM is identified by an intermediate tone, alternate dots 
and dashes at the rate of 95 dot/dash combinations per minute, and an amber marker beacon light. The 
IM, where installed, is identified by a high-pitched tone, continuous dots at the rate of six per second, 
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and a white marker beacon light. The back-course marker (BCM), where installed, is identified by a 
high-pitched tone with two dots at a rate of 72 to 75 two-dot combinations per minute, and a white 
marker beacon light. Marker beacon receiver sensitivity is selectable as high or low on many units. The 
low-sensitivity position gives the sharpest indication of position and should be used during an 
approach. The high-sensitivity position provides an earlier warning that the aircraft is approaching the 
marker beacon site. 
The ILS and its components are subject to certain errors, which are listed below. 
Localizer and glide-slope signals are subject to the same type of bounce from hard objects as space 
waves. 
1. Reflection. Surface vehicles and even other aircraft flying below 5,000 feet above ground level 
(AGL) may disturb the signal for aircraft on the approach. 
2. False courses. In addition to the desired course, glideslope facilities inherently produce additional 
courses at higher vertical angles. The angle of the lowest of these false courses will occur at 
approximately 9°–12°. An aircraft flying the LOC/glide-slope course at a constant altitude would 
observe gyrations of both the glide-slope needle and glide-slope warning flag as the aircraft passed 
through the various false courses. Getting established on one of these false courses will result in either 
confusion (reversed glide-slope needle indications), or result in the need for a very high descent rate. 
However, if the approach is conducted at the altitudes specified on the appropriate approach chart, 
these false courses will not be encountered. 
The very low power and directional antenna of the marker beacon transmitter ensures that the 
signal will not be received any distance from the transmitter site. Problems with signal reception are 
usually caused by the airborne receiver not being turned on, or by incorrect receiver sensitivity. Some 
marker beacon receivers, to decrease weight and cost, are designed without their own power supply. 
These units utilize a power source from another radio in the avionics stack, often the ADF. In some 
aircraft, this requires the ADF to be turned on in order for the marker beacon receiver to function, yet 
no warning placard is required. Another source of trouble may be the “High/Low/Off” three-position 
switch, which both activates the receiver and selects receiver sensitivity. Usually, the “test” feature only 
tests to see if the light bulbs in the marker beacon lights are working. Therefore, in some installations, 
there is no functional way for the pilot to ascertain the marker beacon receiver is actually on except to 
fly over a marker beacon transmitter, and see if a signal is received and indicated (e.g., audibly and 
marker beacon lights). 
 
3.6.5 SIMPLIFIED DIRECTIONAL FACILITY (SDF) 
 
The SDF provides a final approach course similar to the ILS  localizer. The SDF course may or 
may not be aligned with the runway and the course may be wider than a standard ILS localizer, 
resulting in less precision [ATC-4]. Usable off-course indications are limited to 35° either side of the 
course centreline. Instrument indications in the area between 35° and 90° from the course centreline 
are not controlled and should be disregarded. The SDF antenna may be offset from the runway 
centreline. Because of this, the angle of convergence between the final approach course and the runway 
bearing should be determined by reference to the instrument approach chart. This angle is usually not 
more than 3°. You should note this angle since the approach course originates at the antenna site, and 
an approach continued beyond the runway threshold would lead the aircraft to the SDF offset position 
rather than along the runway centreline. 
The course width of the SDF signal emitted from the transmitter is fixed at either 6° or 12°, as 
necessary, to provide maximum flyability and optimum approach course quality. A three-letter identifier 
is transmitted in code on the SDF frequency; there is no letter “I” (two dots) transmitted before the 
station identifier, as there is with the LOC. For example, the identifier for Lebanon, Missouri, SDF is 
LBO. 
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3.6.6 LOCALIZER TYPE DIRECTIONAL AID (LDA) 
 
The LDA is of comparable utility and accuracy to a localizer but is not part of a complete ILS. 
The LDA course width is between 3° and 6° and thus provides a more precise approach course than an 
SDF installation [ATC-4]. Some LDAs are equipped with a glide slope. The LDA course is not aligned 
with the 
runway, but straight-in minimums may be published where the angle between the runway centreline 
and the LDA course does not exceed 30°. If this angle exceeds 30°, only circling minimums are 
published. The identifier is three letters preceded by “I” transmitted in code on the LDA frequency. 
For example, the identifier for Van Nuys, California, LDA is I-BUR. 
 
3.7 COMPASS LOCATOR 
 
Compass locators are low-powered NDBs and are received and indicated by the ADF receiver 
[ATC-4]. When used in conjunction with an ILS front course, the compass locator facilities are 
colocated with the outer and/or MM facilities. The coding identification of the outer locator consists of 
the first two letters of the three-letter identifier of the associated LOC. For example, the outer locator 
at Dallas/Love Field (DAL) is identified as “DA.” The middle locator at DAL is identified by the last 
two letters “AL.” 
 
3.8 APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEMS (ALS) 
 
Normal approach and letdown on the ILS is divided into two distinct stages: the instrument 
approach stage using only radio guidance, and the visual stage, when visual contact with the ground 
runway environment is necessary for accuracy and safety [ATC-3]. The most critical period of an 
instrument approach, particularly during low ceiling/visibility conditions, is the point at which the pilot 
must decide whether to land or execute a missed approach. As the runway threshold is approached, the 
visual glidepath will separate into individual lights. At this point, the approach should be continued by 
reference to the runway touchdown zone markers. The ALS provides lights that will penetrate the 
atmosphere far enough from touchdown to give directional, distance, and glidepath information for 
safe visual transition. Visual identification of the ALS by the pilot must be instantaneous, so it is 
important to know the type of ALS before the approach is started. Check the instrument approach 
chart and the A/FD for the particular type of lighting facilities at the destination airport before any 
instrument flight. With reduced visibility, rapid orientation to a strange runway can be difficult, 
especially during a circling approach to an airport with minimum lighting facilities, or to a large terminal 
airport located in the midst of distracting city and ground facility lights. Some of the most common 
ALS systems are shown in Figure 22. 
A high-intensity flasher system, often referred to as “the rabbit,” is installed at many large 
airports. The flashers consist of a series of brilliant blue-white bursts of light flashing in sequence along 
the approach lights, giving the effect of a ball of light travelling towards the runway. Typically, “the 
rabbit” makes two trips toward the runway per second.  
Runway end identifier lights (REIL) are installed for rapid and positive identification of the 
approach end of an instrument runway. The system consists of a pair of synchronized flashing lights 
placed laterally on each side of the runway threshold facing the approach area. 
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The visual approach slope indicator (VASI) gives visual descent guidance information during 
the approach to a runway. The standard VASI consists of light bars that project a visual glidepath, 
which provides safe obstruction clearance within the approach zone. The normal glide-slope angle is 
3°; however, the angle may be as high as 4.5° for proper obstacle clearance. On runways served by ILS, 
the VASI angle normally coincides with the electronic glide-slope angle. Visual left/right course 
guidance is obtained by alignment with the runway lights. The standard VASI installation consists of 
either 2-, 3-, 4-, 6-, 12-, or 16-light units arranged in downwind and upwind light bars. Some airports 
serving long-bodied aircraft have three-bar VASIs which provide two visual glidepaths to the same 
runway. The first glidepath encountered is the same as provided by the standard VASI. The second 
glidepath is about 25 percent higher than the first and is designed for the use of pilots of long-bodied 
aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 22 – Precision and nonprecision ALS configuration [ATC-3] 
 
The basic principle of VASI is that of colour differentiation between red and white. Each light 
projects a beam having a white segment in the upper part and a red segment in the lower part of the 
beam. From a position above the glidepath the pilot sees both bars as white. Lowering the aircraft with 
respect to the glidepath, the colour of the upwind bars changes from white to pink to red. When on the 
proper glidepath, the landing aircraft will overshoot the downwind bars and undershoot the upwind 
bars. Thus the downwind (closer) bars are seen as white and the upwind bars as red. From a position 
below the glidepath both light bars are seen as red. Moving up to the glidepath, the colour of the 
downwind bars changes from red to pink to white. When below the glidepath, as indicated by a distinct 
all-red signal, a safe obstruction clearance might not exist. A standard two-bar VASI is illustrated in 
Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 – Standard 2-bar VASI [ATC-3] 
 
3.9 MICROWAVE LANDING SYSTEM (MLS) 
 
The Microwave Landing System (MLS) provides precision approach navigation guidance. 
Transmitting in the frequency range of 5031 to 5091 MHz, it provides azimuth (left/right) and 
elevation (glide slope) information, displayed either on conventional CDIs or with multifunction 
cockpit displays. Range information is also provided. 
MLS requires separate airborne equipment to receive and process the signals from what is 
normally installed in general aviation aircraft today. It has data communications capability, and can 
provide audible information about the condition of the transmitting system and other pertinent data 
such as weather, runway status, etc. The MLS transmits an audible identifier consisting of four letters 
beginning with the letter M, in Morse code at a rate of at least six per minute. The MLS system 
monitors itself and transmits ground-to-air data messages about the system’s operational condition. 
During periods of routine or emergency maintenance, the coded identification is missing from the 
transmissions. 
 
Figure 24 – MLS coverage volumes, 3-D representation [ATC-3] 
 
The MLS is made up of an approach azimuth station (transmitter/antenna) with data 
transmission capability, an elevation station, a range station, and sometimes a back azimuth station. 
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3.9.1 APPROACH AZIMUTH STATION 
 
The approach azimuth station, unlike ILS, is able to provide approach guidance along any path 
within its ±40° (to runway alignment) range, like in Figure 24. Therefore, curved and segmented 
approaches are possible. This facility also provides the data communications capability of the system. 
This station is normally located about 1,000 feet beyond the stop end of the runway, but beyond this 
limitation there is considerable latitude in actual station location. A back azimuth station may be 
operating in conjunction with the approach azimuth station. If so, lateral guidance is available for 
missed approach and departure navigation. 
 
3.9.2 ELEVATION GUIDANCE STATION 
 
Like the approach azimuth station, the elevation guidance station has considerably more 
capability than the ILS glideslope system. Approach glidepath angles are selectable over a wide range up 
to at least 15°, with coverage to a maximum of 30°. This provides considerable flexibility for 
developing multipath approaches. 
 
3.9.3 RANGE GUIDANCE STATION 
 
The range guidance station transmits both normal and precision DME (DME/P) signals that 
function the same as normal DME (DME/N), with some technical and accuracy differences. Accuracy 
is improved to be consistent with the accuracy provided by the MLS azimuth and elevation stations. 
 
4 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (FMS) 
 
The Flight Management System (FMS) is not a navigation system in itself. Rather, it is a system 
that automates the tasks of managing the onboard navigation systems. FMS may perform other 
onboard management tasks, but this discussion is limited to its navigation function [ATC-4]. 
FMS is an interface between flight crews and flight-deck systems. FMS can be thought of as a 
computer with a large database of airport and NAVAID locations and associated data, aircraft 
performance data, airways, intersections, DPs, and STARs. FMS also has the ability to accept and store 
numerous user-defined waypoints, flight routes consisting of departures, waypoints, arrivals, 
approaches, alternates, etc. FMS can quickly define a desired route from the aircraft’s current position 
to any point in the world, perform flight plan computations, and display the total picture of the flight 
route to the crew. 
FMS also has the capability of controlling (selecting) VOR, DME, and LOC NAVAIDs, and 
then receiving navigational data from them. INS, LORAN, and GPS navigational data may also be 
accepted by the FMS computer. The FMS may act as the input/output device for the onboard 
navigation systems, so that it becomes the “go-between” for the crew and the navigation systems. 
At startup, the crew programs the aircraft location, departure runway, DP (if applicable), 
waypoints defining the route, approach procedure, approach to be used, and routing to alternate. This 
may be entered manually, be in the form of a stored flight plan, or be a flight plan developed in another 
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computer and transferred by disk or electronically to the FMS computer. The crew enters this basic 
information in the control/display unit (CDU) shown in Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 25 – A picture of the computational and wind side of a common mechanical computer, an electronic 
computer, and plotter [ATC-4] 
 
Once airborne, the FMS computer channels the appropriate NAVAIDs and takes 
radial/distance information, or channels two NAVAIDs, taking the more accurate distance 
information. FMS then indicates position, track, desired heading, groundspeed and position relative to 
desired track. Position information from the FMS updates the INS. In more sophisticated aircraft, the 
FMS provides inputs to the HSI, RMI, glass cockpit navigation displays, head-up display (HUD), 
autopilot, and auto-throttle systems. 
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Figure 26 – FMS CDU in flight plan mode [ATC-4] 
 
5 HEAD‐UP DISPLAY (HUD) 
The HUD is a display system that provides a projection of navigation and air data (airspeed in 
relation to approach reference speed, altitude, left/right and up/down glide slope) on a transparent 
screen between the pilot and the windshield [ATC-4]. 
Other information may be displayed, including a runway target in relation to the nose of the 
aircraft. This allows the pilot to see the information necessary to make the approach while also being 
able to see out the windshield, which diminishes the need to shift between looking at the panel to 
looking outside. Virtually any information desired can be displayed on the HUD if it is available in the 
aircraft’s flight computer, and if the display is user-definable. 
 
6 RADAR NAVIGATION (GROUND BASED) 
 
Radar works by transmitting a pulse of RF energy in a specific direction. The return of the echo 
or bounce of that pulse from a target is precisely timed. From this, the distance travelled by the pulse 
and its echo is determined and displayed on a radar screen in such a manner that the distance and 
bearing to this target can be instantly determined. The radar transmitter must be capable of delivering 
extremely high power levels toward the airspace under surveillance, and the associated radar receiver 
must be able to detect extremely small signal levels of the returning echoes. 
The radar display system provides the controller with a maplike presentation upon which 
appear all the radar echoes of aircraft within detection range of the radar facility. By means of 
electronically-generated range marks and azimuth indicating devices, the controller can locate each 
radar target with respect to the radar facility, or can locate one radar target with respect to another. 
Another device, a video-mapping unit, generates an actual airway or airport map and presents it 
on the radar display equipment. Using the video-mapping feature, the air traffic controller not only can 
view the aircraft targets, but will see these targets in relation to runways, navigation aids, and hazardous 
ground obstructions in the area. Therefore, radar becomes a navigational aid, as well as the most 
significant means of traffic separation. 
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In a display presenting perhaps a dozen or more targets, a primary surveillance radar system 
cannot identify one specific radar target, and it may have difficulty “seeing” a small target at 
considerable distance—especially if there is a rain shower or thunderstorm between the radar site and 
the aircraft. This problem is solved with the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS), 
sometimes called secondary surveillance radar (SSR), which utilizes a transponder in the aircraft. The 
ground equipment is an interrogating unit, with the beacon antenna mounted so it rotates with the 
surveillance antenna. The interrogating unit transmits a coded pulse sequence that actuates the aircraft 
transponder. The transponder answers the coded sequence by transmitting a preselected coded 
sequence back to the ground equipment, providing a strong return signal and positive aircraft 
identification, as well as other special data such as the aircraft’s altitude. A transponder code consists of 
four numbers from zero to seven (4,096 possible codes). There are some standard codes, or ATC may 
issue a four-digit code to an aircraft. When a controller requests a code or function on the transponder, 
the word “squawk” may be used. 
The radar systems used by ATC are air route surveillance radar (ARSR), airport surveillance 
radar (ASR), precision approach radar (PAR) and airport surface detection equipment (ASDE). 
Surveillance radars scan through 360° of azimuth and present target information on a radar display 
located in a tower or centre [ATC-3]. This information is used independently or in conjunction with 
other navigational aids in the control of air traffic. 
ARSR is a long-range radar system designed primarily to cover large areas and provide a display 
of aircraft while en route between terminal areas. The ARSR enables air route traffic control centre 
(ARTCC) controllers to provide radar service when the aircraft are within the ARSR coverage. In some 
instances, ARSR may enable ARTCC to provide terminal radar services similar to but usually more 
limited than those provided by a radar approach control. 
ASR is designed to provide relatively short-range coverage in the general vicinity of an airport 
and to serve as an expeditious means of handling terminal area traffic through observation of precise 
aircraft locations on a radarscope [AIRP-9]. Nonprecision instrument approaches are available at 
airports that have an approved surveillance radar approach procedure. ASR provides radar vectors to 
the final approach course, and then azimuth information to the pilot during the approach. Along with 
range (distance) from the runway, the pilot is advised of MDA, when to begin descent, and when at the 
MDA. If requested, recommended altitudes will be furnished each mile while on final. 
PAR is designed to be used as a landing aid displaying range, azimuth, and elevation 
information rather than an aid for sequencing and spacing aircraft. PAR equipment may be used as a 
primary landing aid, or it may be used to monitor other types of approaches. Two antennas are used in 
the PAR array, one scanning a vertical plane, and the other scanning horizontally. Since the range is 
limited to 10 miles, azimuth to 20°, and elevation to 7°, only the final approach area is covered. The 
controller’s scope is divided into two parts. The upper half presents altitude and distance information, 
and the lower half presents azimuth and distance. 
The PAR is one in which a controller provides highly accurate navigational guidance in azimuth 
and elevation to a pilot. Pilots are given headings to fly, to direct them to, and keep their aircraft aligned 
with the extended centreline of the landing runway. They are told to anticipate glidepath interception 
approximately 10 to 30 seconds before it occurs and when to start descent. The published decision 
height (DH) will be given only if the pilot requests it. If the aircraft is observed to deviate above or 
below the glidepath, the pilot is given the relative amount of deviation by use of terms “slightly” or 
“well” and is expected to adjust the aircraft’s rate of descent/ascent to return to the glidepath. Trend 
information is also issued with respect to the elevation of the aircraft and may be modified by the terms 
“rapidly” and “slowly”; e.g., “well above glidepath, coming down rapidly.” Range from touchdown is 
given at least once each mile. If an aircraft is observed by the controller to proceed outside of specified 
safety zone limits in azimuth and/or elevation and continue to operate outside these prescribed limits, 
the pilot will be directed to execute a missed approach or to fly a specified course unless the pilot has 
the runway environment (runway, approach lights, etc.) in sight. Navigational guidance in azimuth and 
elevation is provided to the pilot until the aircraft reaches the published decision altitude (DA)/DH. 
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Advisory course and glidepath information is furnished by the controller until the aircraft passes over 
the landing threshold, at which point the pilot is advised of any deviation from the runway centreline. 
Radar service is automatically terminated upon completion of the approach. 
 
 
Figure 27 – PAR Radar at Milan Malpensa Airport 
 
The Airport Surface Detection Equipment SMR (Surface Movement Radar) is specifically 
designed to detect all principal features on the surface of an airport, including aircraft and vehicular 
traffic, and to present the entire image on a radar indicator console in the control tower. It is used to 
augment visual observation by tower personnel of aircraft and/or vehicular movements on runways 
and taxiways. 
Radar Limitations [ATC-3]: 
1. It is very important for the aviation community to recognize the fact that there are limitations 
to radar service and that ATC controllers may not always be able to issue traffic advisories concerning 
aircraft which are not under ATC control and cannot be seen on radar. 
2. The characteristics of radio waves are such that they normally travel in a continuous straight line 
unless they are “bent” by abnormal atmospheric phenomena such as temperature inversions; reflected 
or attenuated by dense objects such as heavy clouds, precipitation, ground obstacles, mountains, etc.; or 
screened by high terrain features. 
3. Primary radar energy that strikes dense objects will be reflected and displayed on the operator’s 
scope thereby blocking out aircraft at the same range and greatly weakening or completely eliminating 
the display of targets at a greater range. 
4. Relatively low altitude aircraft will not be seen if they are screened by mountains or are below 
the radar beam due to curvature of the Earth. 
5. The amount of reflective surface of an aircraft will determine the size of the radar return. 
Therefore, a small light airplane or a sleek jet fighter will be more difficult to see on primary radar than 
a large commercial jet or military bomber. 
6. All ARTCC radar in the conterminous U.S. and many airport surveillance radar have the 
capability to interrogate Mode C and display altitude information to the controller from appropriately 
equipped aircraft. However, a number of airport surveillance radar do not have Mode C display 
capability; therefore, altitude information must be obtained from the pilot. 
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7 AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE (ADS) 
 
The classic original idea of ADS was recommended to ICAO by the FANS/I Committee. 
Subsequently the developments of appropriate standards and guidance material has been entrusted to 
the ADS Panel, whose work provided the basis for the publication of an ICAO circular [AIRP-12]. 
This “classic” ADS is a surveillance technique for use by air traffic services in which aircraft 
automatically provide, via data-link, data derived from on-board position-fixing and navigation systems. 
ADS will allow controllers to obtain position data and other information from ADS equipped aircraft 
in a timely manner in accordance with their requirements, and will allow the aircraft to be tracked even 
in non-radar airspace. 
The ADS application allows the implementation of reporting agreements, which, with the 
exception of an aircraft in an emergency situation, are established exclusively by the ground. An ADS 
agreement is an ADS reporting plan which establishes the conditions of ADS data reporting (i.e. data 
required by the ATC system and the frequency of the ADS reports which have to be agreed prior to 
the provision of the ADS-ATS services). The terms of an ADS agreement will be exchanged between 
the ground system and the aircraft by means of a contract, or a series of contracts. An ADS contract 
specifies under what conditions an ADS report would be initiated, and what data groups will be 
included in the reports. There are three types of contract: 
• on demand, which provides an immediate report; 
• periodic, which provides a report at a regular periodic intervals determined by the ground 
system; 
• event, which provides a report when or if a specified event or events take place. 
 
ADS contracts necessary for the control of the aircraft will be established with each aircraft by the 
relevant ground system, for at least the portion of the aircraft flight over which that ground system has 
jurisdiction. The contract may include the provision of a basic ADS reports at a periodic interval 
defined by the ground system with, optionally, one or more additional blocks containing specific 
information, which may or may be not be sent with each periodic report. The agreement may also 
provide for ADS reports at geographically-defined points such as way-points and intermediate points, 
in addition to other specific event-driven reports. The primary objective of the ADS application is to 
provide automated aircraft position data for ATC. The ADS application may also be useful in air traffic 
flow management (ATFM) and airspace management (ASM). ATM benefits from the use of the ADS 
application may include separation minima reduction, and more efficient use of the airspace. The first 
operational application of the “classic” ADS was implemented in the Pacific Ocean in 1995, taking 
advantage of character oriented protocols (not compatible with the ICAO standardised ATN) and 
satellite communications. 
Although the application of ADS does not specifically encompass ATC communications, 
automation or procedures, all of these elements must be tailored to support the ADS application and to 
make meaningful use of the data. Thus, it is critical to consider the ATC automation and 
communication system as the foundation upon which an ADS-based ATC system is built. The ADS 
application and associated communications will have to be supported by advanced airborne and ground 
facilities and data-link communications with proven end-to end- integrity, reliability and availability, 
within the boundaries of acceptable cost and complexity. The implementation of the “classic” ADS, 
through reliable data-link communications and accurate aircraft navigation systems, therefore provides 
surveillance services in oceanic airspace and other areas where non-radar air traffic control services are 
currently provided. 
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In non-radar airspace, the effective use of ADS in air traffic services will facilitate the reduction 
of separation minima, enhance flight safety and better accommodate user preferred profiles, but the 
proper enhanced implementation of ADS may also provide benefits in en-route continental, terminal 
areas and on the airport surface. The automatic transmission of the aircraft position through ADS will 
replace present pilot position reports or complement radar information. The content and the frequency 
of reporting will be determined by the controlling ATC unit. 
ADS basic information report contains the following information: 
• the 3-D position of the aircraft (latitude, longitude, and altitude); 
• the time; 
• an indication of the accuracy of the position data information (figure of merit). 
An ADS report may contain any (or all) of the following information too: 
• aircraft identification; 
• ground vector (Track, Ground speed, Rate of climb or descent); 
• air vector (Heading, Mach or IAS, Rate of climb or descent); 
• projected profile (Next and Next+1 waypoint altitude and time); 
• meteorological information (Wind vector, Temperature and Turbulence); 
• short term intent (Lat, Lon, Alt and Time at projected intent point); 
• intermediate intent; 
• extended projected profile. 
 
If an altitude, track or speed change is predicted to occur between the aircraft’s current position and the 
projected intent point (indicated above), additional information to the short term intent data would be 
provided as intermediate intent (repeated as necessary). 
 
7.1 ADS BROADCAST (ADS‐B) 
 
ADS-B is a surveillance application transmitting parameters, such as position, ground track and 
ground speed, via a broadcast mode data link for utilisation by any air and/or ground user requiring it. 
This capability will permit enhanced airborne and ground situational awareness to provide for specific 
surveillance functions and co-operative pilot-controller and pilot-pilot ATM. The ADS-B application 
will not be limited to the traditional roles associated with ground based radar system. ADS-B will 
provide opportunities for new functionality both onboard the aircraft and within the ground ATC 
automation systems. Depending on the implementation, ADS-B may encompass both air-ground and 
air-air surveillance functionality, as well as applications between and among aircraft on the ground and 
ground vehicles. ADS-B will have many benefits in extending the range beyond that of secondary 
surveillance radar, particularly in airport surface and low altitude airspace, and air-to-air situational 
awareness. 
Each ADS-B capable aircraft will periodically broadcast its position and other required data 
provided by the onboard navigation system. Any user, either airborne or ground based, within range of 
this broadcast may choose to receive and process this information. The aircraft originating the 
broadcast need have no knowledge of what systems are receiving its broadcast. Because broadcast data 
might be received by the ground station at a rate in excess of the requirements of the ATC system, 
some filtering and/or tracking may be necessary. 
The ADS-B application supports improved use of airspace, reduced ceiling/visibility 
restrictions, improved surface surveillance, and enhanced safety. ADS-B equipage may be extended to 
vehicles on the airport surface movement area, uncharted obstacles not identified by a current 
NOTAM, and non-powered airborne vehicles or obstacles if a satisfactory cost/benefit ratio is 
achieved. ADS-B will support several services, including those designed for both air-ground and air-air 
use: 
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• ATC surveillance; 
• Airborne situational awareness (i.e. cockpit display of traffic information, CDTI); 
• Conflict detection (both airborne and ground based); 
• Airborne Separation Assurance System; 
• ATC conformance monitoring. 
 
ADS-B will enhance ATC surveillance in the following ways: 
• in a mixed ADS-B/radar surveillance environment, ADS-B data will complement or 
supplement radar data ADS-B can be used as back-up for SSR introducing a cheaper and dissimilar 
redundancy since it can be seen as an additional independent information channel; 
• ADS-B will extend surveillance services into non-radar airspace such as low altitude airspace, 
remote airspace and coastal waters using economically acceptable line of sight communication means. 
Airborne ADS-B is performed by airborne systems and applications that utilize surveillance 
information pertaining to other nearby aircraft. The users of ADS-B reports are the flight crews and 
normally independent of the ground ATC infrastructure. 
 
7.2 INTEGRATION OF ADS AND SSR DATA 
 
The safe operation of aircraft at close proximity requires an increase in the availability of very 
accurate positional data in order to apply separation closer to the minima and increase the airspace 
capacity. An enhancement of tracking algorithms is obviously necessary in order to take advantage of 
all available surveillance sources as well as processing new parameters related to aircraft motion. The 
primary objective of the ADS/SSR integration technique is to take advantage of the generalised ADS 
concept for implementation within areas covered by radar surveillance as well as transition areas 
between radar and ADS only coverage. Complete radar coverage in ADS/SSR airspace is not required, 
although outer horizontal limits should normally be coincident. In addition an ADS transition buffer is 
advisable. In areas where duplicate radar coverage is currently mandatory the integration of ADS might 
lead to a mitigation of that requirement, as well as for the provision of single radar coverage in 
homogeneous areas where the installation of radar system is not feasible or economically justifiable. 
The use of the ADS/SSR integration in areas already having multiple radar coverage will take advantage 
of additional data providing the system with the capability of making as uniform as possible track 
quality within radar covered airspace, thus overcoming residual radar shortcomings. ADS/SSR 
integration will result in the augmentation of surveillance performance in existing radar environments, 
as well as beyond radar coverage. The ADS/SSR integration will result also in a more reliable data 
availability for conflict detection and conformance monitoring function thus reducing the probability of 
false alarms of this function. This will be essentially due to kinematics data measured on-board and 
availability of aircraft intent. 
ADS/SSR data integration will use different technique for “classic” ADS or ADS-Broadcast. 
Since the ADS technique relies upon the capability of an ADS facility to set up a contract with the 
aircraft to send reports with appropriate content and periodicity, the contract management function will 
play a key role in defining the most appropriate periodicity and content to optimise the ADS/SSR 
integration. The strategy to define the best contract for this function should take into account 
constraints on airspace and traffic scenario, as well as aircraft flight plan and communication 
infrastructure performances ADS-B relies upon the capability of an aircraft to transmit periodically a 
set of flight related information via a broadcast data link. ICAO indicates only a minimum set of 
information transmitted and maximum update period for various operational domain. 
The ADS/SSR data integration can provide the following improvements to the surveillance function: 
• automatic acquisition of certain airborne data containing parameters such as true track, speed, 
etc. (i.e. in general vector information), which will improve the ground tracking of aircraft. 
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• availability of surveillance data also when the radar limitations occur. These limitations are: 
- mechanical rotation of the radar antenna, 
- garbling, fruiting and splitting. 
• coding of the altitude data in smaller altitude unit increments (about 3 meters or 10 feet) and 
the availability of the vertical rate, as provided by Ground Vector or Air Vector, which will improve the 
ability of ATC to monitor and make high quality predictions of aircraft trajectories in the vertical plane, 
thus improving the Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA) function to significantly reduce the number of 
potential false alarms; 
• automatic acquisition of aircraft call signs by ATC system, thus overcoming current problems 
connected with SSR code-call sign correlation and with radar identification and transfer procedures; 
• acquisition of surveillance data, when satellite data link is used to support the ADS function, 
also when radar shortcomings such as line of sight propagation limitations (e.g., shadowing by 
orography, earth curvature, low level flight) become apparent, from properly equipped aircraft; 
• minimisation of the number of SSRs required to supply mono-radar coverage, since ADS fills in 
the small areas not covered by them (“gap filler”); 
• increase of the level of availability using the ADS as one more level of dissimilar redundancy; 
• availability of a means for a cross-check of ADS/Navigation data or radar integrity (NIM, 
Navigational Integrity Monitoring); 
• possibility of adapting the degree of surveillance redundancy for each aircraft according to 
instantaneous ATC needs, thus providing redundancy in a very cost effective manner, and paving the 
way towards the Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) which may emerge in ICAO after the 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP)  and the Required Communication Performance (RCP). 
In summary the improvements above are applicable to integration between ADS and Mode A/C and 
Monopulse SSR.  
Systems developed to support ASD/SSR data integration will be capable of meeting the 
communication performance appropriate to generate a reliable and effective data integration process. 
When considering ADS/SSR integration, the following should be taken into account: 
• performance requirements for ADS, including availability and integrity; 
• accuracy of both Radar and ADS position reports; 
• use of ADS data for example, as part of a data fusion and not just as back-up; 
• trajectory prediction requirements; 
• the development of a common surveillance processing system, where both the ADS and Radar 
tracks may be amalgamated to generate a single system track; and 
• the synchronisation of both radar and ADS update rates. 
 
7.3 GROUND MOVEMENTS 
 
When the aircraft are moving on the airport surface useful data will be basic information with 
very high reporting rate, to insure that the required tracking accuracy is met. 
ADS-B will also support ground conflict detection function. Airport surface conflict detection function 
shall detect conflicts including: 
• potential collision with static aircraft; 
• potential collision with moving aircraft; 
• potential collision with known static obstacles; 
• potential incursion into a restricted area 
• potential incursion into a controlled area. 
 
Basic ADS-B information, ground vector block, flight identification and/or airplane identification 
block and aircraft type or category will be also used for conflict detection function in airport surface 
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8 MODE S MULTILATERATION 
 
The ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) describes 
how traffic should be controlled on the surface of an airport, based upon the principle of “see and be 
seen”. It is recognised that the current SMGCS is not capable of delivering the required sophistication 
and capacity, particularly on complex airports and under conditions of reduced visibility. As a result of 
this A-SMGCS is being developed (A-stands for Advanced). 
Multilateration, or hyperbolic positioning, is the process of locating an object based on the 
Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) of a signal emitted from that object to three or more sensors.  
When a signal is transmitted from an object, it will be received by two spatially separate sensors at 
different times. The time difference is then used to calculate the objects position. By using three or 
more sensors, a complete position analysis can be attained. 
For ATC applications, multilateration provides the same level of fleet coverage as traditional 
SSR (ie. all aircraft or vehicles equipped with an operational Mode A, Mode C or Mode S transponder).  
Multilateration will generally provide higher accuracy, greater update rate, better coverage and improved 
reliability when compared to traditional SSR, and will do so at a much lower initial cost and with lower 
annual maintenance costs.  
Eurocontrol is focusing on the introduction of improved surveillance and procedures for air 
traffic controllers. Mode S Multilateration technology provides accurate surveillance and identification 
of all aircraft and transponder equipped vehicles on the airport surface. 
Controllers see the result on a dedicated display screen, with each aircraft and vehicle securely 
tagged with its identification and position. This is also useful for the controllers in good visibility, 
particularly when multiple aircraft with similar colour schemes are manoeuvring in close proximity to 
one another (e.g. in a holding bay). 
 
 
Figure 28 – The system normally uses three or more receivers to calculate the position of the aircraft or 
transponder equipped vehicle 
 
The ground systems consists of a number of Receiver units, Receiver/Transmitter units, a 
Reference Transponder (all non-rotating sensors) and a Central Processing Station. The number of 
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Receiver and Receiver/transmitter units vary depending of the size and layout of the aerodrome. The 
Multilateration system uses multiple receivers to capture the “squitter” transmitted from the Mode S 
transponder. Then, by comparing the time difference, the system calculates the position. For aircraft 
the system will get the identity by selectively interrogating the transponder to receive the assigned Mode 
A code or the Aircraft Identification (i.e. The ICAO call sign used in flight inserted in the FMS or 
Transponder Control Panel). For transponder equipped vehicles the system will get the identity by the 
unique Mode S address transmitted by the transponder. 
Mode S Multilateration systems have been already initially introduced at Amsterdam, Brussels, 
Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Geneva, London Heathrow, Milan (Malpensa), Milan (Linate), Paris Charles de 
Gaulle, Prague, Rome (Fiumicino), Vienna and Zurich Airports. Further implementation is foreseen at 
airports such as Palma De Majorca and Madrid. Widespread implementation within the USA is also 
planned. 
Before Push back/Taxi the pilot will be requested to enter a Mode A code at start up (i.e. 
assigned Mode A code). This code will be either a discrete code or the non-discrete code 1000. 
Whenever the aircraft is capable of reporting Aircraft Identification, the Aircraft’s Identification should 
also be entered through the FMS or the Transponder Control Panel. Flight crew must use the 3-letter 
ICAO designator of the operator, followed by flight identification number (e.g. BAW123, AFR456, 
SAS945…). 
The ATC system will make the correlation with the flight plan either from the discrete code or, 
when the non-discrete code 1000 is entered, from the Aircraft Identification entered through the FMS 
or the Transponder Control Panel. 
Pilots should ensure that the transponder is operating (i.e. XPNDR or the equivalent according 
to specific installation, AUTO if available, not OFF or STBY) and the assigned Mode A code selected 
from the request for push back or taxi whichever is earlier. 
 
 
 
Figure 29 – TCAS should normally be selected at the holding position/point. After Landing and vacating the 
runway, TCAS should normally be deselected 
 
After landing Pilots should ensure that the transponder is operating (i.e. XPNDR or the 
equivalent according to specific installation, AUTO if available, not OFF or STBY) after landing 
continuously until the aircraft is fully parked on stand. 
Most aircraft are already equipped with Mode S transponders for the purposes of ACAS. Also 
from 2005 all aircraft flying IFR in the core area need to be suitably equipped in accordance with the 
planned implementation of Mode S Surveillance. Requirements relating to the ground operation of 
Mode S transponders were included in ICAO Annex 10, Vol. IV more than ten years ago. The latest 
version (Amendment 77 applicable from 28th of November 2002) states that when the transponder is 
switched on and not in the stand-by mode and in the on-the-ground status, only replies to all call 
transmissions shall be inhibited (used for acquisition by Mode S Radars). This status requirement is 
normally fulfilled automatically through a nose wheel weight switch. There aren’t any new 
requirements, except that the transponder needs to remain operating on the ground with on-the-
ground status, otherwise the Multilateration system cannot determine the position and identity of the 
aircraft. The Mode S transponder must be compliant with JAA Technical Standard Order JTSO-
2C112a, or an equivalent standard that is compliant with the relevant ICAO SARPS and which is 
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acceptable to the certification authority. For the purpose of IFR/GAT flights, existing SSR mode-A/C 
transponders must be replaced by Mode S transponders with effect from 31 March 2005. 
In its surveillance role, multilateration does away with the need for expensive rotating radar 
antennas, replacing SSRs with several small and inexpensive stations strategically located to cover the 
same or greater airspace volume. Each unmanned station acts as a passive “listening post”, 
instantaneously receiving every aircraft transponder transmission within line-of-sight range, out to the 
highest jet altitudes. One or more multilateration stations can be combined active/passive units, both 
transmitting transponder interrogation signals identical to an SSR and then listening to their responses. 
Multilateration stations can receive all transponder responses (i.e. basic Mode-A/C, Mode-S, military 
IFF and ADSB). 
When incoming transponder signals are received by these stations, each immediately transfers 
its data to a centrally located processing unit the size of a filing cabinet, where advanced signal time-of-
arrival and triangulation techniques are applied to determine the precise position of each aircraft These 
are then passed to the air traffic control (ATC) centre using standard protocols, including all the data 
normally provided by an SSR. However, the multilateration process is much faster, allowing controllers 
to track traffic every second, compared to viewing targets with each sweep of an SSR’s rotating 
antenna. 
The frequent tracking produces a very smooth trace on the controller's display screen rather 
than the progressive “jumps” characteristic of SSR targets. What’s more, strategic location of the 
listening stations allows reception of aircraft signals in areas that are below SSR coverage or that are 
blocked by intervening structures. Position accuracy is also a strong point: over many evaluations, 
multilateration has been shown to be at least as accurate, and usually more so, than conventional SSR. 
Multilateration installations are now operating at a large number of locations around the world. 
These applications range from long-range, high-altitude airspace surveillance over very large areas, to 
terminal area traffic monitoring, to precise tracking and display of aircraft and vehicle movements on 
the airport surface. Such installations are even being used to automate the collection of aircraft user 
fees. 
Among countries that have adopted wide area multilateration is the Czech Republic, which has 
chosen this solution over SSR to accurately track, maintain separation and record the increasing 
number of high-altitude aircraft transiting its airspace to destinations beyond. The Czech Republic’s 
ANSP has established what is arguably one of the largest airspace areas in the world to be covered by 
multilateration traffic surveillance, at least with respect to those areas where the provision of 
conventional SSR is considered too costly. In the terminal area, the tracking and separation of aircraft 
has been traditionally an exclusive SSR function. While unquestionably safe and efficient, SSR coverage 
of key areas can be hampered by local high terrain. This limitation led to the earliest certified use of 
multilateration for terminal airspace control at Ostrava, in the Czech Republic. Located within a wide 
horseshoe of mountains, Ostrava and its surrounding terminal airspace posed a difficult challenge for 
the operation of SSR. The ANSP consequently opted in 2001 for a multilateration network solution, 
which was commissioned in 2002. By the following year, sufficient data had been obtained on the 
system’s performance to receive formal approval from the Civil Aviation Authority to reduce terminal 
area aircraft separation to three nautical miles from the typical five miles. As well, the low level 
coverage of the multilateration system permitted its exclusive use below 3,000 feet in the Ostrava 
terminal area, well below the surveillance coverage of regional radars. 
Yet one of the most demanding applications of the multilateration technique is in its use for 
monitoring landing approaches and airport surface movements. To achieve this, a number of the 
system’s small receivers are strategically placed around the airport and its runway approaches to 
produce clear and unobstructed line-of-sight displays of all air craft from the commencement of their 
multifinal approaches to their landings and subsequent taxiing to their terminals. 
In the approach area, multilateration’s very high one-second update rate provides controllers 
with a virtually continuous and extremely accurate picture of the approach stream, which is especially 
valuable in monitoring parallel runway operations. As a result, multilateration systems have recently 
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been chosen by the authorities at Beijing's Capital International and Madrid’s Barajas airports for this 
purpose - an application that previously had been the exclusive domain of radar. 
Perhaps equally important is the system’s application to monitoring movements on the 
aerodrome’s surface, which paradoxically remains one of aviation’s most hazardous operating 
environments. With the current emphasis on avoiding runway incursions at aerodromes around the 
world, surface surveillance has understandably increased in importance. In this respect, multilateration 
offers significant advantages. Inevitably, even local radars are “blanked” in some sectors by airport 
buildings and other obstructions, sometimes leaving significant areas of the airport surface uncovered 
and therefore invisible to controllers. In contrast, appropriately positioned multilateration stations can 
cover the total aerodrome surface without being affected by adverse weather conditions. 
Aside from their installation in aircrafts, vehicles tracking units can be installed on all vehicles which use the 
operational areas. Small, affordable and quickly installed, these units can readily be seen on the controller’s 
display, with their unique vehicular identification tags allowing quick differentiation from taxiing 
aircraft, and thereby allowing appropriate communication messages to be sent. In January 2007, the 
Dutch ANSP selected multilateration-based vehicles tracking units for over 300 service vehicles at 
Amsterdam Schiphol, following similar introductions at the Copenhagen, Prague, Santiago and Cape 
Town airports. At Schiphol, vehicles movement monitoring will be an integral part of the airport’s 
advanced surface movement guidance and control system (A-SMGCS), as it will be in the 
multilateration-supported A-SMGCS at Beijing. 
One unique application of the technology is in its very precise height measurement of aircraft 
overflying at high altitudes. The worldwide introduction of reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM) 
is unquestionably having a very beneficial effect on airspace capacity. Throughout most of the world, 
aircraft may now operate with 1000 feet vertical separation between 29000 and 44000 feet, compared to 
the previous 2000 feet of separation necessary because of the lower accuracy of earlier aircraft 
altimeters. Nevertheless, the importance that aviation attaches to redundancy dictates that independent 
checks of aircraft flying in RVSM airspace is a prudent step. Consequently, a growing number of RVSM 
monitoring stations have been established at key points along major traffic routes. At Linz, Austria, a 
purpose-built five-station multilateration system routinely measures the altitude of aircraft operating in 
RVSM airspace to an accuracy of 50 feet and passes this information – along with each aircraft’s 
individual identification – to the Eurocontrol Centre in Bretigny. 
Multilateration has also found use in tasks not directly concerned with air traffic control, but 
which provide unusually valuable services to airport administrations. For example, the system lends 
itself well to noise and curfew monitoring, and several small airports have adopted it for that purpose. 
More importantly, it provides very accurate details of the arrival and departure times of all aircraft - 
information that facilitates the automation of airport billing systems. 
Airport operators typically employ monitors that observe aircraft movements and enter the data 
manually. Estimates are hard to come by, but it appears certain that a substantial amount of an airport’s 
revenue may be lost under such circumstances. In December 2006, the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey issued a contract for provision of a specifically tailored system dedicated to the fully 
automatic tracking and billing of all aircraft movements at its Kennedy, LaGuardia, Newark and 
Teterboro airports. Combined, these airports handle over 1.4 million aircraft operations and over 94 
million passengers per year, making it one of the largest airport systems in the world, with significant 
revenue generated from the accurate billing of users. 
 
9 MULTILATERATION AND ADS‐B WORKING TOGETHER. 
 
It is not surprising that automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is poised to 
become a key element of the world’s future air traffic management (ATM) system [AIRP-15]. Its 
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benefits are now well understood, both by operators and air navigation service providers (ANSPs). Not 
only does ADS-B enhance safety while increasing capacity and efficiency, it also promises substantial 
cost savings. In announcing its ADS-B programme last year, for example, the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) stated that it would permit the eventual decommissioning of much of the 
country’s secondary surveillance radar (SSR) network, thereby saving about U.S. $1 billion. Airservices 
Australia launched a similar programme in 2005, and it too expects significant savings when use of 
ADS-B reaches the point where its SSR network can be safely retired. 
Perhaps less well known is the fact that a number of ANSPs are already moving to a new 
surveillance technology which provides equivalent and often better performance than the traditional 
SSR, at a much lower acquisition and maintenance cost. But even more important is the fact that this 
technology, known as multilateration, can provide ANSPs with an economical foundation for their 
eventual transition to a full ADSB environment. 
ADS-B is now entering service and will gradually spread to worldwide adoption over the next 
10 to 15 years. In ADS-B each appropriately equipped aircraft automatically transmits bursts of data 
which include the aircraft’s identification, altitude, track, speed, intent (i.e., climbing, descending or 
flying level), plus other information. These transmissions are received by ATC and also by all other 
ADS-B equipped aircraft within reception range, where they are presented on cockpit displays in a 
similar fashion to that of an ATC screen. The cockpit displays usually restrict the presentation to show 
other aircraft within a crew selectable altitude band of up to 3,000 feet above and below their aircraft, 
thereby providing pilots with exceptional situational awareness of the traffic of interest, with obvious 
safety benefits. Eventually, it may be possible, under certain circumstances for the system to be used by 
pilots for maintaining separation. 
Today, relatively few aircrafts carry complete ADS-B installations, but a growing number are 
transmitting ADS-B data from transponders that are tracked by multilateration installations. In the 
future worldwide ADS-B environment, networks of unmanned, strategically located groundbased 
transceivers will be established. These will receive the ADS-B transmissions from all aircrafts within 
reception range and instantly retransmit this information to controllers’ screens at the nearest ATC 
centre. In certain systems, the ATC centre can uplink weather, NOTAMs, and other important flight 
information to the aircrafts via same transceivers. During the lengthy transition to a complete ADS-B 
environment, the most important uplinked data will undoubtedly be that describing the flight paths of 
aircraft not yet equipped with ADS-B. These would be visible to controllers using radar or 
multilateration surveillance, but without the uplink would not be visible to the crew of an aircraft 
equipped for ADS-B. Details of unequipped traffic are provided to ADS-B equipped aircraft via the 
traffic information service-broadcast (TISB), one of the ADS-B system’s two supporting features. The 
other, known as the flight information system-broadcast (FIS-B), will carry weather, NOTAMs and 
other priority information. Both uplink transmissions are specific to the ground-based transceiver’s 
coverage areas. 
For ANSP the critical questions are therefore those that concern the timing of their transition 
to a full ADS-B control environment and the associated investment in a network of dedicated ground-
based transceivers to cover their airspace. The date by which ground-based transceivers will be needed 
in a specific area is hard to determine, being dependent on the rate at which aircraft operators install 
equipment in their aircraft. One economical solution to this transition dilemma is a scheme in which the basic 
multilateration ground station incorporates the full functions of a ground-based transceiver for a future time when aircraft 
equipage is extensive. During the interim period, basic multilateration provides high performances coupled with low-
cost acquisition and reduced maintenance expense, either in covering additional airspace surveillance 
requirements or in replacing legacy SSRs should that be necessary before full ADS-B service is required. 
 The benefits of multilateration are being increasingly realized by ANSPs around the world, 
especially now that system’s flexibility, breadth of application and economic advantages are being 
demonstrated daily. As in communications, where data links in certain applications are gradually 
superseding routine voice messages, and likewise in navigation – a field in which terrestrial aids are being 
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supplanted by satellite positioning – technological evolution also characterizes surveillance, with 
multilateration and ADS-B expected to eventually replace radar in most, if not all, aviation applications. 
 But such transformations are in fact the normal state in air traffic management, and one can 
anticipate still more fundamental changes in the way aviation is conducted as the 21st century unfolds. 
Elements that were formerly regarded as being exclusively government-owned and operated, such as 
the traditional flag carrier, have already been widely privatized, and corporatization and privatization are 
spreading to other areas. Air Traffic Control, for example, is being transformed in a similar manner, as 
demonstrated by the growing number of privatized or partially privatized ANSPs. Along with this 
development, the provision of ATC related supporting services is beginning to change. In a significant 
step in this direction, the U.S. FAA recently announced that its nationwide ADS-B surveillance service 
– which it describes as the critical “backbone” of its Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NGATS) – will be provided by a private industry contractor. Under the FAA contract, the selected 
organization will be responsible for the design, production, installation, support and ongoing 
maintenance of over 500 ADS-B ground-based transceivers across the United States. In a break with 
the past, the FAA will not own and operate the surveillance system; its sole commitment, along with 
the operators that will benefit from the system, will be to pay for the service. Yet another example of 
this trend was the FAA’s transfer of the staffing and operation of many of its airport control towers 
and its general aviation flight service briefing activity to the industry. 
 Taking process a step further, one might expect that in the future, many of the world’s air 
traffic support services will be provided by private organizations under exclusive agreements with 
national or regional ATM authorities. The aforementioned system provides a scalable network 
backbone to enable these types of surveillance service models, with clear benefits to all stakeholders of 
air navigation services. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AIRPORT OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Each time a pilot operates an airplane, the flight normally begins and ends at an airport. An 
airport may be a small sod field or a large complex utilized by air carriers. This chapter discusses airport 
operations and identifies features of a complex airport, as well as provides information on operating on 
or in the vicinity of an airport. 
 
1 TYPES OF AIRPORTS 
 
There are two types of airports [AIRP-3]: 
• Controlled Airport 
• Uncontrolled Airport 
 
1.1 CONTROLLED AIRPORT 
 
A controlled airport has an operating control tower. Air traffic control (ATC) is responsible for 
providing for the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic at airports where the type of 
operations and/or volume of traffic requires such a service. Pilots operating from a controlled airport 
are required to maintain two-way radio communication with air traffic controllers, and to acknowledge 
and comply with their instructions. Pilots must advise ATC if they cannot comply with the instructions 
issued and request amended instructions. A pilot may deviate from an air traffic instruction in an 
emergency, but must advise ATC of the deviation as soon as possible. 
 
1.2 UNCONTROLLED AIRPORT 
 
An uncontrolled airport does not have an operating control tower. Two-way radio 
communications are not required, although it is a good operating practice for pilots to transmit their 
intentions on the specified frequency for the benefit of other traffic in the area. Table 1 lists 
recommended communication procedures. More information on radio communications will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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2 SOURCES FOR AIRPORT DATA 
 
When a pilot flies into a different airport, it is important to review the current data for that airport. 
This data can provide the pilot with information, such as communication frequencies, services 
available, closed runways, or airport construction [ATC-3]. Three common sources of information are: 
• Aeronautical Charts 
• Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD) 
• Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) 
 
2.1 AERONAUTICAL CHARTS 
 
Aeronautical charts provide specific information on airports. An aeronautical chart is provided 
together with an aeronautical chart legend, which provides guidance on interpreting the information on 
the chart. 
 
2.2 AIRPORT/FACILITY DIRECTORY 
 
The Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD) provides the most comprehensive information on a 
given airport. It contains information on airports, heliports, and seaplane bases that are open to the 
public. The A/FDs are contained in seven books, which are organized by regions. These A/FDs are 
revised every 8 weeks. For a complete listing of information provided in an A/FD and how the 
information may be decoded, one should refer to the “Directory Legend Sample” located in the front 
of each A/FD. In the back of each A/FD, there is information such as special notices, parachute 
jumping areas, and facility telephone numbers. It would be helpful to review an A/FD to become 
familiar with the information it contains. 
 
Table 1 – Recommended communication procedures [ATC-3] 
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2.3 NOTICES TO AIRMEN 
 
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) provide the most current information available [AIRP-3]. They 
provide time-critical information on airports and changes that affect the national airspace system and 
are of concern to instrument flight rule (IFR) operations. NOTAM information is classified into three 
categories. These are NOTAM-D or distant, NOTAM-L or local, and flight data centre (FDC) 
NOTAMs. NOTAM-Ds are attached to hourly weather reports and are available at flight service 
stations (AFSS/FSS). NOTAM-Ls include items of a local nature, such as taxiway closures or 
construction near a runway. These NOTAMs are maintained at the FSS nearest the airport affected. 
NOTAM-Ls must be requested from an FSS other than the one nearest the local airport for which the 
NOTAM was issued. FDC NOTAMs are issued by the National Flight Data Center and contain 
regulatory information, such as temporary flight restrictions or an amendment to instrument approach 
procedures. The NOTAM-Ds and FDC NOTAMs are contained in the Notices to Airmen publication, 
which is issued every 28 days. Prior to any flight, pilots should check for any NOTAMs that could 
affect their intended flight. 
 
3 AIRPORT MARKINGS AND SIGNS 
 
There are markings and signs used at airports, which provide directions and assist pilots in airport 
operations [AIRP-3]. Some of the most common markings and signs will be discussed. Additional 
information may be found in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). 
 
3.1 RUNWAY MARKINGS 
 
Runway markings vary depending on the type of operations conducted at the airport. Figure 1 
shows a runway that is approved as a precision instrument approach runway and also shows some 
other common runway markings. A basic VFR runway may only have centreline markings and runway 
numbers. Since aircraft are affected by the wind during takeoffs and landings, runways are laid out 
according to the local prevailing winds. Runway numbers are in reference to magnetic north. Certain 
airports have two or even three runways laid out in the same direction. These are referred to as parallel 
runways and are distinguished by a letter being added to the runway number. 
Examples are runway 36L (left), 36C (centre), and 36R (right). 
Another feature of some runways is a displaced threshold. A threshold may be displaced 
because of an obstruction near the end of the runway. Although this portion of the runway is not to be 
used for landing, it may be available for taxiing, takeoff, or landing rollout. 
Some airports may have a blast pad/stop-way area. The blast pad is an area where a propeller or 
jet blast can dissipate without creating a hazard. The stop-way area is paved in order to provide space 
for an airplane to decelerate and stop in the event of an aborted takeoff. These areas cannot be used for 
takeoff or landing. 
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3.2 TAXIWAY MARKINGS 
 
Airplanes use taxiways to transition from parking areas to the runway. Taxiways are identified 
by a continuous yellow centreline stripe. A taxiway may include edge markings to define the edge of the 
taxiway. This is usually done when the taxiway edge does not correspond with the edge of the 
pavement. If an edge marking is a continuous line, the paved shoulder is not intended to be used by an 
airplane. If it is a dashed marking, an airplane may use that portion of the pavement. Where a taxiway 
approaches a runway, there may be a holding position marker. These consist of four yellow lines (two 
solid and two dashed). The solid lines are where the airplane is to hold. At some controlled airports, 
holding position markings may be found on a runway. They are used when there are intersecting 
runways, and air traffic control issues instructions such as “cleared to land—hold short of runway 30.” 
 
3.3 OTHER MARKINGS 
 
Some of the other markings found on the airport include vehicle roadway markings, VOR 
receiver checkpoint markings, and non-movement area boundary markings. Vehicle roadway markings 
are used when necessary to define a pathway for vehicle crossing areas that are also intended for 
aircraft. These markings usually consist of a solid white line to delineate each edge of the roadway and a 
dashed line to separate lanes within the edges of the roadway. A VOR receiver checkpoint marking 
consists of a painted circle with an arrow in the middle. The arrow is aligned in the direction of the 
checkpoint azimuth. This allows pilots to check aircraft instruments with navigational aid signals. 
A non-movement area boundary marking delineates a movement area under air traffic control. 
These markings are yellow and located on the boundary between the movement and non-movement 
area. They normally consist of two yellow lines (one solid and one dashed). 
 
3.4 AIRPORT SIGNS 
 
There are six types of signs that may be found at airports. The more complex the layout of an 
airport, the more important the signs become to pilots. Figure 2 shows examples of signs, their 
purpose, and appropriate pilot action. The six types of signs are: 
 
• Mandatory Instruction Signs—have a red background with a white inscription. These signs denote an 
entrance to a runway, a critical area, or a prohibited area. 
 
• Location Signs—are black with yellow inscription and a yellow border and do not have arrows. They 
are used to identify a taxiway or runway location, to identify the boundary of the runway, or identify an 
instrument landing system (ILS) critical area. 
 
• Direction Signs—have a yellow background with black inscription. The inscription identifies the 
designation of the intersecting taxiway(s) leading out of an intersection. 
 
• Destination Signs—have a yellow background with black inscription and also contain arrows. These 
signs provide information on locating things, such as runways, terminals, cargo areas, and civil aviation 
areas. 
  
XIX ciclo di Dottorato in Ingegneria Elettrica 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA 
 
 4-5
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Selected airport markings and surface lighting [ATC-3] 
 
• Information Signs—have a yellow background with black inscription. These signs are used to provide 
the pilot with information on such things as areas that cannot be seen from the control tower, 
applicable radio frequencies, and noise abatement procedures. The airport operator determines the 
need, size, and location of these signs. 
 
• Runway Distance Remaining Signs—have a black background with white numbers. The numbers indicate 
the distance of the remaining runway in thousands of feet. 
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Figure 2 – Airport signs [ATC-3] 
 
4 AIRPORT LIGHTING 
 
The majority of airports have some type of lighting for night operations. The variety and type 
of lighting systems depends on the volume and complexity of operations at a given airport. Airport 
lighting is standardized [AIRP-3] so that airports use the same light colours for runways and taxiways. 
 
4.1 AIRPORT BEACON 
 
Airport beacons help a pilot identify an airport at night. The beacons are operated from dusk till 
dawn and sometimes they are turned on if the ceiling is less than 1,000 feet and/or the ground visibility 
is less than 3 statute miles (visual flight rules minimums). However, there is no requirement for this, so 
a pilot has the responsibility of determining if the weather is VFR. 
The beacon has a vertical light distribution to make it most effective from 1-10° above the horizon, 
although it can be seen well above or below this spread. The beacon may be an omnidirectional 
capacitor-discharge device, or it may rotate at a constant speed, which produces the visual effect of 
flashes at regular intervals. 
The combination of light colours from an airport beacon indicates the type of airport (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 – Airport rotating beacons 
 
Some of the most common beacons are: 
• Flashing white and green for civilian land airports. 
• Flashing white and yellow for a water airport. 
• Flashing white, yellow, and green for a heliport. 
• Two quick white flashes followed by a green flash identifies a military airport. 
 
4.2 APPROACH LIGHT SYSTEMS 
 
Approach light systems are primarily intended to provide a means to transition from instrument 
flight to visual flight for landing. The system configuration depends on whether the runway is a 
precision or non-precision instrument runway. Some systems include sequenced flashing lights, which 
appear to the pilot as a ball of light travelling towards the runway at high speed. Approach lights can 
also aid pilots operating under VFR at night. 
 
4.3 VISUAL GLIDESLOPE INDICATORS 
 
Visual glideslope indicators provide the pilot with glidepath information that can be used for 
day or night approaches. By maintaining the proper glidepath as provided by the system, a pilot should 
have adequate obstacle clearance and should touch down within a specified portion of the runway. 
 
4.4 VISUAL APPROACH SLOPE INDICATOR 
 
Visual approach slope indicator (VASI) installations are the most common visual glidepath 
systems in use. The VASI provides obstruction clearance within 10° of the runway extended runway 
centreline, and to 4 nautical miles (NM) from the runway threshold. 
AVASI consists of light units arranged in bars. There are 2-bar and 3-bar VASIs. The 2-bar VASI has 
near and far light bars and the 3-bar VASI has near, middle, and far light bars. Two-bar VASI 
installations provide one visual glidepath which is normally set at 3°. The 3-bar system provides two 
glidepaths with the lower glidepath normally set at 3° and the upper glidepath one-fourth degree above 
the lower glidepath. 
The basic principle of the VASI is that of colour differentiation between red and white. Each light unit 
projects a beam of light having a white segment in the upper part of the beam and a red segment in the 
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lower part of the beam. The lights are arranged so the pilot will see the combination of lights shown in 
Figure 4 to indicate below, on, or above the glidepath. 
 
Figure 4 – Precision approach path indicator 
 
 
Figure 5 – 2-Bar VASI system 
 
4.5 OTHER GLIDEPATH SYSTEMS 
 
A precision approach path indicator (PAPI) uses lights similar to the VASI system except they 
are installed in a single row, normally on the left side of the runway, like in Figure 5. 
A tri-colour system consists of a single light unit projecting a three-color visual approach path. A below 
the glidepath indication is red, on the glidepath colour is green, and above the glidepath is indicated by 
amber. When descending below the glidepath, there is a small area of dark amber. Pilots should not 
mistake this area for an “above the glidepath” indication as per Figure 6. There are also pulsating 
systems, which consist of a single light unit projecting a two-colour visual approach path. A below the 
glidepath indication is shown by a steady red light, slightly below is indicated by pulsating red, on the 
glidepath is indicated by a steady white light, and a pulsating white light indicates above the glidepath, 
as per Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Tri-color visual approach slope indicator [ATC-3] 
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Figure 7 – Pulsating visual approach slope indicator [ATC-3] 
 
4.6 RUNWAY LIGHTING 
 
There are various lights that identify parts of the runway complex. These assist a pilot in safely 
making a takeoff or landing during night operations. 
 
4.6.1 RUNWAY END IDENTIFIER LIGHTS 
 
Runway end identifier lights (REIL) are installed at many airfields to provide rapid and positive 
identification of the approach end of a particular runway. The system consists of a pair of synchronized 
flashing lights located laterally on each side of the runway threshold. REILs may be either 
omnidirectional or unidirectional facing the approach area. 
 
4.6.2 RUNWAY EDGE LIGHTS 
 
Runway edge lights are used to outline the edges of runways at night or during low visibility 
conditions. These lights are classified according to the intensity they are capable of producing. They are 
classified as high intensity runway lights (HIRL), medium intensity runway lights (MIRL), or low 
intensity runway lights (LIRL). The HIRL and MIRL have variable intensity settings. These lights are 
white, except on instrument runways, where amber lights are used on the last 2,000 feet or half the 
length of the runway, whichever is less. The lights marking the end of the runway are red. 
 
4.6.3 IN‐RUNWAY LIGHTING 
 
Touchdown zone lights (TDZL), runway centreline lights (RCLS), and taxiway turnoff lights are 
installed on some precision runways to facilitate landing under adverse visibility conditions. TDZLs are 
two rows of transverse light bars disposed symmetrically about the runway centreline in the runway 
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touchdown zone. RCLS consists of flush centreline lights spaced at 50 foot intervals beginning 75 feet 
from the landing threshold. Taxiway turnoff lights are flush lights, which emit a steady green colour. 
 
4.7 CONTROL OF AIRPORT LIGHTING 
 
Airport lighting is controlled by air traffic controllers at controlled airports. At uncontrolled 
airports, the lights may be on a timer, or where an FSS is located at an airport, the FSS personnel may 
control the lighting. A pilot may request various light systems be turned on or off and also request a 
specified intensity, if available, from ATC or FSS personnel. At selected uncontrolled airports, the pilot 
may control the lighting by using the radio. This is done by selecting a specified frequency and clicking 
the radio microphone. For information on pilot controlled lighting at various airports, refer to the 
Airport/Facility Directory, as in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 – Radio control runway lighting [ATC-4] 
 
4.8 TAXIWAY LIGHTS 
 
Omnidirectional taxiway lights outline the edges of the taxiway and are blue in colour. At many 
airports, these edge lights may have variable intensity settings that may be adjusted by an air traffic 
controller when deemed necessary or when requested by the pilot. 
Some airports also have taxiway centreline lights that are green in colour. 
 
4.9 OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS 
 
Obstructions are marked or lighted to warn pilots of their presence during daytime and night-
time conditions. Obstruction lighting can be found both on and off an airport to identify obstructions. 
They may be marked or lighted in any of the following conditions. 
 
• Red Obstruction Lights—either flash or emit a steady red colour during night-time operations, and 
the obstructions are painted orange and white for daytime operations. 
 
• High Intensity White Obstruction Light—flashes high intensity white lights during the daytime with 
the intensity reduced for night-time. 
 
• Dual Lighting—is a combination of flashing red beacons and steady red lights for night-time 
operation, and high intensity white lights for daytime operations. 
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5 WIND DIRECTION INDICATORS 
 
It is important for a pilot to know the direction of the wind. At facilities with an operating 
control tower, this information is provided by ATC. Information may also be provided by FSS 
personnel located at a particular airport or by requesting information on a common traffic advisory 
frequency (CTAF) at airports that have the capacity to receive and broadcast on this frequency. 
When none of these services is available, it is possible to determine wind direction and runway in use 
by visual wind indicators. A pilot should check these wind indicators even when information is 
provided on the CTAF at a given airport because there is no assurance that the information provided is 
accurate. 
 
Figure 8 – Wind direction indicators [ATC-3] 
 
 
Figure 9 – Segmented circle and airport traffic pattern [ATC-3] 
 
Wind direction indicators include a wind sock, wind tee, or tetrahedron. These are usually 
located in a central location near the runway and may be placed in the centre of a segmented circle, 
which will identify the traffic pattern direction, if it is other than the standard left-hand pattern, as per 
Figure 9. The wind sock is a good source of information since it not only indicates wind direction, but 
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allows the pilot to estimate the wind velocity and gusts or factor. The wind sock extends out straighter 
in strong winds and will tend to move back and forth when the wind is gusty. Wind tees and 
tetrahedrons can swing freely, and will align themselves with the wind direction. The wind tee and 
tetrahedron can also be manually set to align with the runway in use; therefore, a pilot should also look 
at the wind sock, if available. 
 
6 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Operating in and out of a controlled airport, as well as in a good portion of the airspace system, 
requires that an aircraft have two-way radio communication capability. For this reason, a pilot should 
be knowledgeable of radio station license requirements and radio communications equipment and 
procedures. 
 
6.1 RADIO EQUIPMENT 
 
In general aviation, the most common types of radios are VHF. A VHF radio operates on 
frequencies between 118.0 and 136.975 and is classified as 720 or 760 depending on the number of 
channels it can accommodate. The 720 and 760 uses .025 spacing (118.025, 118.050) with the 720 
having a frequency range up to 135.975 and the 760 going up to 136.975. VHF radios are limited to line 
of sight transmissions; therefore, aircraft at higher altitudes are able to transmit and receive at greater 
distances. Using proper radio phraseology and procedures will contribute to a pilot’s ability to operate 
safely and efficiently in the airspace system. A review of the Pilot/Controller Glossary contained in the 
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) will assist a pilot in the use and understanding of standard 
terminology. The AIM also contains many examples of radio communications, which should be 
helpful. 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has adopted a phonetic alphabet, which 
should be used in radio communications. When communicating with ATC, pilots should use this 
alphabet to identify their aircraft, like in Table 3. 
 
6.2 LOST COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES 
 
It is possible that a pilot might experience a malfunction of the radio. This might cause the 
transmitter, receiver, or both to become inoperative. If a receiver becomes inoperative and a pilot needs 
to land at a controlled airport, it is advisable to remain outside or above Class D airspace until the 
direction and flow of traffic is determined. A pilot should then advise the tower of the aircraft type, 
position, altitude, and intention to land. The pilot should continue, enter the pattern, report a position 
as appropriate, and watch for light signals from the tower. Light signal colours and their meanings are 
contained in Table 4. 
If the transmitter becomes inoperative, a pilot should follow the previously stated procedures 
and also monitor the appropriate air traffic control frequency. During daylight hours air traffic control 
transmissions may be acknowledged by rocking the wings, and at night by blinking the landing light. 
When both receiver and transmitter are inoperative, the pilot should remain outside of Class D 
airspace until the flow of traffic has been determined and then enter the pattern and watch for light 
signals. 
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If a radio malfunctions prior to departure, it is advisable to have it repaired, if possible. If this is 
not possible, a call should be made to air traffic control and the pilot should request authorization to 
depart without two-way radio communications. If authorization is given to depart, the pilot will be 
advised to monitor the appropriate frequency and/or watch for light signals as appropriate. 
 
 
Table 3 – Phonetic alphabet 
 
 
Table 4 – Light gun signals [ATC-3] 
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7 WAKE TURBULENCE 
 
All aircraft generate a wake while in flight. This disturbance is caused by a pair of counter-rotating 
vortices trailing from the wingtips. The vortices from larger aircraft pose problems to encountering 
aircraft. The wake of these aircraft can impose rolling moments exceeding the roll-control authority of 
the encountering aircraft. Also, the turbulence generated within the vortices can damage aircraft 
components and equipment if encountered at close range. For this reason, a pilot must envision the 
location of the vortex wake and adjust the flight-path accordingly. 
During ground operations and during takeoff, jet-engine blast (thrust stream turbulence) can cause 
damage and upsets at close range. For this reason, pilots of small aircraft should consider the effects of 
jet-engine blast and maintain adequate separation. 
Also, pilots of larger aircraft should consider the effects of their aircraft’s jet-engine blast on other 
aircraft and equipment on the ground.  
 
7.1 VORTEX GENERATION 
 
Lift is generated by the creation of a pressure differential over the wing surface. The lowest 
pressure occurs over the upper wing surface, and the highest pressure under the wing. This pressure 
differential triggers the rollup of the airflow aft of the wing resulting in swirling air masses trailing 
downstream of the wingtips. After the rollup is completed, the wake consists of two counter rotating 
cylindrical vortices. Most of the energy is within a few feet of the centre of each vortex, but pilots 
should avoid a region within about 100 feet of the vortex core (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 – Figure Vortex generation 
 
7.2 VORTEX STRENGTH 
 
The strength of the vortex is governed by the weight, speed, and shape of the wing of the 
generating aircraft. The vortex characteristics of any given aircraft can also be changed by the extension 
of flaps or other wing configuration devices as well as by a change in speed. The greatest vortex 
strength occurs when the generating aircraft is heavy, clean, and slow. 
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7.3 VORTEX BEHAVIOUR 
 
Trailing vortices have certain behavioural characteristics that can help a pilot visualize the wake 
location and take avoidance precautions. Vortices are generated from the moment an aircraft leaves the 
ground, since trailing vortices are the by-product of wing lift. The vortex circulation is outward, 
upward, and around the wingtips when viewed from either ahead or behind the aircraft. Tests have 
shown that vortices remain spaced a bit less than a wingspan apart, drifting with the wind, at altitudes 
greater than a wingspan from the ground. Tests have also shown that the vortices sink at a rate of 
several hundred feet per minute, slowing their descent and diminishing in strength with time and 
distance behind the generating aircraft (see Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11 – Vortex behaviour 
 
When the vortices of larger aircraft sink close to the ground (within 100 to 200 feet), they tend 
to move laterally over the ground at a speed of 2 or 3 knots. A crosswind will decrease the lateral 
movement of the upwind vortex and increase the movement of the downwind vortex. A tailwind 
condition can move the vortices of the preceding aircraft forward into the touchdown zone. 
 
7.4 VORTEX AVOIDANCE PROCEDURES 
 
• Landing behind a larger aircraft on the same runway—stay at or above the larger aircraft’s approach 
flight path and land beyond its touchdown point. 
• Landing behind a larger aircraft on a parallel runway closer than 2,500 feet—consider the possibility 
of drift and stay at or above the larger aircraft’s final approach flight path and note its touchdown 
point. 
• Landing behind a larger aircraft on crossing runway— cross above the larger aircraft’s flight path. 
• Landing behind a departing aircraft on the same runway—land prior to the departing aircraft’s 
rotating point. 
• Landing behind a larger aircraft on a crossing runway—note the aircraft’s rotation point and if past 
the intersection, continue and land prior to the intersection. If the larger aircraft rotates prior to the 
intersection, avoid flight below its flight path. Abandon the approach unless a landing is ensured well 
before reaching the intersection. 
• Departing behind a large aircraft, rotate prior to the large aircraft’s rotation point and climb above its 
climb path until turning clear of the wake. 
• For intersection takeoffs on the same runway, be alert to adjacent larger aircraft operations, 
particularly upwind of the runway of intended use. If an intersection takeoff clearance is received, avoid 
headings that will cross below the larger aircraft’s path. 
• If departing or landing after a large aircraft executing a low approach, missed approach, or touch and 
go landing (since vortices settle and move laterally near the ground, the vortex hazard may exist along 
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the runway and in the flight path, particularly in a quartering tailwind), it is prudent to wait 2 minutes 
prior to a takeoff or landing. 
• En route it is advisable to avoid a path below and behind a large aircraft, and if a large aircraft is 
observed above on the same track, change the aircraft position laterally and preferably upwind. 
 
8 COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
 
Title 14 of the Code of US Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91 has established right-of-way 
rules, minimum safe altitudes, and VFR cruising altitudes to enhance flight safety. The pilot can 
contribute to collision avoidance by being alert and scanning for other aircraft. This is particularly 
important in the vicinity of an airport. 
Effective scanning is accomplished with a series of short, regularly spaced eye movements that bring 
successive areas of the sky into the central visual field. Each movement should not exceed 10°, and 
each should be observed for at least 1 second to enable detection. Although back and forth eye 
movements seem preferred by most pilots, each pilot should develop a scanning pattern that is most 
comfortable and then adhere to it to assure optimum scanning. Even if entitled to the right-of-way, a 
pilot should give way if it is felt another aircraft is too close.  
 
9 CLEARING PROCEDURES 
 
The following procedures and considerations should assist a pilot in collision avoidance under 
various situations [AIRP-2]. 
• Before Takeoff—Prior to taxiing onto a runway or landing area in preparation for takeoff, 
pilots should scan the approach area for possible landing traffic, executing appropriate manoeuvres to 
provide a clear view of the approach areas. 
• Climbs and Descents—During climbs and descents in flight conditions which permit visual 
detection of other traffic, pilots should execute gentle banks left and right at a frequency which permits 
continuous visual scanning of the airspace. 
• Straight and Level—During sustained periods of straight-and-level flight, a pilot should execute 
appropriate clearing procedures at periodic intervals. 
• Traffic Patterns—Entries into traffic patterns while descending should be avoided. 
• Traffic at VOR Sites—Due to converging traffic, sustained vigilance should be maintained in 
the vicinity of VORs and intersections.  
• Training Operations—Vigilance should be maintained and clearing turns should be made prior 
to a practice manoeuvre. During instruction, the pilot should be asked to verbalize the clearing 
procedures (call out “clear left, right, above, and below”). 
 
High-wing and low-wing aircraft have their respective blind spots. High-wing aircraft should 
momentarily raise their wing in the direction of the intended turn and look for traffic prior to 
commencing the turn. Low-wing aircraft should momentarily lower the wing. 
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10 RUNWAY INCURSION AVOIDANCE 
 
It is important to give the same attention to operating on the surface as in other phases of 
flights. Proper planning can prevent runway incursions and the possibility of a ground collision. A pilot 
should be aware of the airplane’s position on the surface at all times and be aware of other aircraft and 
vehicle operations on the airport. At times controlled airports can be busy and taxi instructions 
complex. In this situation it may be advisable to write down taxi instructions. The following are some 
practices to help prevent a runway incursion [AIRP-2]. 
• Read back all runway crossing and/or hold instructions. 
• Review airport layouts as part of pre-flight planning and before descending to land, and while 
taxiing as needed. 
• Know airport signage. 
• Review Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) for information on runway/taxiway closures and 
construction areas. 
• Request progressive taxi instructions from ATC when unsure of the taxi route. 
• Check for traffic before crossing any Runway Hold Line and before entering a taxiway. 
• Turn on aircraft lights and the rotating beacon or strobe lights while taxing. 
• When landing, clear the active runway as soon as possible, then wait for taxi instructions before 
further movement. 
• Study and use proper phraseology in order to understand and respond to ground control 
instructions. 
• Write down complex taxi instructions at unfamiliar airports. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WEATHER ADVERSELY 
AFFECTING AIRPORT 
OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
 
1 FOG 
 
Instrument pilots and Air Traffic Controllers must learn to anticipate conditions leading to the 
formation of fog and take appropriate action early in the progress of the flight [ATC-3]. Before a flight, 
close examination of current and forecast weather should alert the pilot to the possibility of fog 
formation. When fog is a consideration, pilots should plan adequate fuel reserves and alternate landing 
sites. En route, the pilot must stay alert for fog formation through weather updates from EFAS, ATIS, 
and ASOS/AWOS sites.  
 
Figure 1 – Typical Fog Visual Range Reduction at Bologna Airport, Italy 
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Two conditions will lead to the formation of fog [ATC-2]. Either the air is cooled to saturation, 
or sufficient moisture is added to the air until saturation occurs. In either case, fog can form when the 
temperature/dew point spread is 5° or less. Pilots planning to arrive at their destination near dusk with 
decreasing temperatures should be particularly concerned about the possibility of fog formation. 
 
2 VOLCANIC ASH 
 
Volcanic eruptions create volcanic ash clouds containing an abrasive dust that poses a serious 
safety threat to flight operations. Adding to the danger is the fact that these ash clouds are not easily 
discernible from ordinary clouds when encountered at some distance from the volcanic eruption.  
When an aircraft enters a volcanic ash cloud, dust particles and smoke may become evident in 
the cabin, often along with the odour of an electrical fire. Inside the volcanic ash cloud, the aircraft may 
also experience lightning and St. Elmo’s fire on the windscreen. The abrasive nature of the volcanic ash 
can pit the windscreens, thus reducing or eliminating forward visibility. The pitot-static system may 
become clogged, causing instrument failure. Severe engine damage is probable in both piston and jet-
powered aircraft. 
Every effort must be made to avoid volcanic ash [ATC-3]. Since volcanic ash clouds are carried 
by the wind, pilots should plan their flights to remain upwind of the ash-producing volcano. Visual 
detection and airborne radar are not considered a reliable means of avoiding volcanic ash clouds. Pilots 
witnessing volcanic eruptions or encountering volcanic ash should immediately pass this information 
along in the form of a pilot report. The National Weather Service monitors volcanic eruptions and 
estimates ash trajectories. This information is passed along to pilots in the form of SIGMETs. 
Like many other hazards to flight, the best source of volcanic information comes from PIREPs. 
Pilots who witness a volcanic eruption or encounter volcanic ash in flight should immediately inform 
the nearest agency. Volcanic Ash Forecast Transport and Dispersion (VAFTAD) charts are also 
available; these depict volcanic ash cloud locations in the atmosphere following an eruption, and also 
forecast dispersion of the ash concentrations over 6- and 12-hour time intervals. See AC 00-45, 
Aviation Weather Services. 
 
3 THUNDERSTORMS 
 
A thunderstorm packs just about every weather hazard known to aviation into one vicious 
bundle. Turbulence, hail, rain, snow, lightning, sustained updrafts and downdrafts, and icing conditions 
are all present in thunderstorms. Do not take off in the face of an approaching thunderstorm or fly an 
aircraft that is not equipped with thunderstorm detection in clouds or at night in areas of suspected 
thunderstorm activity [ATC-3]. 
There is no useful correlation between the external visual appearance of thunderstorms and the 
severity or amount of turbulence or hail within them. All thunderstorms should be considered 
hazardous, and thunderstorms with tops above 35,000 feet should be considered extremely hazardous. 
Weather radar, airborne or ground based, will normally reflect the areas of moderate to heavy 
precipitation (radar does not detect turbulence). The frequency and severity of turbulence generally 
increases with the radar reflectivity closely associated with the areas of highest liquid water content of 
the storm. A flight path through an area of strong or very strong radar echoes separated by 20 to 30 
miles or less may not be considered free of severe turbulence. 
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Figure 2 – A thunderstorm packs just about every weather hazard known to aviation into one vicious bundle 
 
The probability of lightning strikes occurring to aircraft is greatest when operating at altitudes 
where temperatures are between -5 °C and +5 °C. In addition, an aircraft flying in the clear air near a 
thunderstorm is also susceptible to lightning strikes. Thunderstorm avoidance is always the best policy. 
 
4 WIND SHEAR 
 
Wind shear can be defined as a change in wind speed and/or wind direction in a short distance. 
It can exist in a horizontal or vertical direction and occasionally in both [ATC-3]. Wind shear can occur 
at all levels of the atmosphere but is of greatest concern during takeoffs and landings. It is typically 
associated with thunderstorms and low-level temperature inversions; however, the jet stream and 
weather fronts are also sources of wind shear. 
While an aircraft is on an instrument approach, a shear from a tailwind to a headwind will cause 
the airspeed to increase and the nose to pitch up with a corresponding balloon above the glidepath. A 
shear from a headwind to a tailwind will have the opposite effect and the aircraft will sink below the 
glidepath. 
A headwind shear followed by a tailwind/downdraft shear is particularly dangerous because the 
pilot has reduced power and lowered the nose in response to the headwind shear. This leaves the 
aircraft in a nose-low, power-low configuration when the tailwind shear occurs, which makes recovery 
more difficult, particularly near the ground. This type of wind shear scenario is likely while making an 
approach in the face of an oncoming thunderstorm. Pilots should be alert for indications of wind shear 
early in the approach phase and be ready to initiate a missed approach at the first indication. It may be 
impossible to recover from a wind shear encounter at low altitude. 
To inform pilots of hazardous wind shear activity, some airports have installed a Low-Level 
Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS) consisting of a centerfield wind indicator and several surrounding 
boundary-wind indicators. With this system, controllers are alerted of wind discrepancies (an indicator 
of wind shear possibility) and provide this information to pilots. 
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Figure 3 – Glide-Slope Deviations due to wind shear encounter 
 
5 EFFECT OF OBSTRUCTIONS ON WIND 
 
Another atmospheric hazard exists that can create problems for pilots. Obstructions on the 
ground affect the flow of wind and can be an unseen danger [ATC-3]. Ground topography and large 
buildings can break up the flow of the wind and create wind gusts that change rapidly in direction and 
speed. These obstructions range from manmade structures like hangars to large natural obstructions, 
such as mountains, bluffs, or canyons. It is especially important to be vigilant when flying in or out of 
airports that have large buildings or natural obstructions located near the runway. 
The intensity of the turbulence associated with ground obstructions depends on the size of the 
obstacle and the primary velocity of the wind. This can affect the takeoff and landing performance of 
any aircraft and can present a very serious hazard. During the landing phase of flight, an aircraft may 
“drop in” due to the turbulent air and be too low to clear obstacles during the approach. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Currents generated by varying surface conditions [ATC-3] 
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Figure 5 – Turbulence caused by manmade obstructions [ATC-3] 
 
6 LOW‐LEVEL WIND SHEAR 
 
While wind shear can occur at any altitude, low-level wind shear [ATC-3] is especially hazardous 
due to the proximity of an aircraft to the ground. Directional wind changes of 180° and speed changes 
of 50 knots or more are associated with low-level wind shear. Low-level wind shear is commonly 
associated with passing frontal systems, thunderstorms, and temperature inversions with strong upper 
level winds (greater than 25 knots). 
Wind shear is dangerous to an aircraft for several reasons. The rapid changes in wind direction 
and velocity changes the wind’s relation to the aircraft disrupting the normal flight attitude and 
performance of the aircraft. During a wind shear situation, the effects can be subtle or very dramatic 
depending on wind speed and direction of change. For example, a tailwind that quickly changes to a 
headwind will cause an increase in airspeed and performance. Conversely, when a headwind changes to 
a tailwind, the airspeed will rapidly decrease and there will be a corresponding decrease in performance. 
In either case, a pilot must be prepared to react immediately to the changes to maintain control of the 
aircraft. 
In general, the most severe type of low-level wind shear is associated with convective 
precipitation or rain from thunderstorms. One critical type of shear associated with convective 
precipitation is known as a microburst. A typical microburst occurs in a space of less than 1 mile 
horizontally and within 1,000 feet vertically. The lifespan of a microburst is about 15 minutes during 
which it can produce downdrafts of up to 6,000 feet per minute. It can also produce a hazardous wind 
direction change of 45 knots or more, in a matter of seconds. When encountered close to the ground, 
these excessive downdrafts and rapid changes in wind direction can produce a situation in which it is 
difficult to control the aircraft (see Figure 6). During an inadvertent takeoff into a microburst, the plane 
first experiences a performance-increasing headwind (1), followed by performance-decreasing 
downdrafts (2). Then the wind rapidly shears to a tailwind (3), and can result in terrain impact or flight 
dangerously close to the ground (4). 
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Figure 6 – Effect of a microburst wind [ATC-3] 
 
Microbursts are often difficult to detect because they occur in a relatively confined area. In an 
effort to warn pilots of low-level wind shear, alert systems have been installed at several airports around 
the country. A series of anemometers, placed around the airport, form a net to detect changes in wind 
speeds. When wind speeds differ by more than 15 knots, a warning for wind shear is given to pilots. 
This system is known as the low-level wind shear alert system, or LLWAS. 
It is important to remember that wind shear can affect any flight and any pilot at any altitude. While 
wind shear may be reported, it often remains undetected and is a silent danger to aviation. Always be 
alert to the possibility of wind shear, especially when flying in and around thunderstorms and frontal 
systems. 
 
7 VISIBILITY 
 
Closely related to cloud cover and reported ceilings is visibility information. Visibility [ATC-3] 
refers to the greatest horizontal distance at which prominent objects can be viewed with the naked eye. 
Current visibility is also reported in METAR and other aviation weather reports, as well as automated 
weather stations. Visibility information, as predicted by meteorologists, is available during a pre flight 
weather briefing. 
 
8 PRECIPITATION 
 
Precipitation refers to any form of water particles that form in the atmosphere and fall to the 
ground. It has a profound impact on flight safety. Depending on the form of precipitation, it can 
reduce visibility, create icing situations, and affect landing and takeoff performance of an aircraft. 
Precipitation occurs because water or ice particles in clouds grow in size until the atmosphere 
can no longer support them. It can occur in several forms as it falls toward the Earth, including drizzle, 
rain, ice pellets, hail, and ice.  
Drizzle is classified [ATC-3] as very small water droplets, smaller than 0.02 inches in diameter. 
Drizzle usually accompanies fog or low stratus clouds. Water droplets of larger size are referred to as 
rain. Rain that falls through the atmosphere but evaporates prior to striking the ground is known as 
virga. Freezing rain and  freezing drizzle occur when the temperature of the surface is below freezing; 
the rain freezes on contact with the cooler surface. 
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If rain falls through a temperature inversion, it may freeze as it passes through the underlying 
cold air and fall to the ground in the form of ice pellets. Ice pellets are an indication of a temperature 
inversion and that freezing rain exists at a higher altitude. In the case of hail, freezing water droplets are 
carried up and down by drafts inside clouds, growing larger in size as they come in contact with more 
moisture. Once the updrafts can no longer hold the freezing water, it falls to the Earth in the form of 
hail. Hail can be pea-sized, or it can grow as large as 5 inches in diameter, larger than a softball. 
Snow is precipitation in the form of ice crystals that falls at a steady rate or in snow showers 
that begin, change in intensity, and end rapidly. Falling snow also varies in size, being very small grains 
or large flakes. Snow grains are the equivalent of drizzle in size. 
Precipitation in any form poses a threat to safety of  flight. Often, precipitation is accompanied 
by low ceilings and reduced visibility. Aircraft that have ice, snow, or frost on their surfaces must be 
carefully cleaned prior to beginning a flight because of the  possible airflow disruption and loss of lift. 
Rain can contribute to water in the fuel tanks. Precipitation can create hazards on the runway surface 
itself, making takeoffs and landings difficult, if not impossible, due to snow, ice, or pooling water and 
very slick surfaces. 
 
9 AVIATION WEATHER FORECASTS 
 
Observed weather condition reports are often [ATC-3] used in the creation of forecasts for the 
same area. A variety of different forecast products are produced and designed to be used in the pre-
flight planning stage. The printed forecasts that pilots need to be familiar with are the terminal 
aerodrome forecast (TAF), aviation area forecast (FA), in-flight weather advisories (SIGMET, 
AIRMET), and the winds and temperatures aloft forecast (FD). 
 
9.1 TERMINAL AERODROME FORECASTS (TAF) 
 
A terminal aerodrome forecast is a report established for the 5 statute mile radius around an 
airport. TAF reports are usually given for larger airports. Each TAF is valid for a 24-hour time period, 
and is updated four times a day at 0000Z, 0600Z, 1200Z, and 1800Z. The TAF utilizes the same 
descriptors and abbreviations as used in the METAR report. 
 
The terminal forecast includes the following information in sequential order: 
1. Type of Report—A TAF can be either a routine forecast (TAF) or an amended forecast (TAF 
AMD). 
2. ICAO Station Identifier—The station identifier is the same as that used in a METAR. 
3. Date and Time of Origin—Time and date of TAF origination is given in the six-number code with 
the first two being the date, the last four being the time. Time is always given in UTC as denoted by the 
Z following the number group. 
4. Valid Period Date and Time—The valid forecast time period is given by a six-digit number group. 
The first two numbers indicate the date, followed by the two-digit beginning time for the valid period, 
and the last two digits are the ending time. 
5. Forecast Wind—The wind direction and speed forecast are given in a five-digit number group. The 
first three indicate the direction of the wind in reference to true north. The last two digits state the 
wind-speed in knots as denoted by the letters “KT.” Like the METAR, winds greater than 99 knots are 
given in three digits. 
6. Forecast Visibility—The forecast visibility is given in statute miles and may be in whole numbers or 
fractions. If the forecast is greater than 6 miles, it will be coded as “P6SM.” 
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7. Forecast Significant Weather—Weather phenomenon is coded in the TAF reports in the same 
format as the METAR. If no significant weather is expected during the forecast time period, the 
denotation “NSW” will be included in the “becoming” or “temporary” weather groups. 
8. Forecast Sky Condition—Forecast sky conditions are given in the same manner as the METAR. 
Only cumulonimbus (CB) clouds are forecast in this portion of the TAF report as opposed to CBs and 
towering cumulus in the METAR. 
9. Forecast Change Group—For any significant weather change forecast to occur during the TAF time 
period, the expected conditions and time period are included in this group. This information may be 
shown as From (FM), Becoming (BECMG), and Temporary (TEMPO). “From” is used when a rapid 
and significant change, usually within an hour, is expected. “Becoming” is used when a gradual change 
in the weather is expected over a period of no more than 2 hours. “Temporary” is used for temporary 
fluctuations of weather, expected to last for less than an hour. 
10. Probability Forecast—The probability forecast is given percentage that describes the probability of 
thunderstorms and precipitation occurring in the coming hours. This forecast is not used for the first 6 
hours of the 24-hour forecast. 
 
9.2 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES 
 
The following examples describe surface problem situations in which weather in the terminal area 
adversely affects the capacity of an airport [ATC-2]. In each example, we describe not only the weather 
event, but also the impact that it has on conditions in the NAS. 
Each of the problem situations described below can have purely local (isolated) effects or both local 
and global (propagating) effects. 
 
9.2.1 SURFACE  SITUATION  1:  SHIFTING  WIND  DIRECTION  CHANGES 
THE RUNWAY CONFIGURATION 
 
A sudden change in runway configuration due to unpredicted or poorly predicted changes in 
wind direction (and/or the presence of wind shear or microburst warnings) results in high workload 
and added delays while aircraft are re-routed to new arrival fixes and runways. This may also result in a 
runway configuration selection that is non-optimal for the current conditions and traffic complexity, in 
which case, additional arrival and departure delays may occur. 
Such a situation can occur when the ATC tower tries to predict likely future conditions, picking 
a runway configuration that is less sensitive to wind shifts – potentially at the expense of throughput in 
the event that the weather event doesn’t actually materialize. 
Generally, the impacts of such events on NAS operations include: 
• Wind direction is such that it requires a configuration change 
• If timing of wind shift is not predicted properly, then aircraft currently in queue for a now 
inactive runway need to be taxied to an active runway 
• Aircraft still at gates will need to be assigned to different runways 
• Aircraft on final approach may need to execute a missed approach procedure 
• Aircraft outside of arrival metering fixes must be rerouted to new fixes 
• Departures using the new configuration must wait until terminal airspace has “stabilized” (e.g., 
remaining arrivals clear of departure corridors). 
The impact on capacity varies depending on the condition. In general, a runway configuration change 
adds delay to both arrivals and departures, reducing capacity during the transition. However, the steady 
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state effect of a change in configuration may be to increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the 
achievable arrival and departure rates at a given airport. 
 
9.2.2 SURFACE SITUATION 2: LOW VISIBILITY 
 
Reductions in visibility and Runway Visual Range (RVR) due to fog, haze, snow, etc. negatively 
impact surface operations in the NAS in many ways, including:  
• Ground and Local Controllers unable to discern exact positions of aircraft (see fog in Figure 1) 
• Controllers cannot discern the order of flights in a queue at the runway or spot location 
• Increased separations are required between aircraft to maintain safety as relative distances are 
hard to monitor 
• Runway crossing is more difficult as it relies on controller visual judgment of gaps 
• Pilots ability to see airport signage and pavement markings is significantly reduced, leading to a 
reduction in awareness of actual surface position 
• Pilots have more difficulty seeing other aircraft or knowing their exact position in a queue 
• Controllers must often rely on pilot-reported positions, which may be in error 
• Inability to conduct closely spaced (or parallel) approaches. 
The impacts on capacity are as follows. Pilot uncertainties regarding position lead to a reduced taxi 
speed; simultaneously, controller uncertainty regarding aircraft position results in increased runway 
crossing times and thus taxi delays. Surface movement inefficiency “backs up” to the runways, reducing 
both AAR and ADR (Airport Departure Rate). Elimination of closely-spaced parallel approaches, 
common during low visibility, further lowers the AAR. 
 
9.2.3 SURFACE SITUATION 3: AIRCRAFT REQUIRING DE‐ICING 
 
 
Figure 7 – De-icing operations increase the time required between flights and reduce airport capacity 
 
De-icing (e.g. Figure 7) is a cumbersome procedure requiring time, equipment, de-icing fluid, 
and personnel that impacts capacity in terms of departure rates. Ice accumulation on aircraft wings and 
control surfaces must be removed. The extent of the capacity reduction depends, in a large part, on the 
availability of equipment and personnel and the location of the de-icing pads relative to the gates and 
runways (some airports de-ice at the gates, while others use a remote de-icing pad). Once aircraft are 
de-iced, they must takeoff within a given time period (typically 15 minutes) or be re-treated. The impact 
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on capacity is primarily related to the time consumed by the de-icing process, namely any additional taxi 
time to/from remote de-icing pads plus the service time required to apply the de-icing treatment. This 
impact manifests itself as departure delays – the extent of which is determined by the efficiency of the 
process. Note that since passengers on commercial flights expect flights to be boarded as scheduled, 
there is little opportunity for airlines to board aircraft early to “make up” for the time needed for de-
icing (assuming it could be predicted). 
An indirect capacity impact is related to the need to expedite the departures for aircraft which 
have been de-iced to avoid the need for re-treatment – which can impact the required inter-arrival 
spacing on mixed use runways. 
 
9.2.4 SURFACE SITUATION 4: SNOW, ICE, SLUSH, WATER ON RUNWAY 
 
Slick conditions on the airport surfaces can reduce aircraft braking and directional control. 
Complicating the situation is the fact that braking conditions are not necessarily the same on all parts of 
a runway, due to its length. Impacts of this problem on NAS surface operations include: 
• Increased runway occupancy time as aircraft must rollout to the last runway exit 
• Ceasing of Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO) 
• Some shorter runways may not be usable  
• Temporary runway closure due to the need for removal of accumulated snow, and 
• Impaired visibility of surface pavement markings and lighting from the flight deck. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Snow on the airport surface 
 
The impacts on capacity are as follows. A reduction in options of runway exits impacts taxi 
routing flexibility, potentially leading to arrival taxi delays (or at least increased taxi times) and possible 
surface congestion. 
With an increase in runway occupancy time, there will be a corresponding AAR reduction due 
to the need for increased inter-arrival spacing. This reduction is exacerbated by the closure of runways 
for snow removal and when certain runways are unusable due to poor braking action. The inability to 
utilize LAHSO procedures further impacts capacity by limiting the ability of controllers to coordinate 
operations between dependent runways. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A‐SMGCS 
 
 
 
 
Over the past decade or so there has been increasing interest and recognition of the ground 
movement environment as part of the overall air traffic control problem. There are a number of 
reasons for this, both on safely and airport efficiency grounds. One recognition of this was the 
adoption by EUROCONTROL of a gate to gate air traffic control concept. There is also considerable 
activity by organisations such as, FAA, ICAO, the EU and EUROCAE. As an example of this, the 
FAA is currently procuring a large number of ground surveillance systems for use at US airports. 
Equally many European airports and aviation authorities are or have recently purchased surface 
movement systems. 
Nowadays, because of the ever-growing number of aircrafts in the areas to be controlled; the 
raising demand for safety of passengers and cargoes; and the greater care about the environment, the 
problem of improving the performances of traditional Airport Control systems must be faced.  
Research trend in future years is oriented toward the development of integrated systems, which collect 
information coming from various sensors and distribute it both to ground air-traffic controllers and to 
moving vehicles. The realisation of a system for the automatic control of airport surface traffic can play 
an important role in this context. The systems and procedures that ensure the above-mentioned 
operations can be included in the “ Advanced-Surface Movement Guidance and Control System” (A-
SMGCS). 
The Air Traffic Management (ATM) concept envisages an air traffic service that works at 
optimum efficiency, capacity, and safety. This could be achieved through the integration and 
harmonisation of all the systems, services, and procedures required for the air traffic services. 
The objective of the A-SMGCS is to optimise the efficiency, capacity, and safety of operations at an 
aerodrome.  
Traditionally, radar has been the main sensor for surveillance of the airport surface. While this is 
still the case, the overall concept of ground movement control is considerably more complex than that 
of the radar alone, and will involve multiple types of sensors data fused to provide data output. 
Following the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Report of 2005 airport delays are a 
growing proportion of the total ATM delays. Nearly all European hubs and already some mid-size 
airports are on the list of the 15 most penalising airports in Europe, which together generate 77% of all 
airport ATFM delays. 
Extending existing airport infrastructure, e.g. by building new runways, is a very difficult and 
complex process associated with many restrictions. Therefore, the optimal usage of existing 
infrastructure more and more becomes a necessity. Despite the importance of optimal resource usage, 
flight deck operations on the ground are still not very sophisticated nowadays. Implementation of 
modern cockpit technology for surface operations lags behind the developments for other flight 
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phases. “Seen and be seen” is still the most common practice on ground. After landing pilots have to 
navigate using paper maps and look out of the window to avoid other traffic. Above that ATCOs are 
performing the surveillance task mainly visually. Frequently, ATCOs are supported by surface 
movement radar (SMR) only giving them poor analogue radar plots with a lot of clutter and nuisance 
targets. As soon as the visual reference is impaired all surface operations are severely impacted by an 
increasing workload and a decreasing situation awareness of all participants, compromising safety and 
airport capacity and increasing delays. This leads to negative consequences for the approach areas and 
finally to unfavourable network effects in the overall air transport system. 
An A-SMGCS helps to overcome this poor situation. In its basic level 1 it provides the ATCOs 
with a display showing the complete traffic situation that includes the position of all aircraft and vehicle 
movements and their identification [AIRP-11]. Since it is assumed that each day in the US and Europe 
at least one runway incursion is occurring, which may lead to severe accidents, such as the Milan-Linate 
accident in 2001, in its level 2 the A-SMGCS provides the ATCO with an Automatic Runway Incursion 
Monitoring And Alerting Function [AIRP-11].  
 
Figure 1 – Milan-Linate accident in 2001 
 
1 A‐SMGCS PURPOSE 
 
A-SMGCS is a modular system defined in the ICAO Manual on Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS). Such systems aim to “maintain the declared surface 
movement rate under all weather conditions within the aerodrome visibility operational level (AVOL) 
while maintaining the required level of safety”. 
With the complete concept of an A-SMGCS, air traffic controllers (ATCO), flight crews, and vehicles 
drivers are assisted with surface operations in terms of surveillance, control, routing/planning and 
guidance tasks. 
The EUROCAE MASPS document gives a useful overall system description. The overall 
system is subdivided into a number of elements. These are: 
1. Surveillance Element. The task of this element is to identify (or if not possible classify) and 
position all targets of operational significance at the time of each update. The system update time is at 
least once a second. This element provides a fundamental input to the rest of the system 
2. Monitoring and alerting. Having provided a suitable surveillance system , the ASMGCS must use 
this information to monitor the situation on the aerodrome surface and provide alerts when particular 
situations are encountered. Such an alert could be if two aircraft are on the same runway at the same 
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time going in different directions, or if one aircraft as entered onto the runway before the runway is 
clear etc. 
3. Guidance. It is proposed, at least in more complex airports, that guidance will be provided to 
aircraft automatically or semi-automatically. The use of airport lighting systems (taxiway lights and stop 
bars) is one such guidance system- cockpit data displays are a longer term possibility 
4. Route planning. Automatic or semi-automatic allocation of routes by the system to deal with both 
strategic (or long term) and tactical (short term)route planning , for example in emergency situations. 
 
The standard also notes that different airport needs will be met by different levels of implementation of 
the system- from just surveillance right through to full A-SMGCS operation. 
 
1.1 SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION 
 
The surveillance element as defined above requires as a minimum detection and identification 
of targets of operational interest [AIRP-6]. Operational interest will vary according to size of airport, 
number of movements, level of implementation, etc. In this context targets will certainly include large 
and small aircraft both at high and low speeds but will also include ground vehicles(baggage handlers, 
service and emergency vehicles) and could include people, animals such as dogs and even single pieces 
of luggage. The surveillance element must provide situation awareness of all these. No one sensor will 
be capable of providing this information with sufficiently high probability of detection and sufficiently 
low false alarm rate to be acceptable in a safety critical system. So it is anticipated the surveillance 
element will comprise a number of sensors and a data fusion processor. It is further commented here 
that clearly a very high probability of detection is required in a complex airport environment, however a 
low rate of false detection is as important otherwise false alerts may be generated by the Monitoring 
and Alerting function which will yield the system not usable in a busy ground movement control 
situation. Crucially, to be used for decision making by downstream system element such as monitoring 
and alerting the information must be timely- that is the surveillance element must provide at it’s output 
the situation on the airport surface at the time it is reported, not necessarily the time when the 
information was gathered from the sensors. This means the data fusion must include a high integrity 
tracking process to overcome different sensor interrogation rates, system latency issues etc. 
The sensors are categorised in two broad groups- co-operative and non-cooperative: 
Co-operative sensors require a transponder or similar on the target. The most common type is some form 
of multilateration technique using existing SSR mode S or ADS-B transponders . There are also a 
number of proprietary ground vehicle tracking schemes. These systems have the advantage of being 
able to provide the identity of the target in addition to position. They have the fundamental 
disadvantage of requiring a operational transponder on the target. Not all targets have such devices, or 
can have them (consider the dog!) - also the system must be able to handle the situation of a defective 
transponder. 
Non co-operative sensors have no need for equipment on the target, but while some classification may be 
possible (large, medium or small for example) non cooperative sensors cannot in general provide 
reliable information regarding the identity of the target. While there are a number of non cooperative 
sensors proposed (for example magnetic loop sensors) by far the most common and widely used is 
radar. 
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Figure 2 – Ground ATCO A-SMGCS HMI at Paris Charles De Gaulle 
 
 
1.1.1 THE RADAR SENSOR 
 
Before discussing the details of radar sensors used in the airport surface movement application 
it is worthwhile to highlight some of the difficulties faced by the radar design: 
1. Wide range of RCS of targets, with small targets close to large ones 
2. Extended and point source targets 
3. High and low velocity targets (including stationary targets) 
4. High resolution (range and azimuth) 
5. High clutter both ground and often rain 
6. Complex multipath and shadowing scenarios 
7. High system update rate 
8. High system integrity 
9. Cost constraints 
When working as a A-SMGCS sensor, as opposed to a stand alone radar, the system must use 
target extracted output- the option of using raw video is clearly not possible- and the challenge of 
generating a even better (signal) to (clutter plus noise) ratio is, if anything, more demanding [AIRP-9]. 
Within the overall market interest for surface movement systems high detection capability and 
reliability coupled with low cost are essential. History has proven that high cost systems can only be 
implemented at a few airports- what is needed is a range of solutions to meet different operational 
needs. 
One major factor in the design of the radar system is the assessment of it’s detection performance. The 
major difficulty here is the impact of rain clutter on the system. 
Work undertaken during the development of such radars shows why the situation is much more 
complex than the standard air surveillance scenario. When the target is at some height, the radar 
performance in rain is dominated by backscatter from the rain itself, as is well known, and is commonly 
reduced by use of circular polarisation in the radar. However in the ground movement scenario the 
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presence of the ground greatly complicates the situation. In essence the rain clutter contribution occurs 
not only from direct backscatter but also from reflections from the ground. 
There are four main clutter paths - direct reflection, then a path reflecting from the clutter to the 
ground and back to the radar, also the path from ground to clutter and back to the radar and finally a 
path from the ground to the rain clutter and back via the ground. Now, these extra paths greatly affect 
the amount of rain clutter entering the system, particularly at short ranges. 
This type of model is very important as the system is clutter limited- hence only by adoption of a more 
complex model will allow the designer to correctly optimise the system. It is not the purpose of this 
thesis to discuss competing radar predictions in detail- but an incorrect model may yield a system highly 
susceptible to high rainfall clutter- the sort of conditions when the radar is really needed. 
Traditionally, Ku-band (approximately 16GHz) has been used for high performance ground 
movement use, principally as this offers a good angular resolution from a practical sized antenna . This 
frequency band was adopted in the 1970s and 1980s .for example. by the ASDE-3 system in the USA 
and many authorities worldwide. Millimetric radar has been used experimentally since 1960s, and 
continues to be offered. It provides high resolution from small antennas, but suffers from limitations at 
high rainfall rates. Therefore networks of such radars , possibly used in conjunction with lower 
frequency systems have been proposed t cover the airport surface 
The largest growth however has been at X-band (around 9 GHz). Here the development of 
lower cost, high performance components, the inherent lower sensitivity to rain clutter coupled with 
recent developments in both transceiver and antenna technology have yielded high performance lower 
cost systems. Recently many authorities has adopted X-band radars including, the USA, Canada. and 
many European countries. Arguably, X-band is now the frequency of choice for most new systems. 
Turning to transmitter technology, most installed systems (both Ku and X-band) use magnetron based 
sources. However there has been considerable development of X-band transceiver technology. Newer 
designs offer sophisticated control of the transceiver and features such as frequency diversity (normally 
using two magnetrons of different frequencies) needed for clutter reduction. Commercial receiver front 
end noise figures of 4dB or better are considered normal. The older (but still sophisticated) ASDE-3 
system utilises a TiVT approach with multiple frequencies available. The number of frequencies used 
(up to 14) is needed to minimise rain clutter (which is inherently higher at Ku than X-band). This 
approach has lead to a excellent RF performance but is high cost and has a high cost of ownership. 
Most recently, the ASDE-X system being provided to the FAA in its most recent contract uses a 
innovative all solid state design of transceiver.  
Other solutions being offered to the market place include electronically scanned phased array-
high cost, and only limited scan angle per face, but with the obvious benefits of being non rotating. 
Research into sensors is also yielding other possible solutions such as the Near Radar Network - a type 
of multilateration using fixed, non-rotating, X-band sensors – currently being developed in Germany. 
 
1.2 MONITORING FUNCTION 
 
Once the route has been assigned to an aircraft the Monitoring/Alerting function must check 
that the aircraft is maintaining the correct route, without deviation (i.e., the aircraft should reach each 
waypoint within the allotted time slot, and take the correct leg when leaving the waypoint). This is 
called “Conformance Monitoring.” validation service on the proposed route. They range from very 
simple to more complicated methods.  
There are several ways to implement the conflict validation service on the proposed route. They range 
from very simple to more complicated methods. There are at least three possible methods to 
implement the conflict validation service on the proposed route. They all validate the Route sampling 
each Route in the Waypoints. 
There are several ways to implement the conflict 
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1.2.1 TIME AT WAYPOINT 
 
The Time at Waypoint method takes into account the time each target should be at given 
Waypoints. The method takes a Route and for each Waypoint checks if there are any other Assigned 
Routes where a target should transit by the same Waypoint at nearly the same time. It must be defined 
a Time Separation. 
 
1.2.2 FREE LEG 
 
The Free Leg method, shown on previous page, takes into account the Layout of the Airport 
and the position of each Target. No other target should be in any Leg connected to the Waypoint. The 
method takes a Route and for each Waypoint checks if there are any other Assigned Routes where a 
target should transit by any Leg connected to the Waypoint at the same time. 
 
1.2.3 DISTANCE SEPARATION 
 
The Distance Separation method takes into account the position of each target. No other target 
should be at a distance less then a given spatial separation. The method takes a route and for each 
Waypoint checks if there are any other Assigned Route where a target at a distance less then a given 
Spatial Separation at the same time. An improvement for any of the above mentioned methods could 
be to take into consideration the relative motion at that time (intersecting Routes, parallel Routes, same 
Route, same direction, opposite direction, and so on...). 
 
1.3 GUIDANCE FUNCTION 
 
The main objective of the Guidance function [AIRP-8] is the provision of clear indication of 
assigned routes to pilots in the movement area such that they can follow the assigned route. Guidance 
aids indicate where on the runway, taxiway, or apron the aircraft or vehicle can be manoeuvred safely. 
The A-SMGCS have the ability to automatically control taxiway lights, stop bars, and other guidance 
aids to prevent conflicts and provide optimum routings 
Guidance results from a combination of the following actions: 
• a controlling authority (e.g., ATC) issues a clearance that gives a pilot permission to move an 
aircraft along the assigned route;  
• the A-SMGCS provides the processing and signalling functionality to provide the necessary 
guidance associated with the clearance; 
• the aircraft moves in accordance with a pilot’s interpretation of the control and guidance given.  
 
The Guidance function of the A-SMGCS: 
• provides necessary guidance for any authorized movement and available for all possible route 
selections; 
• provides clear indication to pilots to allow them to follow their assigned route; 
• is capable of accepting a change of route at any time; and 
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• allows monitoring of the operational status of all guidance aids. 
 
It should be noted that pilots will need to retain the right to refuse clearances and to stop the 
aircraft if, in their judgement, a continuation of the movement would cause a hazard to the aircraft. The 
Guidance function is fed with target position information from the Surveillance function. On the basis 
of this, the target position with respect to the Airport Layout is known. Guidance requires that the 
taxiway centreline lighting for a given route to be followed is lit up in front of a moving target and 
extinguished when the target has passed. 
The overall structure of the Guidance Function, considers a main loop which receives the Target’s 
information from the Surveillance Function. The Guidance Function main loop should know all the 
Routes already assigned to Targets by the Routing Function and collected in the Assigned Routes 
Table. 
Finally the Airport Layout, especially about the Runways, is supposed to be coded in several databases: 
• Light Segment Data Base Collects information on Taxiway centreline segments and Stopbar 
Segments; mainly position and status. The Database of the Light System is made up by segments, one 
segment for each straight leg, curve, and stopbar. 
• Runway Data Base Collects information about the Runway structure; mainly position, list of 
exits and a list of stopbars. 
 
1.4 ROUTING FUNCTION 
 
The main objective of the Routing function [AIRP-8] is to generate routes in order to make full 
use of aerodrome capacity. This requires the provision of a tactical planning tool which reacts to the 
dynamics of the traffic situation providing variations to former assigned routes to maintain the required 
flow despite unplanned occurrences.  
The Routing function must have information about the current traffic situation on the aerodrome, as 
well as aerodrome layout. from one location to another. Routes are composed of a number of 
waypoints selected from a predefined routing grid (Airport Layout). 
Routes clearly define how the aircraft is to proceed 
The Routing function of an A-SMGCS: 
• enable a route to be designated for each aircraft within the movement area; 
• allow for a change of destination at any time; and 
• allow for a change of route to the same destination. 
The Routing function provides the control authority with advisory information on designated routes. 
The assignment of routes is carried out by the control authority. When designating routes, the A-
SMGCS: 
• minimise taxiing times in accordance with the most efficient operational configurations; 
• be interactive with the Monitoring & Control function to minimise junction conflicts; 
• be responsive to operational changes (e.g., runway changes, taxiways closed for maintenance); 
• provide means of validating routes. 
The route depends solely on the ground movement situation that exists at the time when the route is 
issued. It is critical to the efficient and flexible operation of any aerodrome that planning elements be 
tactically adjusted to meet changing circumstances. 
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1.4.1 AIRPORT LAYOUT 
 
The aerodrome layout is the most mandatory external system. It consists of a digitised airport 
map, representing runways, taxiways, aprons, manoeuvring areas, roads, buildings, restricted areas. It 
shall also contain sensor position, restricted areas, parking positions and shelters. It must define 
precisely an airport reference point (generally the control tower or the centre of airport bounds). All 
other co-ordinates are expressed in reference to this point. The “interface with external databases” 
partly responsible of access to the aerodrome layout has the responsibility of converting co-ordinates in 
the airport referential to WGS-84. 
 
1.4.2 WAYPOINT 
 
Each Waypoint is typically a point at the crossing of two Taxiways or one Taxiway and one 
Runway. It follows that each point has a position on the Airport Map which could be expressed either 
in metres with reference to a reference point on the Airport Map or with absolute geographical co-
ordinate. In this latter case, the WGS84 system must be used. If the relative system is used, then it 
should be provided a means to convert the position (x, y, z) of each Waypoint into the WGS84 
coordinate system. For each route the time at which the aircraft is expected at each Waypoint is 
estimated by adding the time at which the aircraft is expected at the previous Waypoint and the time 
needed to run the Leg that links the two Waypoints. The times needed to run the segment is simply: 
time = length/speed; and the length is the Euclidean distance between P1 and P2. For the speed is 
used the maximum speed allowed in the Leg. 
 
1.4.3 CONFLICT VALIDATION 
 
When planning a 3D (x, y, t) route it is important to ensure that the route is conflict-free at the 
time the route plan is generated. This is the task of the Route Planning function. Clearly, the best way 
to ensure conflict-free routes is to avoid any intersections, but this may not always be possible. 
Normally, there will be no conflicts if aircraft follow behind each other with a reasonable separation. 
Except in low visibility conditions, pilots can see the aircraft in front and maintain separation. 
Furthermore, conflicts between outbound and inbound aircraft are normally avoided by assigning non-
intersecting routes. 
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2 EUROPEAN  AIRPORT  MOVEMENT  MANAGEMENT  BY  A‐
SMGCS (EMMA) 
 
To harmonise the implementation of the first two levels of A-SMGCS, which focus on 
surveillance and conflict monitoring, and to further mature the necessary technology and operating 
procedures, the European Commission funded the project EMMA [AIRP-10] (European airport 
Movement Management by A-SMGCS) within the sixth framework programme. Within EMMA, A-
SMGCS level 1&2 systems were installed at three European mid-size airports: Milan-Malpensa, Prague-
Ruzynĕ, and Toulouse-Blagnac [AIRP-7]. Technical and operational trials were conducted at all three 
sites to verify the technical performance against the requirements and to prove operational feasibility. 
Additionally, real-time simulations were performed in order to tune parameters of the monitoring and 
alerting function and to also assess operational improvements under experimental conditions. 
 
Here are the most important figures of merit of EMMA: 
 
• Probability of Identification PID ≥ 99.9%  for identifiable targets  
• Probability of False Identification PFID < 10E-3 per Reported Target 
• Target Report Update Rate TRUR ≤ 1 s  
• Probability of Detection of an Alert Situation PDAS ≥ 99.9%  
• Probability of False Alert PFA < 10E-3 per Alert  
• Alert Response Time ART ≤ 0.5 s 
• Routing Process Time RPT < 10 s 
 
High-level 
Objective 
Low-level Objective Indicator 
Reduced number of incidents and 
accidents Number of incidents and accidents 
Safety Faster identification and mitigation of 
safety hazards 
Time for conflict detection, 
identification and resolution 
Lower Taxi Time for in and 
outbound traffic Taxi Time 
Efficiency/Capacity Lower duration of radio 
communications 
Duration of radio communications 
(R/T load) 
Higher Situation Awareness Situational Awareness 
Human Factors Convenient level of workload Workload 
Table 1 – EMMA’s objectives and relative indicators 
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Parameter  Definition  Source  
Alert Response Time 
(ART)  
The time delay between an alert situation occurring at the 
input to the Alert Situation Detection Element and the 
corresponding alert report being generated at its output.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Display Resolution 
(DR)  
The number of individually addressed picture elements 
(pixels) along each axis of the display screen. (For a raster-
scan display, the resolution is normally expressed in terms 
of the number of raster lines and the number of pixels per 
line.)  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Identification Renewal 
Time-Out Period 
(IRTOP)  
The elapsed time after which the output of valid 
identification data in target reports for a specific track will 
be terminated due to a lack of renewed identification data 
from any sensor system.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Information Display 
Latency  
(IDL)  
The maximum time delay between a report, other than a 
target report, being received by the A-SMGCS HMI and 
the corresponding presentation on the HMI display of the 
information contained in the report.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Position Registration 
Accuracy (PRA)  
The difference between the co-ordinates contained in the 
dynamic input data to the HMI and the corresponding 
geographical position represented on the HMI display.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Position Renewal 
Time-Out Period 
(PRTOP)  
The elapsed time after which the output of target reports 
for a specific track will be terminated due to a lack of new 
position information from any sensor system.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Probability of 
Detection (PD)  
The probability that an actual target is reported at the 
output of the Surveillance Element of an A-SMGCS.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Probability of 
Detection of an Alert 
Situation (PDAS)  
The probability that the Monitoring/Alerting Element 
correctly reports an alert situation.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Probability of False 
Alert (PFA)  
The probability that the Control service reports anything 
other than actual alert situations.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Probability(PFD) of 
False Detection  
The probability that the Surveillance Element of an A-
SMGCS reports anything other than actual targets.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Probability of False 
Identification (PFID)  
The probability that the identity reported at the output of 
the Surveillance Element of an A-SMGCS is not the 
correct identity of the actual target.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Probability(PID) of 
Identification  
The probability that the correct identity of a co-operative 
target is reported at the output of the Surveillance 
Element.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Reported Position 
Accuracy  (RPA)  
The difference, at a specified confidence level, between the 
reported position of the target and the actual position of 
the target at the time of the report.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Reported Velocity  
Accuracy  (RVA)  
The difference, at a specified confidence level, between the 
reported target velocity and the actual target velocity at the 
time of the report.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
Response Time to 
Operator Input 
(RTOI)  
The maximum time delay between the operator making an 
input on a data entry device of an A-SMGCS HMI and the 
corresponding action being completed or acknowledged on 
the HMI display.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
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Surveillance Capacity  
The number of target reports in a given period, which the 
Surveillance Element is able to process and output without 
degradation below the minimum performance 
requirements.  
[EUROCAE  
MASPS]  
System Accuracy  
The term accuracy generally describes the degree of 
conformance between a platform's true position and/or 
velocity and its estimated position and/or velocity.  
[ICAO A-
SMGCS]  
System Availability  
Availability is the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform a 
required function at the initiation of the intended operation 
within an A-SMGCS area.  
[ICAO A-
SMGCS]  
System Capacity  
The maximum number of simultaneous movements of 
aircraft and vehicles that the system can safely support 
within an acceptable delay commensurate with the runway 
and taxiway  capacity at a particular airport.  
[ICAO A-
SMGCS]  
System Continuity  
Continuity is the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform its 
required function without non-scheduled interruption 
during the intended operation in an A-SMGCS area.  
[ICAO A-
SMGCS]  
System Integrity  
Integrity relates to the trust, which can be placed in the 
correctness of the information provided by an A-SMGCS. 
Integrity includes the ability of an A-SMGCS to provide 
timely and valid alerts to the user(s) when an A-SMGCS 
must not be used for the intended operation.  
[ICAO A-
SMGCS]  
System Reliability  
Reliability is defined as the ability of an A-SMGCS to 
perform a required function under given conditions for a 
given time interval.  
[ICAO A-
SMGCS]  
Target Display 
Latency (TDL)  
The maximum time delay between a target report being 
received by the A-SMGCS HMI and the corresponding 
presentation on the HMI display of the target position 
contained in the report.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Target(TRUR) Report 
Update Rate  
The frequency with which target reports are output from 
the Surveillance Element of the A-SMGCS.  
[EUROCAE 
MASPS]  
Transaction 
Expiration Time 
(ETRCP)  
Maximum time for completion of a transaction after which 
peer parties should revert to an alternative procedure. The 
rate at which a transaction expiration time can be exceeded 
is determined by the continuity parameter.  
[ED-78A]  
95% Transaction Time 
(TT95)  
Time before which 95% of the transactions are completed. 
This is the time at which controllers and pilots can 
nominally accept the system performance and represents 
normal operating performance.  
[ED-78A]  
Continuity (CRCP)  
Probability that the transaction will be completed before 
the transaction expiration time, assuming that the 
communication system is available when the transaction is 
initiated  
[ED-78A]  
Availability (ARCP)  Probability that the communication system between the two parties is in service when it is needed  
[ED-78A]  
Availability 
(AProvision)  
Probability that communication with all aircraft in the area 
is in service.  [ED-78A]  
Communication 
Integrity (IRCP)  
Acceptable rate of transactions completed with error 
undetected.  [ED-78A]  
Table 2 – A-SMGCS main identification parameters 
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Figure 3 – EMMA’s domain 
 
 
3 AVAILABLE  STANDARDS,  MANUALS,  AND 
DOCUMENTATIONS  
 
3.1 ICAO 
 
One of ICAO's chief activities is standardisation, the establishment of international standards, 
recommended practices and procedures covering the technical fields of aviation: licensing of personnel, 
rules of the air, aeronautical meteorology, aeronautical charts, units of measurement, operation of 
aircraft, nationality and registration marks, airworthiness, aeronautical telecommunications, air traffic 
services, search and rescue, aircraft accident investigation, aerodromes, aeronautical information 
services, aircraft noise and engine missions, security and the safe transport of dangerous goods. After a 
standard is adopted it is put into effect by each ICAO contracting State in its own territories. As 
aviation technology continues to develop rapidly, the Standards are kept under constant review and 
amended as necessary. 
In keeping pace with the rapid development of international civil aviation, ICAO is conscious 
of the need to adopt in its specifications modern systems and techniques. Guidance Material is 
produced to supplement the SARPS and PANS and to facilitate their implementation. Guidance 
material is issued as Attachments to Annexes or in separate documents such manuals, circulars and lists 
of designators/addresses. Usually it is approved at the same time as the related SARPS are adopted. 
Manuals provide information to supplement and/or amplify the Standards and Recommended 
Practices and Procedures for Air Navigation Services. They are specifically designed to facilitate 
implementation and are amended periodically to ensure their contents reflect current practices and 
procedures. 
 
Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems Manual (A-SMGCS), Doc 9830 
AN/452, first edition 2004. 
The systems described in the ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems 
(SMGCS), (Doc 9476) are not always capable of providing the necessary support to aircraft operations 
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in order to maintain required capacity and safety levels, especially under low visibility conditions. An 
advanced SMGCS (ASMGCS) therefore, is expected to provide adequate capacity and safety in relation 
to specific weather conditions, traffic density and aerodrome layout by making use of modern 
technologies and a high level of integration between the various functionalities. The manual was 
produced to enable manufacturers and operators as well as certifying authorities to develop and 
introduce A-SMGCS depending on local circumstances and taking into account global interoperability 
requirements for international civil aviation operations. 
The Manual presents the common basic operational concept and system design for a universal 
A-SMGCS adaptable to the specific local aerodrome needs. The concept describes the necessary basic 
A-SMGCS functions Surveillance, Control, Routing and Guidance together with their communication 
and their evolution towards higher automation. 
A-SMGCS provides full service under a wide range of operational conditions: 
• all visibility conditions until AVOL, 
• growing traffic, and 
• complex traffic flows, 
to aircraft and affected vehicles on the movement area between runways and stands in order to 
maintain: 
• safety - the required high level of safety, and 
• capacity - maximum utilisation of flow rates, given by infrastructure. 
To help airport operators to decide on the level of automation they need, ICAO has defined five levels 
of implementation for particular aerodromes. All four basic ASMGCS functions (i.e. surveillance, 
control, routing and guidance) are provided at all levels, but the part played by automation and avionics 
increases progressively through the levels. The international agreed modular design, open architecture 
and foreseen standardisation of modules/interfaces enable cost effective A-SMGCS solutions for local 
demands by implementing only those modules for the identified necessary ASMGCS functions. A 
future upgrade of A-SMGCS is possible in an economic way by adding the appropriate necessary 
modules without replacing the whole existing system. 
 
Manual of the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Systems (Doc 9684, 2nd edition, 1998). 
This document provides guidance material on characteristics of the ground stations and airborne 
transponders of SSR systems which are defined in the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 
of Annex 10, Volume IV. It also describes the contribution of SSR as a major system for surveillance 
purposes in most air traffic control (ATC) systems and the data link capability of the Mode S 
component to be utilized as part of the aeronautical telecommunication network (ATN).  
 
Air Traffic Management - Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS-ATM), Doc 4444, 
14th edition, 2001. 
These procedures are complementary to the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in 
Annex 2 and Annex 11 and specify, in greater detail than in the Standards and Recommended Practices, 
the actual procedures to be applied by air traffic services units in providing the various air traffic 
services to air traffic. 
 
Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (Doc 9476, reprinted 
March 2003). 
This manual has been developed to facilitate the implementation of specifications relating to SMGC 
systems found in various Annexes and the PANS-RAC. It contains information on: designing an 
SMGC system for an aerodrome; the functions and responsibilities of personnel, procedures; low 
visibility operations; high traffic volume operations; runway protection measures and apron 
management service. 
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ANNEX 10 Volume III (Part I - Digital Data Communication Systems; Part II - Voice 
Communication Systems). 
Volume III of Annex 10 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and guidance 
material for various air-ground and ground-ground voice and data communication systems, including 
aeronautical telecommunication network (ATN), aeronautical mobile-satellite service (AMSS), 
secondary surveillance radar (SSR) Mode S air-ground data link, very high frequency (VHF) air-ground 
digital link (VDL), aeronautical fixed telecommunication network (AFTN), aircraft addressing system, 
high frequency data link (HFDL), aeronautical mobile service, selective calling system (SELCAL), 
aeronautical speech circuits and emergency locator transmitter (ELT). 
 
Annex 10 - Volume IV (Surveillance Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems).  
Volume IV of Annex 10 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and guidance 
material for secondary surveillance radar (SSR) and airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS), 
including SARPs for SSR Mode A, Mode C and Mode S; and the technical characteristics of ACAS. 
 
3.2 EUROCONTROL/AIRPORT OPERATIONS‐PROGRAMME 
 
The Airport Operations Programme forms a part of the EUROCONTROL activity in 
European Air Traffic Management (EATM) and hosts four projects that will enhance airside safety and 
capacity. This will be achieved by improving airside efficiency and harmonising the introduction of new 
technologies. 
The A-SMGCS is one of the four above mentioned projects. Its main objectives are set out below: 
• To fully develop A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2, ensuring that all issues relevant to operational 
implementation are identified and addressed 
• Identify, develop & validate appropriate procedures 
• Verify performance requirements 
• Build Safety & Human Factors Cases 
• Address training & licensing 
• Support harmonised implementation within ECAC 
• Support global implementation (through ICAO) 
• Ensure coordination with ICAO, EC, FAA, NAV CANADA etc. 
• Provide baseline for further developments (A-SMGCS Levels 3 & 4) 
 
To date a considerable amount of work has been performed by ICAO (AOPG PT/2), EUROCAE 
(WG41) and the European Commission (DGTREN). The need for A-SMGCS is also recognised 
through the ATM Strategy for the Years 2000+. This Strategy contains a number of ‘Directions for 
Change’ and complementary Operational Improvements, which contribute towards a realisation of the 
overall concept for the ATM Network within ECAC. The Direction for Change applicable to A-
SMGCS is entitled “Improved Traffic Management on the Movement Area” and the associated 
Operational Improvements are: 
1. Improvement of Aerodrome Control Service on the Manoeuvring Area; 
2. Improvement of Conflict Detection and Alert for all Traffic on the Movement Area; 
3. Improvement of Planning and Routing on the Movement Area; 
4. Improvement of Guidance and Control on the Movement Area. 
These Operational Improvements are to be met through the A-SMGCS Project of the EATM Airport 
Operations Programme, which aims to facilitate the implementation of A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2 
through the development of appropriate operational concepts, requirements and procedures. It also 
aims at addressing related operational issues such as safety, human factors and licensing of controllers. 
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The first phase of the project has involved the development of agreed requirements for A-
SMGCS Levels 1 & 2, namely: 
• Agreed User Requirements 
• A Concept of Operations 
• Operational Requirements 
• Functional Requirements 
 
This phase of the A-SMGCS project is now complete and the following documents are available: 
 
A-SMGCS Project Strategy. 
The A-SMGCS subjects and specifications have already been tackled and extensively investigated by 
several organizations such as ICAO, EUROCAE, FAA and EUROCONTROL. The aim of this 
document is to propose a strategy for A-SMGCS implementation on the basis of the work that has 
already been performed by these organizations. The Strategy presents an operational vision on how 
ATS and the relationships amongst airport stakeholders are expected to evolve through the 
evolutionary implementation of ASMGCS. Such a vision encompasses airspace users, ATM 
stakeholders, airport operators (i.e. pilots, airlines, airport managers, handling operators, apron vehicle 
drivers). The document also phases the A-SMGCS implementation in compliance with the context of 
the gate-to-gate ATM network and the related EATMP Programs as well as the availability of ECAC 
airport projects and technology such as CDM, AMAN, DMAN, ADS, GNSS etc.  
 
Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels. 
This document aims at defining the A-SMGCS implementation levels corresponding to the A-SMGCS 
project strategy. These Implementation Levels form a coherent series that: 
• Recognizes operational needs; 
• Reflects the evolution of technologies and procedures; 
• Enables airports to equip according to local requirements. 
 
Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. 
The EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project aims at defining pragmatic implementation steps for A-
SMGCS. The first step named A-SMGCS Level I focuses on the implementation of automated 
surveillance. A-SMGCS Level II aims at complementing surveillance service with a control service that 
provides a runway safety net and prevents incursions into restricted areas. This documents aim at 
defining the operational concept and the requirements for ASMGCS implementation Levels I & II, i.e. 
how ATS is expected to evolve through the introduction of the integrated Surveillance 
technology/functions and how ATS is expected to evolve through the introduction of the A-SMGCS 
automated control functions, respectively. 
 
Functional Specifications for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. 
On the basis of the analysis of the users needs presented in the Operational Concept & Requirements 
for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II, this documents define the functional specifications for A-
SMGCS Implementation Level I & II. These documents focus on the operational and functional 
requirements. The operational requirements are already presented in the OC & R documents and they 
are recalled and listed in these documents for readability purpose. 
 
Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. 
This documents aim at defining the Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS implementation Levels I & 
II. The Validation Master Plan identifies the objectives and the steps of the validation process. It 
provides for each step a full description (resources, timeframe, training etc.) and identifies its 
prerequisites. This documents also identifies the techniques of evaluation (fast time and real time 
simulations, pre-operational trials at representative airports,…) to assess, demonstrate and confirm that 
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A-SMGCS fulfil the Operational Concept with respect to the airport manoeuvring area, for all visibility 
conditions, times of the day and traffic densities. A particular emphasis is placed upon the validation of 
A-SMGCS related procedures, with the view to providing the data necessary to support their 
submission to ICAO. To develop The Validation Master Plans for A-SMGCS Levels I & II have been 
defined following the steps proposed by the MAEVA methodology [MAEVA], which has been 
especially designed for this kind of exercise by the Master ATM European Validation Plan (MAEVA) 
project. 
 
A-SMGCS Safety Plan. 
In connection with the EATM Airport Operations Programme (APR) - maintained by the Airport 
Operations Domain - a safety plan shall be developed to define the safety activities to be undertaken 
within the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) project of the 
APR. The safety plan shall be addressing separately, ASMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. The 
safety activities will be linked with the validation process and will result in two safety cases (for 
Implementation Levels I & II) proving that the project as it is defined is safe for introduction. Thus, 
the safety plan shall help to ensure that the safety–related data including safety objectives and safety 
requirements are validated during the validation process and can be used to develop the appropriate 
safety cases for A-SMGCS Implementation Levels I & II. 
 
A-SMGCS Safety Policy. 
This document, the APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy Document, has been developed by the Airport 
Throughput Business Unit of EUROCONTROL Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control 
System (A-SMGCS) Project. The APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy Document sets out the Safety Policy, 
the Safety Objectives and describes the safety-related tasks and actions to ensure a safe development, 
implementation and continued operation of the A-SMGCS. The APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy 
Document is intended to provide a framework to facilitate the safety regulation process of the APR A-
SMGCS project. The document also represents the initiation of a co-ordination dialogue between the 
APR A-SMGCS Project and the Safety Regulation Commission (SRC). This co-ordination process will 
continue throughout the APR A-SMGCS Project and will cover the development, implementation and 
continued operation of the A-SMGCS. The APR A-SMGCS Safety Policy Document includes 
description of the deliverables of the APR A-SMGCS Project. The document is closely related to the 
APR A-SMGCS Safety Plan. 
 
A-SMGCS Human Factors Plan. 
The document describes a Human Factors Plan supporting the Validation master Plan for the A-
SMGCS. A principle aim of the validation process is to assess the Human Factors impact of A-SMGCS 
Level 1 and/or 2 implementation, with data obtained during the validation process being used to 
develop appropriate Human Factor Cases (i.e. Human Factor Cases for Implementation Levels 1 & 2). 
A ‘Human Factor Plan’ has to be developed to help identify and ensure that the appropriate data are 
available for the validation This plan shall define the Human Factor activities to be undertaken within 
the A-SMGCS project (particularly during the validation process) following EUROCONTROL’s 
guidelines for Human Factors Integration. 
 
In parallel, work has progressed on the identification and development of the procedures, 
necessary to support the implementation of A-SMGCS. These procedures focus upon enabling the 
controller, when appropriate, to issue ATC instructions and clearances to aerodrome traffic on the 
basis of surveillance data alone. Harmonised procedures are being developed to ensure that as A-
SMGCS becomes widespread, pilots, vehicle drivers and controllers will be working to the same rules 
and standards throughout the European region. Their description represents the main content of the 
“A-SMGCS Operating Procedures” document produced inside the A-SMGCS project, as well. 
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3.3 EUROCAE’S MISSION AND WG’S 41 ACTIVITIES 
 
EUROCAE is an international non-profit making organisation. Membership is open to 
European manufacturers of equipment for aeronautics, trade associations, national civil aviation 
administrations, users, and non-European organisations. Its work programme is principally directed to 
the preparation of performance specifications and guidance documents for civil aviation equipment, for 
adoption and use at European and worldwide levels. 
The findings of EUROCAE are resolved after discussion among its members and in cooperation with 
RTCA Inc., Washington DC, USA and/or the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Warrendale 
PA, USA through their appropriate committees. 
The following EUROCAE documents are available: 
 
ED-87 MASPS for Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (ASMGCS). 
This document contains the Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification (MASPS) for A-
SMGCS at the current level of maturity. This document specifies system and equipment characteristics 
that should be useful to designers, installers, manufacturers, service providers and users of systems 
intended for operational use at aerodromes. Functional requirements are used wherever possible to 
allow flexibility in the design of sub-system equipment. This specification was produced from existing 
and proposed products, methods and requirements that support the A-SMGCS concept. Adherence to 
this specification is intended to enable early operational implementation of a system at an aerodrome in 
accordance with the aerodrome's operational requirements. 
Chapter 1 of this document outlines the A-SMGCS role within the future air traffic management 
system. It describes the rationale for the system concept, the expected operational goals of the A-
SMGCS and outlines the fundamental design concepts. It provides definitions of terms used in the 
document, lists of abbreviations and references.  
Chapter 2 outlines the enabling functions of an A-SMGCS and defines an evolutionary approach to 
configuration levels which have been identified by EUROCAE as the steps for building the A-SMGCS. 
Advice on interfaces is provided. 
Chapter 3 specifies performance requirements for the principal enabling functions of an ASMGCS.  
Chapter 4 describes methodologies for the verification of A-SMGCS performance requirements 
specified in Chapter 3 and contains descriptions of the recommended generic test procedures needed to 
verify compliance at both functional element and overall system level. 
Supplementary information on test, variation and verification methods is provided within appendices A 
and B. 
 
ED 78A GUIDELINES for approval of the provision and use of Air Traffic Services supported 
by Data Communications. 
This guidance document was jointly prepared by Special Committee 189 (SC-189) and the European 
Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Working Group 53 (WG-53) and approved 
by the RTCA Program Management Committee (PMC) on December 14, 2000. This guidance material 
recommends minimum acceptable criteria for approving the provision and use of an ATS supported by 
data communications when approvals are required to show compliance to civil regulations. The criteria 
are in the form of process objectives and guidance for evidence. As used throughout this document, 
evidence is data produced during the accomplishment of the process objectives. Applicants can use the 
evidence to show an approval authority that the objectives have been satisfied. For example, evidence 
may take the form of standards such as the SPR and INTEROP standards, or plans such as the 
approval plan, or results of verification activities such as test results. This document provides means to 
establish the operational, safety, performance, and interoperability requirements for ATS supported by 
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data communications, to assess their validity, and to qualify the related CNS/ATM system. It is a single 
source document that provides guidance for approval of the CNS/ATM system and its operation 
where coordination is necessary across organizations. The guidance material considers the allocations 
of the operational, safety, performance, and interoperability requirements to the elements of the 
CNS/ATM system. These 4 include ground-based elements, operational procedures, including the 
human, and aircraft equipage. 
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1 A-SMGCS Purpose ............................................................................................................................................. 2 
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CHAPTER 7 
RANDOM NUMBERS 
GENERATION (RNG) 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes algorithms for the generation of pseudorandom numbers with both 
uniform and normal distributions. Simulations in the following chapters are performed by generating 
realizations of the underlying stochastic processes, by using random numbers.  
Regardless of whether or not one employs variance-reducing techniques, the statistical integrity 
of every Monte Carlo sampling experiment depends on the availability of an algorithm for generating 
random numbers or, more precisely, for generating sequences of numbers which by relatively stringent 
standards can be regarded as indistinguishable from sequences of truly random numbers. These 
computer-generated quantities are called pseudorandom numbers and their use leads to at least two 
sources of error. The first comes from the finite word-sizes of digital computers. This limitation 
induces a discretization error generic to all numerical evaluation methods. Insisting on extended 
precision in all arithmetic calculations makes the seriousness of this error source relatively minor. 
Regrettably, developers of pseudorandom number generating algorithms for microcomputers have 
occasionally ignored this precaution, casting suspicion on the scientific integrity of results garnered 
from Monte Carlo sampling experiments that used these algorithms (e.g., [RNG-9]). 
Unfortunately, the need to produce pseudorandom numbers efficiently restricts the class of generating 
algorithms that one can realistically consider; and this restriction leads to the second potential source of 
error [RNG-1]. Ideally, for every positive integer k , one would like to draw statistically independent 
samples ),...,( 111
)1(
kUUU = , ),...,( 221)2( kUUU = ,… each having the uniform probability distribution 
over the k-dimensional unit hypercube kk ]1,0[=ℑ . However, the rapidly generating algorithms in 
common use produce sequences whose properties depart from this ideal with error that increases as k 
increases. Careful choice of a generating algorithm can substantially reduce the potential error from this 
source., with emphasis on the trade-off between speed and statistical error. However, a user of the 
Monte Carlo method must recognize that employing the best of methods rarely offers more than two- 
to three-digit accuracy; and pretending otherwise would misrepresent the accuracy of experimental 
results. This last observation prompts a more expansive comment about the disparity between theory 
and practice. 
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1 PSEUDORANDOM NUMBERS 
 
Random numbers generators (RNGs) are needed for practically all kinds of computer 
applications, such as simulation of stochastic systems, numerical analysis, probabilistic algorithms, 
secure communications, computer games, and gambling machines, to name a few [RNG-6]. The so-
called random numbers may come from a physical device, like thermal noise from electronic diodes, 
but are more often the output of a small computer program which, from a given initial value called the 
seed, produces a deterministic sequence of numbers that are supposed to imitate typical realizations of 
independent uniform random variables. The latter are sometimes called pseudo-random [RNG-4] 
number generators, or algorithmic RNGs. Since they have a deterministic and periodic output, it is 
clear a priori that they do not produce independent random variables in the mathematical sense and 
that they cannot pass all possible statistical tests of uniformity and independence. But some of them 
have huge period lengths and turn out to behave quite well in statistical tests that can be applied in 
reasonable time. On the other hand, several popular RNGs, some available in commercial software, fail 
very simple tests. 
Good RNGs are not designed by trying some arbitrary algorithms and applying empirical tests to the 
output until all the tests are passed. Instead, their design should involve a rigorous mathematical 
analysis of their period lengths and of the uniformity of the vectors of successive values that they 
produce over their entire period length; that’s how independence is assessed theoretically. However, 
once they have been selected and implemented, they must also be tested empirically. Statistical tests are 
also required for RNGs based (totally or partially) on physical devices. These RNGs are used to 
generate, for example, keys in cryptosystems and to generate numbers in lotteries and gambling 
machines. 
A good definition for PseudoRandom Numbers was given in 1951 by Berkeley Professor D. H. 
Lehmer, a pioneer in computing and, especially, computational number theory: 
 
“A random sequence is a vague notion ... in which each term is unpredictable to the uninitiated and whose digits pass a 
certain number of tests traditional with statisticians ...” 
 
It may seem perverse to use a computer, that most precise and deterministic of all machines 
conceived by the human mind, to produce “random” numbers. More than perverse, it may seem to be 
a conceptual impossibility. Any program, after all, will produce output that is entirely predictable, hence 
not truly “random.” 
One sometimes hears computer-generated sequences termed pseudorandom, while the word 
random is reserved for the output of an intrinsically random physical process, like the elapsed time 
between clicks of a Geiger counter placed next to a sample of some radioactive element. We will not try 
to make such fine distinctions. A working, though imprecise, definition of randomness in the context 
of computer-generated sequences, is to say that the deterministic program that produces a random 
sequence should be different from, and — in all measurable respects — statistically uncorrelated with, 
the computer program that uses its output. In other words, any two different random number 
generators ought to produce statistically the same results when coupled to your particular applications 
program. If they don’t, then at least one of them is not (from your point of view) a good generator. 
The above definition may seem circular, comparing, as it does, one generator to another. However, 
there exists a body of random number generators which mutually do satisfy the definition over a very, 
very broad class of applications programs. And it is also found empirically that statistically identical 
results are obtained from random numbers produced by physical processes. So, because such 
generators are known to exist, we can leave to the philosophers the problem of defining them. 
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2 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION 
 
Uniform deviates are just random numbers that lie within a specified range (typically 0 to 1), 
with any one number in the range just as likely as any other. They are, in other words, what you 
probably think “random numbers” are. However, we want to distinguish uniform deviates from other 
sorts of random numbers, for example numbers drawn from a normal (Gaussian) distribution of 
specified mean and standard deviation. These other sorts of deviates are almost always generated by 
performing appropriate operations on one or more uniform deviates, as we will see in subsequent 
sections. So, a reliable source of random uniform deviates, the subject of this section, is an essential 
building block for any sort of stochastic modelling or Monte Carlo computer work. 
Lehmer also invented the multiplicative congruential algorithm, which is the basis for many of the 
random number generators in use today. Lehmer’s generators involve three integer parameters, a , c  
and m , and an initial value, 0x , called the seed. A sequence of integers is defined by: 
 
mcaxx kk mod1 +=+  Eq. 1 
 
The operation “ mmod ” means take the remainder after division by m . For example, with 
,31,0,13 === mca  and 10 =x , the sequence begins with 
 
K3, 5, 29, 7, 22, 16, 6, 10, 27, 14, 13, 1,  Eq. 2 
 
What's the next value? Well, it looks pretty unpredictable, but you've been initiated. So you can 
compute 31mod313 ⋅ , which is 8 . The ¯first 30 terms in the sequence are a permutation of the 
integers from 1 to 30 and then the sequence repeats itself. It has a period equal to 1−m . 
If a pseudorandom integer sequence with values between 0  and m  is scaled by dividing by m , the 
result is floating-point numbers uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Our simple example begins 
with 
 
K0.5161, 0.1935, 0.3226, 0.8710, 0.4516, 0.4194, 0.0323,  Eq. 3 
 
There are only a finite number of values, 30 in this case. The smallest value is 1/31; the largest is 30/31. 
Each one is equally probable in a long run of the sequence. 
Although this general framework is powerful enough to provide quite decent random numbers, its 
implementation in many, if not most, ANSI C libraries is quite flawed; quite a number of 
implementations are in the category “totally botched.” Blame should be apportioned about equally 
between the ANSI C committee and the implementers. 
 
This can be disastrous in many circumstances: for a Monte Carlo integration, you might well want to 
evaluate 610 different points, but actually be evaluating the same 32767 points 30 times each, not at all 
the same thing! You should categorically reject any library random number routine with a two-byte 
returned value. Second, the ANSI committee’s published rationale includes the following mischievous 
passage: “The committee decided that an implementation should be allowed to provide a rand function 
which generates the best random sequence possible in that implementation, and therefore mandated no 
standard algorithm. It recognized the value, however, of being able to generate the same pseudo-
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random sequence in different implementations, and so it has published an example. . . .[emphasis 
added]” The “example” is: 
 
unsigned long next=1; 
int rand(void) /* NOT RECOMMENDED (see text) */ 
{ 
next = next*1103515245 + 12345; 
return (unsigned int)(next/65536) % 32768; 
} 
void srand(unsigned int seed) 
{ 
next=seed; 
} 
 
This corresponds to having with 12345  c ,1103515245  a == , and  322  m = (since arithmetic 
done on unsigned long quantities is guaranteed to return the correct low-order bits). These are not 
particularly good choices for a  and c  (the period is only 230), though they are not gross 
embarrassments by themselves. 
The real botches occur when implementers, taking the committee’s statement above as license, 
try to “improve” on the published example. For example, one popular 32-bit PC-compatible compiler 
provides a long generator that uses the above congruence, but swaps the high-order and low-order 16 
bits of the returned value. 
Somebody probably thought that this extra flourish added randomness; in fact it ruins the generator. 
While these kinds of blunders can, of course, be fixed, there remains a fundamental flaw in simple 
linear congruential generators, which we now discuss. The linear congruential method has the 
advantage of being very fast, requiring only a few operations per call, hence its almost universal use. It 
has the disadvantage that it is not free of sequential correlation on successive calls. 
Even worse, one might be using a generator whose choices of m , a , and c  have been 
botched. One infamous such routine, RANDU. Invented in the 1960's the Scientific Subroutine 
Library on IBM mainframe computers included a random number generator named RND or RANDU. It 
was a multiplicative congruential with parameters 0  c 65539,  a == , and 231  m = . With a 32-bit integer 
word size, arithmetic 312 mod can be done quickly. Furthermore, because 3216 +=a , the 
multiplication by a  can be done with a shift and an addition. 
Such considerations were important on the computers of that era, but they gave the resulting 
sequence a very undesirable property. The following relations are all taken 312 mod  
 
kkkkk xxxxx ]9)32(6[)9262()32()32(
161632216
1
16
2 −+⋅=+⋅+=+=+= ++  Eq. 4 
 
Hence: 
 
kkk xxx 96 12 −= ++  for all k  Eq. 5 
 
As a result, there is an extremely high correlation among three successive random integers of the 
sequence generated by RANDU. 
Correlation in k-space is not the only weakness of linear congruential generators. Such 
generators often have their low-order (least significant) bits much less random than their high-order 
bits. 
Park and Miller have surveyed a large number of random number generators that have been 
used over the last 30 years or more. Along with a good theoretical review, they present an anecdotal 
sampling of a number of inadequate generators that have come into widespread use. The historical 
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record is nothing if not appalling. For many years, the Matlab uniform random number function, rand, 
was also a multiplicative congruential generator. The parameters were: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
==
=
==
2147483647  1 -2  m
0  c
16807  7  a
31
5
 Eq. 6 
 
These values are recommended in a 1988 paper by Park and Miller (“Minimal Standard” 
generator [RNG-9]). First proposed by Lewis, Goodman, and Miller in 1969, this generator has in 
subsequent years passed all new theoretical tests, and (perhaps more importantly) has accumulated a 
large amount of successful use. Park and Miller [RNG-9] do not claim that the generator is “perfect” 
(we will see below that it is not), but only that it is a good minimal standard against which other 
generators should be judged. 
 
Figure 1 – 3D Scatter Plot 
 
Figure 1 shows that the points do not suffer the correlation of the SSP generator. They generate a 
much better “random" cloud within the cube. 
Like our toy generator, randmcg and the old version of the Matlab function rand generate all real 
numbers of the form mk /  11 −= mk K . The smallest and largest are 0.00000000046566 and 
0.999999999534340. The sequence repeats itself after 1−m  values, which is a little over 2 billion 
numbers. A few years ago, that was regarded as plenty. But today, an 800 MHz Pentium laptop can 
exhaust the period in less than half an hour. Of course, to do anything useful with 2 billion numbers 
takes more time, but we would still like to have a longer period. 
In 1995, Version 5 of Matlab introduced a completely different kind of random number 
generator. The algorithm is based on work of George Marsaglia [RNG-8], a professor at Florida State 
University and author of the classic analysis of random number generators, “Random numbers fall 
mainly in the planes”. Marsaglia’s generator [RNG-8] does not use Lehmer’s congruential algorithm. In 
fact, there are no multiplications or divisions at all. It is specifically designed to produce floating-point 
values. The results are not just scaled integers. In place of a single seed, the new generator has 35 words 
of internal memory or state. Thirty-two of these words form a cache of floating-point numbers, z , 
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between 0 and 1. The remaining three words contain an integer index i , which varies between 0 and 
31, a single random integer j , and a “borrow" flag b . This entire state vector is built up a bit at a time 
during an initialization phase. Different values of j  yield different initial states. 
The generation of the i th floating-point number in the sequence involves a “subtract with 
borrow” step, where one number in the cache is replaced by the difference of two others: 
 
bzzz iii −−= ++ 520  Eq. 7 
 
The three indices, 20, +ii , and 5+i , are all interpreted  32 mod (by using just their last five 
bits). The quantity b  is left over from the previous step; it is either zero or a small positive value. If the 
computed iz  is positive, b  is set to zero for the next step. But if the computed iz  would be negative, it 
is made positive by adding 1.0 before it is saved and b  is set to 532−  for the next step. The quantity 
532− , which is half of the Matlab [RNG-7] constant eps, is called one ulp because it is one unit in the last 
place for floating-point numbers slightly less than 1. 
By itself, this generator would be almost completely satisfactory. Marsaglia [RNG-8] has shown 
that it has a huge period - almost 14302  values would be generated before it would repeat itself. But it 
has one slight defect. All the numbers are the results of floating-point additions and subtractions of 
numbers in the initial cache, so they are all integer multiples of 532− . Consequently, many of the 
floating-point numbers in the interval [0, 1] are not represented. 
The floating-point numbers between 1/2 and 1 are equally spaced with a spacing of one ulp, and 
our subtract-with-borrow generator will eventually generate all of them. But numbers less than 1/2 are 
more closely spaced and the generator would miss most of them. It would generate only half of the 
possible numbers in the interval [1/4, 1/2], only a quarter of the numbers in [1/8,1/4] and so on. This 
is where the quantity j  in the state vector comes in. It is the result of a separate, independent, random 
number generator based on bitwise logical operations. The floating-point fraction of each iz  is XORed 
with j  to produce the result returned by the generator. This breaks up the even spacing of the 
numbers less than 1/2. It is now theoretically possible to generate all the floating-point numbers 
between 532− and 5321 −− . We're not sure if they are all actually generated, but we don't know of any 
that can't be. 
Figure 2 shows what the new generator is trying to accomplish. For this graph, one ulp is equal to 
42− instead of 532− . 
 
 
Figure 2 – Uniform distribution of floating-point numbers [RNG-8] 
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The graph in Figure 1 depicts the relative frequency of each of the floating-point numbers. A total of 
32 floating-point numbers is shown. Eight of them are between 1/2 and 1 and they are all equally like 
to occur. There are also eight numbers between 1/4 and 1/2, but, because this interval is only half as 
wide, each of them should occur only half as often. As we move to the left, each subinterval is half as 
wide as the previous one, but it still contains the same number of floating-point numbers, so their 
relative frequencies must be cut in half. Imagine this picture with 253 numbers in each of 232 smaller 
intervals and you will see what the new random number generator is doing. 
With the additional bit fiddling, the period of the new generator becomes something like 14922 . 
Maybe we should call it the Christopher Columbus generator. In any case, it will run for a very long 
time before it repeats itself. 
 
3 TRANSFORMATION METHOD: EXPONENTIAL AND NORMAL 
DEVIATES 
 
In the previous section, we learned how to generate random deviates with a uniform probability 
distribution, so that the probability of generating a number between  x  and dxx + , denoted dxxp )( , 
is given by 
 
⎩⎨
⎧=
0
 
)(
dx
dxxp     
otherwise
x 10 <<
 Eq. 8 
 
The probability distribution )(xp  is of course normalized, so that 
 
∫+∞
∞−
=1)( dxxp  Eq. 9 
 
Now suppose that we generate a uniform deviate x  and then take some prescribed function of 
it, )(xy . The probability distribution of y , denoted dyyp )( , is determined by the fundamental 
transformation law of probabilities, which is simply 
 
dxxpdyyp )()( =  Eq. 10 
 
or better: 
 
dy
dxxpyp )()( =  Eq. 11 
 
3.1 EXPONENTIAL DEVIATES 
 
As an example, suppose that )ln()( xxy −= , and that )(xp  is as given by the equation for a 
uniform deviate. Then: 
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dyedy
dy
dxdyyp y−==)(  Eq. 12 
 
which is distributed exponentially. This exponential distribution occurs frequently in real problems, 
usually as the distribution of waiting times between independent Poisson-random events, for example 
the radioactive decay of nuclei. You can also easily see that the quantity λ/y  has the probability 
distribution ye λλ − . 
 
 
Figure 3 – Transformation method for generating a random deviate y from a known probability distribution p(y). 
The indefinite integral of p(y) must be known and invertible. A uniform deviate x is chosen between 0 and 1. Its 
corresponding y on the definite-integral curve is the desired deviate [RNG-6] 
 
Let’s see what is involved in using the above transformation method to generate some arbitrary 
desired distribution of y ’s, say one with )()( yfyp =  for some positive function f  whose integral is 
1. (See Figure 3) According to what stated above, we need to solve the differential equation 
 
)(yf
dy
dx =  Eq. 13 
 
But the solution of this is just )(yFx = , where )(yF  is the indefinite integral of )(yf . The desired 
transformation which takes a uniform deviate into one distributed as )(yf is therefore 
 
)()( 1 xFxy −=  Eq. 14 
 
where 1−F  is the inverse function to F . Whether is feasible to implement depends on whether the 
inverse function of the integral of )(yf  is itself feasible to compute, either analytically or numerically. 
Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn’t. 
Incidentally, this has an immediate geometric interpretation: Since )(yF  is the area under the 
probability curve to the left of y , this is just the prescription: choose a uniform random x , then find 
the value y  that has that fraction x  of probability area to its left, and return the value y . 
 
3.2 REJECTION METHOD: GAMMA, POISSON, BINOMIAL DEVIATES 
 
The rejection method is a powerful, general technique for generating random deviates whose 
distribution function dxxp )(  (probability of a value occurring between x  and dxx + ) is known and 
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computable. The rejection method does not require that the cumulative distribution function [indefinite 
integral of )(xp ] be readily computable, much less the inverse of that function — which was required 
for the transformation method in the previous section. 
The rejection method is based on a simple geometrical argument: Draw a graph of the probability 
distribution )(xp  that you wish to generate, so that the area under the curve in any range of x  
corresponds to the desired probability of generating an x  in that range. If we had some way of 
choosing a random point in two dimensions, with uniform probability in the area under your curve, 
then the x  value of that random point would have the desired distribution. 
Now, on the same graph, draw any other curve )(xf  which has finite (not infinite) area and lies 
everywhere above your original probability distribution. (This is always possible, because your original 
curve encloses only unit area, by definition of probability.) We will call this )(xf  the comparison 
function. Imagine now that you have some way of choosing a random point in two dimensions that is 
uniform in the area under the comparison function. Whenever that point lies outside the area under the 
original probability distribution, we will reject it and choose another random point. Whenever it lies 
inside the area under the original probability distribution, we will accept it. It should be obvious that the 
accepted points are uniform in the accepted area, so that their x  values have the desired distribution.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Rejection method for generating a random deviate x from a known probability distribution p(x) that is 
everywhere less than some other function f(x). The transformation method is first used to generate a random 
deviate x of the distribution f (compare Figure 3 ). A second uniform deviate is used to decide whether to accept 
or reject that x. If it is rejected, a new deviate of f is found; and so on. The ratio of accepted to rejected points is 
the ratio of the area under p to the area between p and f [RNG-6] 
 
It should also be obvious that the fraction of points rejected just depends on the ratio of the 
area of the comparison function to the area of the probability distribution function, not on the details 
of shape of either function. For example, a comparison function whose area is less than 2 will reject 
fewer than half the points, even if it approximates the probability function very badly at some values of 
x , e.g., remains finite in some region where )(xp  is zero. 
It remains only to suggest how to choose a uniform random point in two dimensions under the 
comparison function )(xf . A variant of the transformation method does nicely: be sure to have 
chosen a comparison function whose indefinite integral is known analytically, and is also analytically 
invertible to give x  as a function of “area under the comparison function to the left of x .” Now pick a 
uniform deviate between 0 and A , where A  is the total area under )(xf , and use it to get a 
corresponding x . Then pick a uniform deviate between 0  and )(xf  as the y  value for the two-
dimensional point. You should be able to convince yourself that the point ),( yx  is uniformly 
distributed in the area under the comparison function )(xf . An equivalent procedure is to pick the 
second uniform deviate between zero and one, and accept or reject according to whether it is 
respectively less than or greater than the ratio )(/)( xfxp . 
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So, to summarize, the rejection method for some given )(xp  requires that one find, once and 
for all, some reasonably good comparison function )(xf . Thereafter, each deviate generated requires 
two uniform random deviates, one evaluation of f  (to get the coordinate y ), and one evaluation of p  
(to decide whether to accept or reject the point yx, ). Figure 4 illustrates the procedure. Then, of 
course, this procedure must be repeated, on the average, A  times before the final deviate is obtained. 
 
3.3 POISSON DEVIATES 
 
The Poisson distribution is conceptually related to the gamma distribution. It gives the 
probability of a certain integer number m of unit rate Poisson random events occurring in a given 
interval of time x , while the gamma distribution was the probability of waiting time between x  and 
dxx +  to the m th event. Note that m  takes on only integer values ≥ 0, so that the Poisson 
distribution, viewed as a continuous distribution function dmmpx )( , is zero everywhere except where 
m  is an integer ≥ 0. At such places, it is infinite, such that the integrated probability over a region 
containing the integer is some finite number. The total probability at an integer  j  is  
 
!
)()(Prob
j
exdmmpj
xjj
j
x
−+
−
== ∫
ε
ε
 Eq. 15 
 
At first sight this might seem an unlikely candidate distribution for the rejection method, since no 
continuous comparison function can be larger than the infinitely tall, but infinitely narrow, Dirac delta 
functions in )(mpx . However, there is a trick that we can do: spread the finite area in the spike at j 
uniformly into the interval between j  and 1+j . This defines a continuous distribution dmmqx )(  
given by 
 
dm
m
exdmmq
xm
x ]![
)(
][ −
=  Eq. 16 
 
where ][m  represents the largest integer less than m . If we now use the rejection method to generate a 
(noninteger) deviate from dmmqx )( , and then take the integer part of that deviate, it will be as if drawn 
from the desired distribution )(Prob j . (See Figure 5) This trick is general for any integer-valued 
probability distribution. For x  large enough, the distribution dmmqx )(  is qualitatively bell-shaped 
(albeit with a bell made out of small, square steps), and we can use the same kind of Lorentzian 
comparison function as was already used above. For small x , we can generate independent exponential 
deviates (waiting times between events); when the sum of these first exceeds x , then the number of 
events that would have occurred in waiting time x becomes known and is one less than the number of 
terms in the sum. 
These ideas produce the following routine:  
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Figure 5 – Rejection method as applied to an integer-valued distribution. The method is performed on the step 
function shown as a dashed line, yielding a real-valued deviate. This deviate is rounded down to the next lower 
integer, which is output [RNG-6] 
 
#include <math.h> 
#define PI 3.141592654 
float poidev(float xm, long *idum) 
Returns as a floating-point number an integer value that is a random deviate drawn from a Poisson 
distribution of mean xm, using ran1(idum) as a source of uniform random deviates. 
{ 
float gammln(float xx); 
float ran1(long *idum); 
static float sq,alxm,g,oldm=(-1.0); oldm is a flag for whether xm has changed since last call. 
float em,t,y;  
if (xm < 12.0) { Use direct method. 
if (xm != oldm) { 
oldm=xm; 
g=exp(-xm); If xm is new, compute the exponential. 
} 
em = -1; 
t=1.0; 
do { Instead of adding exponential deviates it is equivalent to multiply uniform deviates. We never 
actually have to take the log, merely compare to the pre-computed exponential. 
++em; 
t *= ran1(idum); 
} while (t > g); 
} else { Use rejection method. 
if (xm != oldm) { If xm has changed since the last call, then 
preoldm=xm; compute some functions that occur below. 
sq=sqrt(2.0*xm); 
alxm=log(xm); 
g=xm*alxm-gammln(xm+1.0); 
The function gammln is the natural log of the gamma function 
} 
do { 
do { y is a deviate from a Lorentzian comparison function. 
y=tan(PI*ran1(idum));  
em=sq*y+xm; em is y, shifted and scaled. 
} while (em < 0.0); Reject if in regime of zero probability. 
em=floor(em); The trick for integer-valued distributions. 
t=0.9*(1.0+y*y)*exp(em*alxm-gammln(em+1.0)-g); 
The ratio of the desired distribution to the comparison function; we accept or reject by comparing 
it to another uniform deviate. The factor 0.9 is chosen so that t never exceeds 1. 
} while (ran1(idum) > t); 
} 
return em; 
} 
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4 QUALITY CRITERIA FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS 
 
The default generators of many popular software programs fail several tests miserably. The 
survivors are the long-period MRGs with good structure, the multiplicative lagged-Fibonacci 
generators, some nonlinear generators designed for cryptology, and some combined generators with 
components from different families. SWB and additive lagged-Fibonacci generators also pass when 
using appropriate decimation, but the decimation slows them down significantly. It seems that 
combined generators with components from different families should be given better attention because 
theoretical guarantees about their uniformity can be proved, their period can easily be made very long, 
splitting their period into long disjoint sub-streams is easy to do if one can do it for the components 
and it is not hard to select the components with this in mind. 
RNGs for all types of applications are designed so that their output sequence is a good 
imitation of a sequence of independent uniform random variables, usually over the real interval )1,0(  
or over the binary set  }1,0{ . In the first case, the relevant hypothesis AH0  to be tested is that the 
successive output values of the RNG, say ,...,, 210 uuu , are independent random variables from the 
uniform distribution over the interval )1,0( , i.e, i.i.d. )1,0(U . 
In the second case, BH0  says that we have a sequence of independent random bits, each taking the 
value 0 or 1 with equal probabilities independently of the others. 
These two situations are strongly related, because under the i.i.d. )1,0(U  hypothesis, any pre-specified 
sequence of bits (e.g., the bit sequence formed by taking all successive bits of 0u , or every second bit, 
or the first five bits of each iu , etc.) must be a sequence of independent random bits. So statistical tests 
for bit sequences can be used as well (indirectly) for testing the null hypothesis AH0 . 
In the )1,0(U  case, AH0  is equivalent to saying that for each integer 0>t , the vector ),...,( 10 −tuu  is 
uniformly distributed over the t -dimensional unit cube t)1,0( . 
This cannot be true for algorithmic RNGs, because these vectors always take their values only from the 
finite set tΨ  of all t -dimensional vectors of t  successive values that can be produced by the generator, 
from all its possible initial states (or seeds). 
The cardinality of this set cannot exceed the number of admissible seeds for the RNG. Assuming that 
the seed is chosen at random, vectors are actually generated in tΨ  to approximate the uniform 
distribution over t)1,0( . This suggests that tΨ  should be very evenly distributed over the unit cube. 
Theoretical figures of merit for measuring this uniformity are used for the design of good RNGs. These 
criteria are much easier to compute for linear generators. 
This is one of the main reasons for the popularity of generators based on linear recurrences; e.g., linear 
congruential generators (LCGs), multiple recursive generators (MRGs), linear feedback shift-register 
(LFSR) generators, and generalized feedback shift-register (GFSR) generators. 
For a sequence of bits, the null hypothesis BH0  cannot be formally true as soon as the length t  of the 
sequence exceeds the number b of bits in the generator’s state, because the number of distinct 
sequences of bits that can be produced cannot exceed b2 . For bt > , the fraction of all t2  sequences 
of t bits that can be visited is at most tb−2 . The goal, then, is to make sure that those sequences that can 
be visited are “uniformly scattered” in the set of all t2  possible sequences, and perhaps hard to 
distinguish. 
Different quality criteria are used for RNGs in cryptology-related applications and for gambling 
machines in casinos. In these settings, an additional concern is unpredictability of the forthcoming 
numbers. The theoretical analysis of RNGs in cryptology is usually asymptotic, in the framework of 
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computational complexity theory. Nonlinear recurrences and/or output functions are used, which 
prevents one from measuring the uniformity of the set tΨ . As a result, empirical testing is even more 
necessary. 
For a more detailed discussion on empirical testing of RNGs and a discussion on the links and 
similarities between different tests, identification of specific types of regularities or defects that they are 
likely to detect, please refer to “TestU01: A C Library for Empirical Testing of Random Number 
Generators”, L’Ecuyer, Simard, Université de Montréal, ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software 
[RNG-5]. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MONTE CARLO 
SIMULATION 
 
 
 
 
We can define Monte Carlo Analysis as a computer-based method of analysis that uses 
statistical sampling techniques in obtaining a probabilistic approximation to the solution of a 
mathematical equation or model [MC-2]. 
The actual use of Monte Carlo methods as a research tool stems from work on the atomic 
bomb during the Second World War. This work involved a direct simulation of the probabilistic 
problems concerned with random neutron diffusion in fissile material; but even at an early stage of 
these investigations, von Neumann and Ulam refined this particular “Russian roulette” and “splitting” 
methods. However, the systematic development of these ideas had to await for the work of Harris and 
Herman Kahn in 1948. About 1948 Fermi, Metropolis, and Ulam obtained Monte Carlo estimates for 
the eigenvalues of Schrodinger equation.  
The name “Monte Carlo” was coined by Metropolis (inspired by Ulam’s interest in poker) 
during the Manhattan Project, because of the similarity of statistical simulation to games of chance, and 
because Monte Carlo, the capital of Monaco was a centre for gambling. 
The generally accepted birth date of the Monte Carlo method is 1949, when an article entitled 
“The Monte Carlo method” by Metropolis and Ulam appeared [MC-1]. The American mathematicians 
John von Neumann and Stanislav Ulam are considered its main originators. In the Soviet Union, the 
first papers on the Monte Carlo method were published in 1955 and 1956 by V. V. Chavchanidze, Yu. 
A. Shreider and V. S. Vladimirov. 
Curiously enough, the theoretical foundation of the method had been known long before the 
von Neumann-Ulam article was published. Furthermore, well before 1949 certain problems in statistics 
were sometimes solved by means of random sampling - that is, in fact, by the Monte Carlo method. 
However, because simulation of random variables by hand is a laborious process, use of the Monte 
Carlo method as a universal numerical technique became practical only with the advent of computers. 
As for the name “Monte Carlo”, it is derived from that city in the Principality of Monaco famous for its 
casinos. The point is that one of the simplest mechanical devices for generating random numbers is the 
roulette wheel. 
In about 1970, the newly developing theory of computational complexity began to provide a 
more precise and persuasive rationale for employing the Monte Carlo method. The theory identified a 
class of problems for which the time to evaluate the exact solution to a problem within the class grows, 
at least, exponentially. The question to be resolved was whether or not the Monte Carlo method could 
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estimate the solution to a problem in this intractable class to within a specified statistical accuracy in 
time bounded.  
Monte Carlo now refers to any method that utilizes sequences of random numbers to perform 
statistical simulation. The main requirement to use Monte Carlo method for simulation of a physical 
system is that it must be possible to describe the system in terms of probability density function (PDF), 
also called partition function (Z). Once the PDF or Z for a system is known, then the simulation begins 
by random “sampling” from the PDF, and subsequently determining the desired properties of the 
sample by conducting some kind of a “trial”. There must be a rule available, based on some reasonable 
mathematical and/or physical theory, to decide the outcome of such a trial. Many trials are conducted 
and outcomes of all of these trials are recorded. The final step in the Monte Carlo method is that the 
behaviour of the overall system is obtained by computing the average of outcomes of the trails 
conducted [MC-3]. 
 
1 PRINCIPLES OF MONTE CARLO METHOD 
 
The Monte Carlo method provides approximate solutions to a variety of mathematical 
problems by performing statistical sampling experiments on a computer. Remarkably, the method 
applies to problems with absolutely no probabilistic content as well as to those with inherent 
probabilistic structure [MC-4]. This alone does not give the Monte Carlo method an advantage over 
other methods of approximation. However, among all numerical methods that rely on n-point 
evaluations in m-dimensional space to produce an approximate solution, the Monte Carlo method has 
absolute error of estimate that decreases as 2/1−n  whereas, in the absence of exploitable special 
structure, all others have errors that decrease as mn /1−  at best. This property gives the Monte Carlo 
method a considerable edge in computational efficiency as m, the size of the problem, increases. 
Combinatorial settings illustrate this property especially well. Whereas the exact solution to a 
combinatorial problem with m elements often has computational cost that increases exponentially or 
super-exponentially with m, the Monte Carlo method frequently provides an estimated solution with 
tolerable error at a cost that increases no faster than as a polynomial in m. 
Deceptively simple in concept, the Monte Carlo method incorporates three distinct, but related, 
historical developments in the mathematical sciences. First, games of chance motivated seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century mathematicians to regard outcomes on successive trials as forming a sequence 
of random events. Observing that the mean of a function of continuous random variables took the 
form of an integral, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century statisticians subsequently recognized that, 
in principle, one could randomly draw numbers, transform them according to prescribed rules, and 
derive an approximate solution to an integral in a problem that intrinsically contained no probabilistic 
content whatever (e.g., National Bureau of Standards 1951, p. 40). In the late nineteenth century, a 
second line of inquiry developed when Lord Rayleigh (1899) showed that a one-dimensional random 
walk without absorbing barriers could provide an approximate solution to a parabolic differential 
equation. In the course of demonstrating that under appropriate conditions a particular finite difference 
equation could produce an approximate solution to the Dirichlet boundary-value problem of partial 
differential equations, Courant et al. (1928) showed that the recursive form of the solution to a two-
dimensional random walk on a square grid within a closed region whose boundary points were 
absorbing states produced the identical difference equation. Shortly thereafter, Kolmogorov (1931) 
showed the relationship between Markov stochastic processes and certain integro-differential 
equations. Petrowsky (1933) considerably generalized the result of Courant et al. by showing the 
asymptotic connection between a random walk whose sequence of locations formed a Markov chain 
and the solution to an elliptic partial differential equation. He called this formulation the generalized 
Dirichlet problem. At that time, these revelations derived their significance from the observation that 
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solutions to problems encountered in stochastic processes often corresponded to solutions that arose 
in the study of partial differential equations, and, therefore, one could employ the difference equation 
methods applicable for solving the differential equations to provide approximate solutions to the 
original stochastic problem. During the development of atomic energy in the post-World War I era, a 
third line of inquiry evolved. Scientists needed to solve problems of neutron diffusion or transport 
through an isotropic medium. These multidimensional problems proved too formidable for the 
difference equation approach. Since it had already been established that the resulting partial differential 
and integral equations all had analogous in stochastic processes, John von Neumann and Stanislaw 
Ulam suggested that sampling experiments using random walk models and executed on the newly 
developed digital computer could provide readily usable approximations to the desired solutions. This 
proposal reversed the direction of reasoning. Instead of using the cumbersome difference equation 
approach to provide solutions to probabilistic problems, one conducted sampling experiments to 
provide solutions to the integro-differential equations, which did not necessarily have a probabilistic 
basis themselves. Moreover, the availability of the digital computer provided the means for putting this 
suggestion into practice. Later, the concept of employing sampling experiments on a computer came to 
prevail in many scientific disciplines, most notably, in chemistry, engineering, operations research, 
physics, and statistics. In operations research, studies of all but the most elementary queuing models 
rely on generating random tours on computers to provide approximate solutions. In physics, the Monte 
Carlo method has come to be recognized as the only approach capable of providing useful insights to 
many neutron transport and lattice structure problems. In about 1970, the newly developing theory of 
computational complexity began to provide a more precise and persuasive rationale for employing the 
Monte Carlo method. The theory identified a class of problems for which the time to evaluate the exact 
solution to a problem within the class grows, at least, exponentially with m. Many commonly 
encountered problems belong to this class and, although special structure when it exists often can lead 
to an algorithm for exact evaluation in time bounded above by a polynomial in m, the absence of 
special structure leaves intact the formidable cost of exact evaluation. The existence of this substantial 
class of problems gave new currency to the idea that the Monte Carlo method might offer a 
competitive solution. The question to be resolved was whether or not the Monte Carlo method could 
estimate the solution to a problem in this intractable class to within a specified statistical accuracy in 
time bounded above by a polynomial in m. Numerous examples now support this contention. Karp 
(1985) shows this property for estimating reliability in a planar multi-terminal network with randomly 
failing edges. Dyer et al. (1989) establish it for estimating the volume of a convex body in m-
dimensional Euclidean space (Sec. 5.32). Broder (1986) and Jerrum and Sinclair (1988) establish the 
property for estimating the permanent of a matrix or, equivalently, the number of perfect matchings in 
a bipartite graph. The simplicity of the concept belies the mathematical sophistication with which one 
can imbue the Monte Carlo method. In particular, von Neumann, Ulam, and others recognized that 
one could modify the standard Monte Carlo method in a way that produced a solution to the original 
problem with specified error bound at considerably less cost, in terms of computing time, than directly 
generating the random tour that corresponded to the original problem. Some of these variance 
reducing techniques were already known to statisticians working in the area of sample survey, but 
others owe their origin to the Monte Carlo method. Collectively, these procedures have come to 
represent the central focus of the Monte Carlo method. The improved computing efficiency to which 
they lead follows from their exploiting available structural information about a problem that the 
elementary or standard Monte Carlo method ignores. At the beginning of the computer age, the relative 
slowness of first-generation computers made the application of variance-reducing techniques an 
essential ingredient of any successful application of the Monte Carlo method. However, now as then, 
an analyst must tailor a variance-reducing technique for each problem, and this tailoring takes the 
analyst’s time. In an age in which personal microcomputers are readily available and workstations are 
becoming increasingly available, one may choose to conserve the amount of exceedingly valuable 
tailoring time in favour of allowing a computer to grind away for long, but exceedingly inexpensive, 
hours to provide an approximate solution using the standard Monte Carlo method. Regarded as 
  
XIX ciclo di Dottorato in Ingegneria Elettrica 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA 
 
 8-4
 
methodological blasphemy until as recently as 1970, when all Monte Carlo work was performed on 
mainframe computers, following this philosophy in some circumstances for problems that can fit 
comfortably time-wise and space-wise into a microcomputer or workstation now seems eminently 
reasonable. Nevertheless, problems of substantial size remain and, regardless of whether one uses a 
microcomputer, workstation, or a mainframe computer, the feasibility of achieving estimated solutions 
with moderately high statistical accuracy depends critically on how effectively one exploits available 
information.  
 
2 CONTROLLING THE ERROR IN MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 
 
While controlling error prevails as an underlying theme, limits exist on our ability to do just 
that. Justification for employing the Monte Carlo method comes from two basic tenets of statistics. Let 
nXXX ,...,, 21  denote a sequence of mutually independent, identically distributed random variables. Let 
nn XXS ++= ...1 . If the expectation iEX=μ  exists, the Weak Law of Large Numbers states that, for 
every 0>ε ,  
 
0lim =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ >−∞→ εμn
Spr n
n
 Eq. 1 
 
If, additionally, the expectation 22 )( μσ −= iXE  exists, then the Central Limit Theorem asserts that, for 
every fixed a : 
 
dzea
n
nSpr
a zn
n ∫ ∞− −−∞→ =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ <− 2/2/1 2)2(lim πσ
μ  Eq. 2 
 
The Law of Large Numbers leads one to believe that, as the sample size n increases, the error of 
approximation in estimating μ  by nSn /  becomes vanishingly small and, in principle, the Central Limit 
Theorem provides a way of assessing the extent of that statistical error for large n . In practice, 
however, the Monte Carlo method relies on techniques that contradict both of these statistical laws. 
Since all numerical-valued samples generated in a Monte Carlo experiment arise from transforming 
numbers that a pseudorandom number generator produces, and since sequences of these numbers 
repeat themselves after a finite number of steps P , sampling without limit in a Monte Carlo 
experiment does not make statistical error vanish. For experiments executed on conventional 
mainframes, personal computers, and workstations, these realities limit achievable accuracy. Although 
most experiments demand levels of accuracy well within these limits, this sobering fact of life should be 
clearly understood before employing the Monte Carlo method. Although the Central Limit Theorem 
provides a simple way of deriving an approximation to the statistical error in a point estimate, the 
goodness of the approximation depends on the rate at which the distribution of 
n
nSn
σ
μ)( −  converges 
to the standard normal distribution. Inevitably, convergence rates differ among problems and, 
therefore, in the absence of any information on convergence one must regard the normal 
approximation as an additional source of error for any finite sample size n. However, this last error can 
be eliminated by resorting to alternative statistical techniques. This is especially true for random 
variables with known lower and upper bounds. To achieve a specified bound on error, these alternative 
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techniques generally predict a larger sample size than the approximating normal approach does. This is 
the penalty for eliminating the additional error that assuming normality would induce. 
 
3 SEQUENTIAL AND NON‐SEQUENTIAL TECHNIQUES 
 
The basic goal of our Monte Carlo analysis in this thesis is to characterize, quantitatively, the 
uncertainty and variability in estimates of risk of collision among aircrafts. A secondary goal is to 
identify key sources of variability and uncertainty and to quantify the relative contribution of these 
sources to the overall variance and range of model results. 
Analytical techniques represent every system by analytical models and evaluate the indices from 
these models using mathematical solutions. Monte Carlo simulation methods, however, estimate the 
indices by simulating the actual process and random behaviour of the system. When complex operating 
conditions are involved (such as an airport), Monte Carlo methods are often preferable. 
There are two basic approaches when Monte Carlo methods are applied to reliability evaluation. 
These methods are known as the sequential and non-sequential techniques. 
The analytical approach and the non-sequential Monte Carlo methods are usually restricted to 
the evaluation of expected values and, sometimes, to a limited range of system parameters. There is 
frequently a need to know the likely range of the reliability indices, the likelihood of a certain value 
being exceeded, and similar parameters. These can only be assessed from a knowledge of the 
probability distribution associated with the index in question, and this is rarely achievable using an 
analytical approach. In such cases, sequential simulation can be utilised. 
In sequential simulation, each subsequent system state sample is related to the previous set of 
system states. A sequential time evolution of system behaviour is created which enables a wide range of 
reliability indices to be evaluated. Sequential simulation is very useful when the system to be analysed is 
past-dependent, i.e. the state of the system at any given time is partially determined by the historical 
evolution of the system. Sequential simulation becomes a necessity when the operating system is 
history-dependent or time correlated. At the present time, sequential simulation is the only realistic 
option available to develop the distributions associated with the system index mean values [MC-6]. This 
approach can be used to represent most of the contingencies and operating characteristics inherent in 
the system and, also, to provide the most comprehensive range of reliability indices. The sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation is the only method which can comprehensively deal with the time-varying 
aspect of the loads at each bus. 
The probability distributions associated with the times-to-failure and times-to-repair of each 
system component are often not known and only the meantime-to-failure (MTTF) and the mean-time-
to-repair (MTTR) are available. In these cases, it is generally assumed that the underlying distributions 
are exponential and the expected values are calculated on that basis. The sequential simulation method 
can, however, be used to sample the failure and repair times from any statistical distribution, such as 
Weibull, normal etc.. 
In this thesis we are using a sequential Monte Carlo approach for composite system 
reliability/safety assessment [MC-7]. The reliability indices of an actual physical system can be estimated 
by collecting data on the occurrence of failures and the Monte Carlo method mimics the failure and 
repair history of the components and the system by using the probability distributions of the 
component state durations. Statistics are then collected and indices estimated using statistical inference 
[MC-8]. 
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3.1 FIXED INTERVAL METHOD AND ASYNCHRONOUS TIMING 
 
We have already seen that there are two basic approaches for Monte Carlo simulation, 
sequential simulation, and random sampling. The sequential simulation proceeds by generating a 
sequence of events using random numbers and probability distributions of random variables 
representing component state durations. In random sampling, states are drawn based on the probability 
distributions of component states and random numbers. The sampling method is generally faster than 
the sequential technique, but is suitable when component failures and repairs are independent. In this 
thesis we will use the sequential method for reliability analysis. 
Further, there are two methods for representing the passage of time in sequential simulation: (1) 
the fixed interval method, also called synchronous timing, and (2) the next event or asynchronous timing method. 
In the fixed interval method, time is advanced in steps of fixed length and the system state is updated. 
In the next event method, time is advanced to the occurrence of the next event. In actual 
implementations, it is likely that combinations of the timing controls may be used. 
The flowchart for this method is shown in Figure 1. The whole procedure consists of the 
following steps. 
 
3.1.1 DATA INPUT AND INITIALIZATION 
 
The input data consists of the failure rate (λ ) and duration ( r ) of every component. The failure 
rate is the reciprocal of the mean up time. The failure duration or mean down time is the reciprocal of 
the repair rate (μ ). The failure and repair rates, λ  and μ , of a component will be used to determine 
how long the component will remain in the “UP” state and the “DOWN” state. 
Simulation could be started from any system state, but it is customary to begin simulation with all the 
components in the “UP” state. 
 
3.1.2 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION 
 
Random numbers constitute a sequence in which each number has an equal probability of 
assuming any one of the possible values, and is statistically independent of the other numbers in the 
sequence. Random numbers, therefore, basically constitute a uniform distribution over a suitably 
selected range of values. This distribution may be constructed using any suitable means. For a more 
detailed description of the Random Number Generation process, please refer to Chapter 7. 
 
3.1.3 COMPUTATION OF TIME TO THE NEXT EVENT 
 
The time to the next event is generated by using the inverse of probability distribution method. 
This method can be understood by considering the probability mass function of a random variable. 
The first step is to convert this mass function into the corresponding distribution function. Now a 
random number z  between 0 and 1 is generated and )(xF  is set equal to z . The corresponding value 
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of X  gives the value of the random variable. An example is shown in Figure 2, with 55.0=z , for 
which 2=X . 
 
 
Figure 1 – Flowchart for Next Event Simulation 
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Figure 2 – PMF and PDF of a Random Variable 
 
It should be noticed that )()( 1−− ii xFxF  is equal to )( ixXP = , and if the random number 
falls in the interval [ ])(),( 1−ii xFxF , the value of  ixX =  will be selected. The procedure therefore 
essentially allocates the random numbers to the random variables in the proportion of their 
probabilities of occurrence. 
This procedure can also be used for continuous distributions. Continuous distributions are 
approximated by discrete distributions whose irregularly spaced points have equal probabilities. The 
accuracy can be increased by increasing the number of intervals into which ]1,0[  is divided. This 
requires additional data in the form of tables. Although the method is quite general, its disadvantages 
are the great amount of work required to develop tables and possible computer storage problems. The 
following analytic inversion approach is simpler. 
Let z be a random number in the range 0 to 1 with a uniform probability density function, i.e., a 
triangular distribution function: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
0
1
0
)(zf    
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0
>
≤≤
<
Z
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Z
 Eq. 3 
 
Similarly 
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 Eq. 4 
 
Let )(xF  be the distribution function from which the random observations are to be generated. Let 
 
)(xFz =  Eq. 5 
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Solving the equation for x  gives a random observation of X . That the observations so generated do 
have )(xF  as the probability distribution can be shown as follows. 
Let φ  be the inverse of F ; then 
 
)(zx φ=  Eq. 6 
 
Now x  is the random observation generated. We determine its probability distribution as follows: 
 
)())(())()(()( XFXFzPXFxFPXxP =≤=≤=≤  Eq. 7 
 
Therefore the distribution function of x  is )(XF , as required. 
In the case of several important distributions, special techniques have been developed for efficient 
random sampling. 
For our purposes, the distributions assumed for up and down times are exponential. The exponential 
distribution has the following probability distribution: 
 
xexXP ρ−−=≤ 1)(  Eq. 8 
 
where ρ/1  is the mean of the random variable X . Setting this function equal to a random decimal 
number between 0 and 1, 
 
xez ρ−−=1  Eq. 9 
 
Since the complement of such a random number is also a random number, the above equation can as 
well be written as 
 
xez ρ−=  Eq. 10 
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and simplifying, we get: 
 
ρ
)ln(zx −=  Eq. 11 
 
which is the desired random observation from the exponential distribution having ρ/1  as the mean. 
This method is used to determine the time to the next transition for every component, using λ , or μ  
for ρ , depending on whether the component is UP or DOWN. The smallest of these times indicates 
the most imminent event, and the corresponding component is assigned a change of state. If this event 
also results in a change of status, (i.e., failure or restoration) of the system, then the corresponding 
system indices are updated. 
 
3.1.4 THE INDICES 
 
At any time t , the mean failure frequency is given by 
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tt
1=λ (number of failures till time t ) Eq. 12 
 
And the mean down time is given by: 
 
t
rt
1= (total time spent in failed state) Eq. 13 
 
3.1.5 CONVERGENCE 
 
The simulation is said to have converged when the indices attain stable values [MC-6]. This 
“stabilization” of the value of an index i  is measured by its standard error, defined as: 
 
c
i
n
ση =  Eq. 14 
 
where iσ  is the standard deviation of the index i  and cn  the number of cycles simulated. 
Convergence is said to occur when the standard error drops below a pre-specified fraction, ε , of the 
index i , i.e., when 
 
i⋅≤ εη  Eq. 15 
 
If, for instance, the mean down time r  is chosen as the index to converge upon, then, after every 
system restoration simulated, the following relation is tested for validity: 
 
r
nc
i ⋅≤ εσ  Eq. 16 
 
If this criterion is satisfied, the simulation is said to have converged. 
 
3.1.6 STATISTICS OBTAINED FROM SIMULATION 
 
Simulation is advantageous in that it not only allows the computation of indices at various 
points in the system, but also permits the accumulation of data pertaining to the distribution of these 
indices, thereby affording a better understanding of the system behaviour. 
For an emergency power system, for instance, statistics may be collected for failure frequency 
and duration at various points in the system, the annual incidence rates for failures, as well as for the 
variances of these indices. 
The approximation in the Monte Carlo method comes from the fact that in this approach, the 
statistics are estimates of the true values, and therefore cannot be exact. It can be seen that if the error 
is to be reduced to half, the number of samples has to increase four times. Thus for systems with high 
reliability (or low probability of failure), the Monte Carlo simulation can take a very long time to 
converge. 
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The main advantage of simulation is that it is very flexible for incorporating dependent failures 
and is very suitable for large systems. Also, it yields the probability distribution of indices in addition to 
estimating mean values. These probability distributions are useful for performing sensibility analysis. 
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CHAPTER 9 
PETRI NETS 
 
 
 
 
This thesis, for the purpose of airport traffic simulation, mainly deals with Petri nets, one of the 
existing formalism for DES modelling and control. 
Petri Nets [PN-7] are a graphical and mathematical modelling tool applicable to many systems. 
They are a promising tool for describing and studying information processing systems that are 
characterized as being concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel, nondeterministic, and/or 
stochastic. 
As a graphical tool, Petri Nets [PN-8] can be used as a visual-communication aid similar to flow 
charts, block diagrams, and networks. In addition, tokens are used in these nets to simulate the dynamic 
and concurrent activities of systems. As a mathematical tool, it is possible to set up state equations, 
algebraic equations, and other mathematical models governing the behaviour of systems. Petri nets can 
be used by both practitioners and theoreticians. Thus, they provide a powerful medium of 
communication between them: practitioners can learn from theoreticians how to make their models 
more methodical, and theoreticians can learn from practitioners how to make their models more 
realistic. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION TO PETRI NETS 
 
Historically speaking, the concept of the Petri net has its origin in Carl Adam Petri’s dissertation 
submitted in 1962 to the faculty of Mathematics and Physics at the Technical University of Darmstadt, 
West Germany. The dissertation was prepared while C. A. Petri worked as a scientist at the University 
of Bonn. Petri’s work came to the attention of A. W. Holt, who later led the Information System 
Theory Project of Applied Data Research, Inc., in the United States. The early developments and 
applications of Petri nets (or their predecessor) are found in the reports associated with this project, 
and in the Record of the 1970 Project MAC Conference on Concurrent Systems and Parallel 
Computation. From 1970 to 1975, the Computation Structure Group at MIT was most active in 
conducting Petri-net related research, and produced many reports and theses on Petri nets. In July 
1975, there was a conference on Petri Nets and Related Methods at MIT, but no conference 
proceedings were published. Most of the Petri-net related papers written in English before 1980 are 
listed in the annotated bibliography of the first book on Petri nets. More recent papers up until 1984 
and those works done in Germany and other European countries are annotated in the appendix of 
another book. Three tutorial articles provide a complementally, easy-to-read introduction to Petri nets. 
  
XIX ciclo di Dottorato in Ingegneria Elettrica 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA 
 
 9-2
 
Since the late-1970‘s, the Europeans have been very active in organizing workshops and publishing 
conference proceedings on Petri nets. In October 1979, about 135 researchers mostly from European 
countries assembled in Hamburg, West Germany, for a two-week advanced course on General Net 
Theory of Processes and Systems. The 17 lectures given in this course were published in its 
proceedings, which is currently out of print. The second advanced course was held in Bad Honnef, 
West Germany, in September 1986. The proceedings of this course contain 34 articles, including two 
recent articles by C. A. Petri; one is concerned with his axioms of concurrency theory and the other 
with his suggestions for further research. The first European Workshop on Applications and Theory of 
Petri Nets was held in 1980 at Strasbourg, France. Since then, this series of workshops has been held 
every year at different locations in Europe: 1981, Bad Honnef, West Germany; 1982, Varenna, Italy; 
1983, Toulouse, France; 1984, Aarhus, Denmark; 1985, Espoo, Finland; 1986, Oxford, Great Britain; 
1987, Zaragoza, Spain; 1988, Venice, Italy; and 1989, Bad Honnef, West Germany (planned). The 
distribution of the proceedings of these workshops is limited to mostly the workshop participants. 
However, selected papers from these workshops and other articles have been published by Springer-
Verlag as Advances in Petri Nets. The 1987 volume contains the most comprehensive bibliography of 
Petri nets listing 2074 entries published from 1962 to early 1987. The “recent publications” section of 
Petri Net Newsletter  lists short abstracts of recent publications three times a year, and is a good source 
of information about the most recent Petri net literature. In July 1985, another series of international 
workshops was initiated. This series places emphasis on timed and stochastic nets and their applications 
to performance evaluation. The first international workshop on timed Petri nets was held in Torino, 
Italy, in July 1985; the second was held in Madison, Wisconsin, in August 1987; the third was held in 
Kyoto, Japan, in December 1989; and the fourth was planned in Australia in 1991. The proceedings of 
the first two workshops, are available from the IEEE Computer Society Press. 
The above is a brief history of Petri nets. Now, we look at some application areas considered in the 
literature. Petri nets have been proposed for a very wide variety of applications. This is due to the 
generality and permissiveness inherent in Petri nets. They can be applied informally to any area or 
system that can be described graphically like flow charts and that needs some means of representing 
parallel or concurrent activities. However, careful attention must be paid to a trade-off between 
modelling generality and analysis capability. That is, the more general the model, the less amenable it is 
to analysis. In fact, a major weakness of Petri nets is the complexity problem, i.e., Petri-net-based 
models tend to become too large for analysis even for a modest-size system. In applying Petri nets, it is 
often necessary to add special modifications or restrictions suited to the particular application. Two 
successful application areas are performance evaluation and communication protocols. Promising areas 
of applications include modelling and analysis of distributed-software systems, distributed-database 
systems, concurrent and parallel programs, flexible manufacturing/industrial control systems, discrete-
event systems, multiprocessor memory systems, dataflow computing systems, fault-tolerant systems, 
programmable logic and VLSI arrays, asynchronous circuits and structures, compiler and operating 
systems, office-information systems, formal languages, and logic programs. Other interesting 
applications considered in the literature are local-area networks, legal systems, human factors, neural 
networks, digital filters, and decision models. 
The use of computer-aided tools is a necessity for practical applications of Petri nets. Most Petri-net 
research groups have their own software packages and tools to assist the drawing, analysis, and/or 
simulation of various applications. A recent article provides a good overview of typical Petri-net tools 
existing as of 1986.  
 
2 FUNDAMENTALS 
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We assume here that the reader already knows Discrete Event Systems (DES), Petri Net (PN) 
concepts and the terminology introduced in [PN-2], [PN-3], [PN-4] and [PN-5] as for Coloured Petri 
Nets (CPNs). This chapter recalls only the main characteristics about DESs, PNs and CPNs used in 
this thesis.  
 
3 DISCRETE‐EVENT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
Transport systems can be seen as having several interacting concurrent processes, showing 
features such as conflict situations, mutual exclusion states and non-determinism. The interaction 
among processes occurs according to the abrupt occurrence of events and asynchronously (event-
driven instead of time-driven). 
Because of these characteristics transport systems can be classified as discrete-event dynamic 
systems since their behaviour is very difficult to describe using the traditional control theory, which 
deals with systems of continuous or asynchronous discrete variables modelled by differential or 
difference equations. 
In general, however, “real world” systems either do not conform to some assumptions made in 
order to simplify a model, or they are just too complex to yield analytical solutions. The model may still 
be valid but there are no tools to solve the equations which make up such a model. Simulation is a 
process through which a system model is numerically evaluated, and the data from this process are used 
to estimate various quantities of interest. Analytical solutions are very hard to obtain while, on the other 
hand, simulations represent a very attractive tool for their study.  
 
 
Figure 1 – The event scheduling scheme in computer simulation 
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DES simulation can be realized by a very general scheme, shown in Figure 1 and named event 
scheduling scheme. The event scheduling scheme should be thought as a procedure for generating 
sample paths based on the used DES model and driven by a given clock structure. The scheduled event 
list (SEL) contains all feasible events at the current state, sorted on a smallest-scheduled-time-first. The 
next event is always 1αe  and it occurs at time 1t . It causes updates to state x  and time t . Then, based 
on the new value of the state, some events are activated and some are deactivated. Events that are 
activated are entered in the SEL with their scheduled occurrence times, maintaining the right sorting 
order. 
 
4 TRANSITION ENABLING AND FIRING 
 
In this section, we give the only rule one has to learn about Petri-net theory: the rule for 
transition enabling and firing. Although this rule appears very simple, its implication in Petri-net theory 
is very deep and complex. A Petri Net is a particular kind of directed graph, together with an initial 
state called the initial marking, 0M . The underlying graph N  of a Petri net is a directed, weighted, 
bipartite graph consisting of two kinds of nodes, called places and transitions, where arcs are either 
from a place to a transition or from a transition to a place. In graphical representation, places are drawn 
as circles, transitions as bars or boxes. Arcs are labelled with their weights (positive integers), where a 
k -weighted arc can be interpreted as the set of k  parallel arcs. Labels for unity weight are usually 
omitted. A marking (state) assigns to each place a non negative integer. If a marking assigns to place p  
a nonnegative integer k , we say that p  is marked with k  tokens. Pictorially, we place k  black dots 
(tokens) in place p . A marking is denoted by M , an m -vector, where m  is the total number of 
places. The p th component of M , denoted by )(pM , is the number of tokens in place p . 
In modelling, using the concept of conditions and events, places represent conditions, and 
transitions represent events. A transition (an event) has a certain number of input and output places 
representing the pre-conditions and post-conditions of the event, respectively. The presence of a token 
in a place is interpreted as holding the truth of the condition associated with the place. In another 
interpretation, k  tokens are put in a place to indicate that k  data items or resources are available. Some 
typical interpretations of transitions and their input places and output places are shown in Table 1. A 
formal definition of a Petri net is given in Table 2. 
 
Input Places Transition Output Places 
Preconditions Event Postconditions 
Input data Computation step Output data 
Input signals Signal processor Output signals 
Resources needed Task or job Resources released 
Conditions Clause in logic Conclusion(s) 
Buffers Processor Buffers 
Table 1 – Some Typical Interpretations of Transitions and Places 
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Formal Definition of a Petri Net 
A Petri net is a 5-tuple, ),,,,( 0MWFTPPN =  where: 
},,,{ 21 mpppP K=  is a finite set of places, 
},,,{ 21 ntttT K=  is a finite set of transitions, 
)()( PTTPF ×∪×⊆  is a set of arcs (flow relation), 
},3,2,1{: K→FW  is a weight function, 
},3,2,1,0{:0 K→PM  is the initial marking, 
0=∩TP  and 0=∪TP . 
A Petri net structure ),,,( WFTPN =  without any specific initial marking is denoted by N . 
A Petri net with the given initial marking is denoted by ),( 0MN . 
Table 2 – Formal Definition of a Petri Net 
 
The behaviour of many systems can be described in terms of system states and their changes. In 
order to simulate the dynamic behaviour of a system, a state or marking in a Petri nets is changed 
according to the following transition (firing) rule: 
1) A transition t  is said to be enabled if each input place p  of t  is marked with at least ),( tpw  
tokens, where ),( tpw  is the weight of the arc from p  to t . 
2) An enabled transition may or may not fire (depending on whether or not the event actually 
takes place). 
3) A firing of an enabled transition t  removes ),( tpw  tokens from each input place p  of t , and 
adds ),( tpw  tokens to each output place p  of t , where ),( tpw  is the weight of the arc from t  to p . 
 
A transition without any input place is called a source transition, and one without any output 
place is called a sink transition. Note that a source transition is unconditionally enabled, and that the 
firing of a sink transition consumes tokens, but does not produce any.  
A pair of a place p  and a transition t  is called a self-loop if p  is both an input and output place of t . 
A Petri net is said to be pure if it has no self-loops. A Petri net is said to be ordinary if all of its arc 
weights are 1’s. 
 
5 BACKGROUND ON PETRI NETS 
 
An ordinary net is a structure  PostPreTPN ,,,=  where: P  is a set of m  places represented 
by circles; T  is a set of n  transitions represented by bars; 0=∩TP , 0≠∪TP  )(PostPre  is the 
TP ×  sized, binary valued, pre-(post-)incidence matrix. For instance, ( )1),(1),( == tpPosttpPre  
means that there is an arc from )(tp  to )(pt . The preset and postset of a node TPX ∪∈  are denoted 
X• and •X . The incidence matrix C of the net is defined as PrePostC −= . An ordinary net N  is a 
Marked Graph (MG) if  Pppp ∈∀== •• ,1 . An ordinary net N is a Free Choice Net (FCN) if 
1, ≤∈∀ •pPp  or { } { }pp =•• . 
A marking is an 1×m  vector N→Pm :  that assigns to each place of a P/T net a non-negative 
integer number of tokens. A P/T system or net system 0,mN  is a P/T net N  with an initial marking 
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0m . A transition Tt∈  is enabled at a marking m  if ),( tPrem ⋅≥ . If t  is enabled, then it may fire 
yielding a new marking ),(),(),( tCmtPretPostmm ⋅+=⋅−⋅+=′ . The notation mtm ′>[  means that 
an enabled transition t  may fire at m  yielding m′ .  A  firing sequence from 0m  is a (possibly empty) 
sequence of transitions ktt K1=σ  such that  kk mtmtmtm >>> [[[ 22110 K . A marking m  is reachable 
in 0,mN  if there exists a firing sequence σ  such that mm >σ[0 . Given a net system 0,mN  the set 
of reachable markings is denoted ( )0,mNR . 
The function N→T:σ , where )(tσ  represents the number of occurrences of t t in σ , is 
called  firing count vector of the fireable sequence σ . If mm >σ[0 , then it is possible to write in 
vector form σ⋅⋅+= ),(0 tCmm , known as state equation of the system. 
Right (Left) annuller vectors of C  are called T-flows (P-flows), i.e. 
)00(  0|0,: =≠→=≠→ C|x,xx:PCxxTx TQQ . P-flows (T-flows) form a linear space (it is also 
possible to consider real-valued solutions; however since incidence matrices only have integer entries, 
every real-valued solution is the product of a real scalar and a rational-valued solution). When positive 
integer solutions are considered, right (left) annuller vectors of C  are called T-invariants (P-invariants), i.e. 
)0|0,:(  0|0,: =≠→=≠→ CxxPxCxxTx TNN ; P-invariants (T-invariants) do not form a linear 
space. The support of a T-invariant (P-invariant) x  is defined as }0)(|{ >∈= txTtx   
( )}0)(|{ >∈= pxPpx . A T-invariant (P-invariant) x  has a minimal support if there exists no other 
invariant x′  such that xx ⊂′ . A T-invariant (P-invariant) is canonical if the greatest common divisor 
of its components is 1. A T-invariant (P-invariant) is said to be minimal if it is canonical and has a 
minimal support. A T-invariant (P-invariant) x  is said to be positive if 0>x . N  is consistent if 
ny )( +∈∃ N  such that 0=Cy . 
A P/T system is live when, from every reachable marking, every transition can ultimately occur. 
N  is structurally live if 0m∃  such that 0,mN  is live. 
A place Pp∈  is said to be k-bounded if  kpmmNRm ≤∈∀ )(),,( 0 . A net system 0,mN  is said to be 
k-bounded if  each one of its places is k-bounded, and it is bounded if  it is bounded for some N∈k . 
A net N  is structurally bounded if 0m∀  the net system 0,mN  is bounded. N  is structurally bounded if  
mx )( +∈∃ N  such that 0≤CxT .  N  is conservative if mx )( +∈∃ N  such that 0=CxT . 
A nonempty subset of places S  in a ordinary net N  is called a siphon if •• ⊆ SS , i.e., every 
transition having an output place in S  has an input place in S . A nonempty subset of places Q  in an 
ordinary net N  is called a trap if •• ⊆QQ , i.e., every transition having an input place in Q  has an 
output place in Q . Given a net system 0,mN , it is possible to obtain from the initial marking 0m  as 
many new markings as the number of the enabled transitions. From each new marking, it is possible to 
reach again more markings. This process results in a tree representation of the markings. Nodes 
represent markings generated from 0m  (the root) and its successors, and each arc represents a 
transition firing, which transforms one marking to another. The obtained tree representation, however, 
grows infinitely if the net is unbounded. To keep the tree finite, it is possible to introduce a special 
symbol ω , which can be thought as “infinity”. This tree, with the presence of ω  is called coverability tree. 
For a bounded Petri net, the coverability tree is called reachability tree since it contains all possible 
reachable markings.  
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6 SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF P/T NETS 
 
In the supervisory control PN theory it is assumed that the set of transitions T  of a net is 
partitioned into two disjoint subsets: ucT , the set of uncontrollable transitions, and cT , the set of 
controllable transitions. 
Let’s consider a PN system 0,mN  with m  places, whose set of reachable markings is 
mmNR N⊂),( 0 . Let mL N⊆ be a set of legal markings, and consider the basic control problem of 
designing a supervisor that restricts the reachability set of the plant in closed-loop to ),( 0mNRL∩ . 
When controllable transitions are present, also legal markings from which it is possible to exit from L  
by firing only uncontrollable transitions have to be forbidden. 
Of particular interest are those PN state-based control problems where the set of legal markings 
L  is expressed by a set of cn  linear inequality constraints called Generalized Mutual Exclusion 
Constraints (GMECs). A single GMEC is a couple ),( kl  where Z→Pl :  is an 1×m  weight vector 
and Z∈k . Given the net system 0,mN , a GMEC defines a set of markings called legal markings: 
}|{),( kmlmklM Tm ≤∈= N . The markings that are not legal are called forbidden markings. A 
controllable transition may be disabled by the supervisor - a controlling agent which ensures that the 
behaviour of the system is a legal one, i.e. it must ensure that the forbidden markings are not reached. 
∗
ucT  denotes the set of all possible sequences of uncontrollable transitions.  
 
An approach to solve the supervisory control problem - when the plant system is modelled as a Petri 
net - has been presented in [PN-3]; it has been shown that if the critical subnet is acyclic, a maximally 
permissive control law has the following form:  
 a transition cTt∈  has to be enabled under the net marking m  if mtm ′>[  and  
 
kClml ucuc
TT ≤+′ ∗σ  Eq. 1 
 
Where ∗ucσ  is the solution of the following ILP  
 
⎩⎨
⎧
′−≥
≥
mC
ts
Cl
ucuc
uc
ucuc
T
uc
σ
σ
σσ
0
..
max
 Eq. 2 
 
where ucC and ucσ  are respectively the incidence matrix and the firing count vector of the 
uncontrollable subnet (i.e. obtained from the plant net by removing uncontrollable transitions). 
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7 COLOURED TIMED PETRI NETS 
 
Coloured Timed Petri Nets (CTPNs) extends the framework of PNs by adding colour, time and 
modular attributes to the net. The colour attribute is developed to deal with systems that have similar 
or redundant logical structures. The time attribute allows various time-based performance measures to 
be added in the system model. 
A multi-set m  is a set which may contain multiple occurrences of elements of a non-empty set 
S. Formally, a multi-set is a function N→Sm : , where N  is the set of non-negative integers, 
represented as a formal sum 
 
∑
∈Ss
ssm .)(  Eq. 3 
 
One denotes by: MSS  the set of all multi-sets over S; )(vType  the type of a variable v ; 
Type(expr)  the type of an expression expr ;  
Var(expr) the set of variables in an expression expr . In addition the binding of a set of variables V  is 
defined as the function b  associating to each variable Vv∈  an element )()( vTypevb ∈  and  
>< bexpr  as the value obtained by evaluating an expression expr  in a binding b , i.e. substituting for 
each variable )(exprVarv∈  the value )()( vTypevb ∈  determined by the binding. 
Now, the following definition is recalled [PN-2]:  
 
Definition 1. A CPN is a 9-tuple ),,,,,,,,( IEGCNATPSCPN =  where: 
 
S  is a set of non-empty types, called colour sets; 
P  is a finite set of places drawn by circles; 
T  is a finite set of transitions including immediate transitions drawn by black bars and timed 
transitions drawn by empty boxes; 
A  is a finite set of arcs such that  0=∩=∩=∩ ATAPTP ; 
N  is a node function defined from A  to PTTP ×∪× ; 
C  is a colour function defined from P  into S ; 
G  is a guard function defined from T  into expressions such that 
])))((())(([: StGVarTypeBtGTypeTt ⊆∧=∈∀ , where B  is the boolean type; 
E  is an arc expression function defined from A  into expressions such that 
])))((()())(([: SaEVarTypepCaETypeAa MS ⊆∧=∈∀ , where p  is a place of )(aN ; 
I  is an initialization function defined from P  into closed expressions such that 
])())(([: MSpCpITypePp =∈∀ . 
 
In order to define the binding of a transition t , the following notation is introduced: 
 
}}{}{)(|{)( PttPaNAatA ×∪×∈∈=  Eq. 4 
 
))}((:)())((|{)( aEVarvtAatGVarvtVar ∈∈∃∨=  Eq. 5 
 
A binding of a transition t  is a function b  defined on )(tVar  such that 
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)()(:)( vTypevbtVarv ∈∈  and 1)( >=< btG  Eq. 6 
 
i.e. the guard function is true. )(tB  denotes the set of all bindings for t . 
 
A token is a pair ),( cp  where Pp∈  and )( pCc∈ , while a binding element is a pair ),( bt  
where Tt∈  and )(tBb∈ . The set of all token elements is denoted by TE  while the set of all binding 
elements is denoted by BE . A marking is a multi-set over TE  while a step is a non-empty and finite 
multi-set over BE . The sets of all markings and steps are denoted by M  and Y  respectively. As 
assumption, nSSSS ×××= K21  and a function between each set iS  and the integer number set Z  is 
defined; this leads to represent a token in a place p  by a n-tuple ),,,( 21 nccct K>=< , where jc  is an 
integer. The black token - i.e. the token having no colour - is represented by (1). A step Y  is enabled in 
a marking M  if the following property is satisfied  
 
∑
∈
>≤<∈∀
Ybt
pMbtpEPp
),(
)(),(:  Eq. 7 
 
When a step is enabled in a marking 1M  it may occur and, if the transition t  fires, the net marking 
changes according to  
 
PpbptEbtpEpMpM
Ybt Ybt
∈∀><+><−= ∑ ∑
∈ ∈),( ),(
12      ),(),()()(  Eq. 8 
 
In this case it is said that 2M  is reachable by 1M . This is written as 21[ MYM > . 
The introduction of a timing specification is essential in order to use Petri net models for performance evaluation 
of distributed systems. This thesis considers nets with deterministic timing and one phase firing rule, i.e. a 
timed enabling (called the service time of the transition) followed by an atomic firing. Service times of 
transitions are supposed to be mutually independent and time independent. 
A time function R→)(: tBf  is introduced; it is the time required by the timed transition t , associated 
with a binding b , to complete the  firing. After time function has been introduced, CPN models take 
the name of Coloured Timed Petri Nets (CTPNs).  
In a CTPN model two kinds of conflicts1 may arise: conflicts among transitions and conflicts 
among bindings. In this work the following solution has been adopted: 
 
• In order to avoid the coupling between resolution of conflicts and duration of activities2, 
transitions in conflict are supposed to be immediate except for timed transitions modelling a 
watchdog timer or immediate transitions modelling a failure detection; only in these special 
cases it is allowed that a timed transition, modelling a watchdog timer, can interrupt another 
timed transition or that an immediate transition, modelling an error detection, can be in conflict 
with a timed transition. 
• In general, in a PN model there is no need to remove tokens from a place in the same order as 
they were added. However, in this case, when tokens contained in a place represent Stock Units 
(as explained afterwards), it is important to preserve the incoming order for their removing. 
                                                 
1 Two or more transitions are in conflict if they have common input places 
2 When a timed activity is associated with transitions, a conflict resolution policy may be a race between conflicting  
transitions, that has no sense in the presence of a physical plant 
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Therefore each place is assumed as being a queuing place with a FIFO policy. Thus, no conflict 
among bindings may arise.  
 
A net place is denoted by },{ yxP , where x  denotes the subsystem of the model and y  denotes the 
index of the place inside the sub-model. Fusion places, source places and sink places are denoted by }{xPf , 
}{xPsr , }{xPsk  respectively and are all drawn by shaded circles. The following expression functions, 
used in the arc expressions and guard functions, are defined: 
 
:),,,,( 21 kcccppr K for each token ><τ  in the place p  the function builds a new token formed only 
by the specified components kccc ,,, 21 K  of the token ><τ ; 
 
:),,,( 21 ><><>< kconc τττ K  the function builds the new token ),,,( 21 ><><>< kτττ K  formed 
by the concatenation of the specified components; 
 
:id  this function selects all the components of a token 
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CHAPTER 10 
SIMULATING COLLISION 
PROBABILITIES OF 
LANDING AIRPLANES 
 
 
 
 
The first assumption that we will make here, in order to make our model the most simple as 
possible, is that the airport that we are going to analyze does not have a control tower: thus severely 
limiting its capacity during poor visibility conditions. 
We will consider a system in which airplanes self-separate, so they are able to land at higher 
capacities without a Control Tower. A further step in our analysis (in the following chapter) will be, of 
course, putting some ATC control inside the system and see how it works, especially if and how safety 
increases. 
What we would like to try to evaluate with this simulation is safety of such a system. Safety is a 
difficult metric to measure and predict, because accidents are very rare. Even computer simulation can 
be slow because of the long time to observe any accidents. In this chapter, we apply one methodology 
that has already shown being successful in assessing aviation safety through simulation. In particular, 
we  will estimate the probability of collisions on the runway in poor visibility. 
The methodology [PN-11] that we are going to use here has been already successfully used in 
safety analysis and is called TOPAZ (Traffic Organizer and Perturbation AnalyZer) modelling 
methodology, developed at the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, the Netherlands (Blom, Bakker, 
et al. 2001).  
This methodology provides a two-step framework for assessing safety: 
• The first step qualitatively assesses safety by identifying hazards relevant to the scenario in 
question. 
• The second step quantitatively estimates safety through simulation. 
 
By identifying critical hazards in the first step, it is possible to create a simulation model which 
only samples the operational space where collisions are likely. Analytical models can, of course, also be 
used to further improve the efficiency of simulation. 
Without a Control Tower, capacities in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) can be as low as 
three landings per hour, depending on the proximity of the airport to nearby radar coverage. We 
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consider a proposed system where a nearby, supporting controller is responsible for the initial 
separation of airplanes entering the airspace near the airport (that is, leaving radar coverage). Of course, 
the pilots are still responsible for self-separation after that. 
We specifically investigate the probability of a collision on the runway in this system [PN-12]. 
This analysis is a step in determining the potential capacity at such non-towered airports and, at the 
same time we want to understand which kind of level of safety is respected. 
Among some existing models for estimating collision risk, we will review, in particular, the Reich 
collision model, which has been used extensively in literature for collision estimation purposes and, of 
course, into the TOPAZ modelling methodology. 
 
1 COLLISION PREDICTION MODELS 
 
This section provides background on analytical, quantitative models that have been used to 
estimate collision and conflict probabilities. We particularly focus on the Reich collision model, since it 
has been widely used all over Collision Risk models already present in literature and is part of the 
TOPAZ methodology that we will use it in our simulation analysis. 
The simplest class of collision models are intersection-type models. In these models, one assumes 
that planes fly along pre-determined, crossing routes, generally at constant velocities. Under these 
assumptions, the probability of a collision at the crossing point can be computed from the arrival rates 
of airplanes along each path, their velocities, and the airplane geometries. For examples of such models, 
see Siddiqee (1973), Geisinger (1985), and Barnett (2000). 
A similar class of models are geometric conflict models (e.g., Paielli and Erzberger 1997, 1999, 
Irving 2002). In these models, the velocities of the airplanes are fixed as before, but their initial 
positions (in three dimensions) are random. Then, based on extrapolating forward in time, it is possible 
to geometrically describe the set of initial locations that eventually lead to a conflict between two 
airplanes. (A conflict occurs when two airplanes are within, say, 5 NM of each other). Integrating the 
probability density of the initial positions over the conflict region gives the probability of a conflict. 
These models generally assume level flight with constant velocities (see Paielli and Erzberger 1999 for a 
generalization to non-level flight). 
 
1.1 THE REICH COLLISION MODEL 
 
A slightly more complex model is the Reich model. This model assumes random deviations in 
both the position and velocity components. It was originally developed to estimate collision risk for 
oceanic travel over the North Atlantic and to determine the appropriate spacing of flight paths (Reich 
1966 [CRM-1], [CRM-2] and [CRM-3]). 
To describe the model, we first start with some notation. Let )(1 tr
r  and )(1 tv
r  be the position 
and velocity vectors of one airplane at time t ; let )(2 tr
r  and 2v
r  be similarly defined for a second 
airplane. To simplify notation, we drop the subscript t , keeping in mind that these and related 
quantities have an implicit dependence on time.  
Let 21),,( rrrrrr zyx
rrr −≡≡  and 21),,( vvvvvv zyx rrr −≡≡  be the relative position and velocity 
vectors of the two airplanes. 
Now, rr  traces out a path in time. If rr  gets too small, there is a collision between the airplanes. 
Therefore, mathematically, if )0,0,0(=rr , each airplane’s centre of mass is at the same point in space. 
 
The Reich model assumes that each airplane is shaped like a box with dimensions: 
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• xs (along-track length), 
• ys (across-track width),  
• zs (vertical height).  
 
Under these assumptions, two airplanes are touching when, for example, one airplane is in front 
of the other by a distance xs , or when one airplane is behind the other by a distance xs  (that is, 
whenever xxx srs ≤≤−  ). More generally, therefore, a collision occurs along any direction whenever rr  
passes through the zyx sss 222 ××  box, centred at the origin. 
Such an event can be called an incrossing; mathematically, there may be multiple incrossings. In reality, 
this would correspond to only one collision. Thus, the probability of an incrossing is an upper bound 
on the probability of a collision. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Geometric representation of the Reich collision model [PN-11] 
 
Hence, the probability of an incrossing depends on the joint probability density function (PDF): 
 
),,,,,(),( zyxzyx vvvrrrfvrf ≡rr  Eq. 1 
 
The Reich model makes the following assumptions on this PDF: 
 
• The density is independent in the x , y , and z  dimensions. That is: 
 
),(),(),(),,,,,(),( zzzyyyxxxzyxzyx vrfvrfvrfvvvrrrfvrf =≡rr  Eq. 2 
 
where xf , yf  and zf  are marginal densities of ),( vrf
rr . 
 
• The density is constant in rr  over the dimensions of the aircraft. That is: 
 
),0(),( xxxxx vfvrf =  when xx sr ≤  Eq. 3 
 
and similarly for the other dimensions. This is reasonable since the density is not expected to vary 
much over a distance as small as the dimensions of an airplane. However, if one changes the 
interpretation of xs , ys  and zs  to represent a conflict box (instead of a collision box) with dimensions 
of several nautical miles, then this assumption won’t be valid anymore. 
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• The density is independent on the position and velocity components (this is true for all the 
three dimensions). That is: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
=
=
)()(),(
)()(),(
)()(),(
,,
,,
,,
zzvzzrzzz
yyvyyryyy
xxvxxrxxx
vfrfvrf
vfrfvrf
vfrfvrf
 Eq. 4 
 
This last assumption is not in Reich’s original assumptions; however, the expression of )(tϕ  below , 
which is frequently quoted from Reich’s paper (e.g., Hazelrigg and Busch 1986, Bakker and Blom 1993) 
requires this assumption. 
As a matter of fact, the three assumptions above mentioned imply: 
 
)()()()0()0()0(),,,,,(),( ,,,,,, zzvyyvxxvzryrxrzyxzyx vfvfvffffvvvrrrfvrf =≡rr  Eq. 5 
 
whenever rr  is on or within the boundary of the collision box. 
 
In addition, Reich (1966) assumes: 
• Planes travel along parallel tracks without making turns. Thus, the orientation of the collision 
box does not change. 
 
• All planes have the same geometric shape. 
 
• There is no evasive manoeuvring by the pilot or intervention by the controller. 
 
Under the above assumptions, the total incrossing rate through all sides of the box is: 
 
∑
=
=
3
1
)0,0,0()(
i
iir vEAft rϕ  Eq. 6 
 
where the subscript i  denotes the three dimensions x , y , and z , rf r  is the marginal density of 
),( vrf rr , and iA  is the area of the face perpendicular to dimension i . Also, rf r  and ivE  are implicit 
functions of time. Since the previous equation gives the incrossing rate at time t , the total expected 
number of incrossings over the time interval ],[ ba  is: 
 
∫=
b
a
dttE )(ϕ  Eq. 7 
 
If there are more than two airplanes, then the previous equation must be evaluated for every possible 
airplane pair and then summed to get the total number of expected incrossings among all airplanes. 
 
An advantage of the Reich collision model is that it accounts for all possible directions of the 
aircraft. Some of the other models, by discounting the vertical dimension, only account for collisions 
through the four sides of the box. 
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1.2 GENERALIZED REICH MODEL 
 
Some of the assumptions in the Reich model are quite restrictive – in particular assumptions the 
first and the third, which state that all components of ),( vr rr are mutually independent. 
In particular, velocity in one direction usually depends on velocity in another direction (for 
example, the ascent rate generally depends on the along-track rate). 
Removing these two assumptions (first and third), Bakker and Blom (1993) derived a 
generalized Reich collision model. In particular, the incrossing rate through a single face (face F in 
Figure 1) and its opposing face is: 
 
∫∫∫
∫∫∫
∞+
−−
∞−−−
−=+
+=−=
0
0
),,,(
),,,()(
yzxzyxxxx
s
s
s
s
yzxzyxxxx
s
s
s
s
x
drdrdvrrsrvfv
drdrdvrrsrvfvt
z
z
y
y
z
z
y
y
ϕ
 Eq. 8 
 
where ),,,( zyxx rrrvf is a marginal distribution of ),( vrf
rr . Thus, the total incrossing rate through all 
faces is: 
 
)()()()( tttt zyx ϕϕϕϕ ++=  Eq. 9 
 
where )(tyϕ  and )(tzϕ are defined similarly to )(txϕ . Although )(txϕ  is difficult to evaluate 
numerically, Blom and Bakker (2002) show that if ),( vrf rr  is a mixture of Gaussian distributions, then 
evaluation of the integral is much easier. 
Blom and Bakker also argue that the fourth assumption can be removed by assuming that 
yx ss = . 
In other words, we can state that, if the length of a plane is approximately the same as its wing span, 
the bounding box does not change when the plane turns. That is, the collision box keeps a fixed 
orientation regardless of the orientation of the two airplanes. 
 
 
2 SIMULATION METHODS: DYNAMICALLY  COLOURED  PETRI 
NETS 
 
In the previous paragraph, we discussed several analytical models to estimate collision risk. A 
central problem with these models is that they only apply to simple scenarios. For example, they 
generally apply to level flight and do not consider corrective actions by pilots or controllers.  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the scenario of predicting plane-to-plane collisions 
on the runway [PN-11] and [PN-12]. While relatively simple, this scenario has several complications 
which make the previous models by themselves insufficient. 
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In particular, the analytical models do not account for corrective actions by the pilots to avoid a 
collision, nor do they account for equipment failures. But, the models are still quite useful as an 
enhancement to simulation, as we are going to discuss below. 
We are now discussing the simulation method used in several TOPAZ models to evaluate 
collision risk (e.g., Blom, Klompstra, and Bakker 2003). The method uses Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets 
(DCPNs) as a framework for simulation. 
To improve efficiency, the method also makes use of the generalized Reich collision model, 
discussed in the previous section. 
The next Figure 2 shows the basic idea. Instead of returning the number of collisions, the 
simulation returns the probability density ),( vrf rr  (the distribution for the relative position and velocity 
of an airplane pair). Given ),( vrf rr , the probability of a collision can be calculated using the generalized 
Reich model, (also see Blom and Bakker 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Basic mechanism for combining simulation with an analytical model [PN-11] 
 
DCPNs are a very versatile instrument: they can simulate a wide variety of system dynamics 
including flight dynamics and controller-pilot interactions. To illustrate the use of DCPNs in the 
context of aviation safety, we give here a simple example.  
Figure 3 gives the DCPN used to simulate the small airport application discussed in the next 
section. For further details on DCPNs, see the chapter of this thesis regarding Petri Nets. 
For an example of DCPNs applied to simultaneous approaches of two airplanes on two 
converging runways, see in particular Blom, Klompstra, and Bakker (2003). 
 
 
Figure 3 – Simple Petri net with possible missed approach [PN-11] 
 
The previous Figure 1 shows two separate (but not independent) Petri nets: 
 
• The right Petri Net models whether or not a runway sensor is working. The token (solid dot) 
indicates the current state. The transitions (gray boxes) represent events which trigger the token to 
move from one state to another. In this Petri net, we suppose that times between transitions are 
independent random variables. For example (and this is a very nice feature of Petri Nets), if they follow 
an exponential distribution, then the right Petri net is a continuous time Markov chain. We can also use 
similar Petri nets to give a very simplified model of human cognitive states - for example, to model 
when a pilot is relaxed, busy, or frantic. For an example of such an application in air traffic 
management, see Blom, Daams, and Nijhuis (2001). Also see Hollnagel (1993) for a more complete 
discussion of human reliability in the context of human internal states. 
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• The left Petri Net is more mathematically complex. The tokens correspond to airplanes and the 
places (open circles) correspond to phases of flight. In the Figure 3, there is one airplane on the runway 
and one airplane in the final approach. Associated with each token is a six-dimensional vector (not 
drawn) giving the position and velocity of that airplane in three dimensional space – from here the net 
is called coloured, since the token brings within itself some “coloured” information. Associated with 
each phase of flight there is therefore a set of six differential equations which govern each airplane’s 
trajectory in time when in that phase. 
 
In the Figure 3, 1G∂  represents a set of six differential equations that govern airplane trajectories in 
the final approach. The differential equations can be stochastic, allowing for random perturbations due 
to wind or pilot/navigational error. 
For example, two of the differential equations used in the final approach phase of the complete 
model (place p12 in the next Figure 5) are: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
+−−=
=
ωσddtkpbvdv
dtvdp
xxx
xx
)(
 Eq. 10 
 
where xp  and xv  are the position and velocity of the airplane in the x  (across-track) dimension; ωd  
represents Brownian motion; k , b , and σ  are constants. 
The previous equations represent a pilot who is trying to keep the airplane centred along the 
runway centreline (at 0=x ), in the presence of some disturbances such as, for example, the wind. The 
first two terms in the second equation represent the pilot controls and the last term represents wind 
(that is, in a small time interval of length tΔ , the perturbation due to wind is a normal random variable 
with mean 0  and variance tΔ2σ ). 
There would also be four other equations corresponding to the y and z  directions. For an 
introduction to stochastic differential equations, see Oksendal (1992). 
 
We can also link the two Petri nets shown in the previous Figure 3. For example, to model the 
functionality of the runway sensor, we define the transition T1 in the left Petri net to trigger when: 
 
• The airplane that is currently in final approach has just crossed the runway threshold (based on 
its position vector),  and 
• - The runway is not occupied or 
- The runway is occupied, but the runway sensor is not working. 
 
Thus, the state of the right Petri Net affects the trigger events of the left Petri Net. This logic can 
also be drawn using standard Petri net notation. However, we do not do this to avoid clutter. 
We can also create a second type of link between the two Petri nets: making the differential 
equations on the left a function of the Petri net state on the right. 
An example would be using the right Petri net to model the state of an Instrument Landing System 
(ILS for a detailed description on that, see chapter regarding fundamentals of Navigation Systems). 
When e.g. the ILS is not working, pilots deviate more from the glide path. Thus, two sets of 
differential equations are needed to model the airplane trajectory, depending on whether or not the ILS 
is working, and so on. 
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3 APPLICATION:  NON‐TOWERED  AIRPORT  (I.E.  NO  ATCO 
INTERVENTION) 
 
This section describes a scenario involving a small airport with no Control Tower or let’s say, 
where the Control Tower is not working at all. The goal is of double nature: 
• From one side, is to increase the capacity of such airports in IMC, keeping constant the level of 
safety, 
• From another, is to keep the actual capacity improving the level of safety. 
 
Currently, procedural separation rules (see the chapters of this thesis regarding Airport Operations 
and Air Traffic Control) dictate that only one airplane is allowed into the airspace near the airport at 
one time (in IMC). This should “guarantee” that two airplanes are not simultaneously flying near the 
airport outside of radar coverage. 
However, this can yield capacities as low as three operations per hour depending on nearby 
terrain and proximity to radar coverage. 
One solution that has been proposed is to equip airplanes with a self-separation capability. 
Nearby controllers have responsibility for the initial separation of airplanes into the local airspace, but 
after that, airplanes must separate themselves. Referring to the next Figure 4, we will consider the 
following concept of operations: 
 
• Since the local airport does not have a Control Tower and is outside radar coverage, en-route 
arrival-departure traffic is controlled by a supporting air traffic controller (ATCo) at a TRACON or 
ARTCC. 
• The supporting ATCo meters airplanes into the local airspace through one of two approach 
legs. The two approach paths combine to form a “T”. The ATCo is responsible for the initial 
separation of the airplanes. 
• Once an airplane enters the airspace, the pilot is responsible for maintaining separation among 
other airplanes. At this point, the airplane is outside radar control and therefore is outside the control 
of the ATCo. 
• A small terminal sensor located on the ground at the airport provides radar-like coverage for 
the local airspace. The sensor fusion system transmits airplane positions to all airplanes in the local 
airspace via a ground-to-air data link. 
• A Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) displays the locations of these airplanes to 
the pilots. Pilots use the display to maintain separation. 
• As a deterrent to a collision on the runway, an infrared sensor on the ground detects the 
presence of an airplane on the runway. If the runway is occupied, the landing pilot receives a warning in 
the cockpit. 
 
Three locations where plane-to-plane collisions are most likely to occur are (see next Figure 4): 
 
1. Intersection of the “T”. The controller has not properly separated incoming airplanes. 
2. Final approach. A faster airplane overtakes and collides with a slower airplane. 
3. Runway. One airplane fails to exit the runway before the approaching airplane lands. 
 
The last collision type is probably the most common. This is because there are only two degrees 
of freedom on the runway, but three degrees of freedom in the air. Since the last collision type presents 
the largest safety issue, this chapter will concentrate only the focus on that scenario. 
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We will also discuss in the next section how the model can be used to evaluate the risk of the 
other collision types. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Landing Airplanes at small, non-controlled airport [PN-11] 
 
4 ANALYSIS  AND  RESULTS  FOR  THE  CASE  OF  AIRPLANES 
LANDING AT SMALL, NON‐CONTROLLED AIRPORT. 
 
This section describes the analysis to estimate the probability of a collision on the runway. A 
first step in safety assessment is an identification of hazards (see Blom, Bakker, et al. 2001, and also 
“FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix F” and, of course, MIL-STD-1629A). 
Since the focus of this work is on simulation, we do not elaborate on this step, but simply list 
examples of hazards which can lead to a collision. Of course, the following is not an exhaustive list. 
1. An airplane lands and becomes disabled, so it cannot exit the runway (blown tire, partial crash 
landing, etc.). 
2. An airplane lands, and the pilot becomes disoriented; instead of exiting to the taxi-way, the pilot 
stays on the runway while going to the gate. 
3. The pilot stops on the runway and does not immediately pull off. 
4. The runway sensor fails. 
5. The communication link between this sensor and other airborne airplanes fails. 
6. The pilot fails to notice a warning from the runway sensor. 
7. The pilot notices the warning, but chooses to ignore it. 
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8. The pilot is distracted and does not see another airplane on the runway. This could be due to 
poor visibility or because the pilot is concentrating on landing his or her own airplane. 
9. The runway is slick, so a landing airplane cannot decelerate as quickly as normal. 
 
Figure 5 gives the Petri net structure which models the scenario described previously. The model 
incorporates all of the hazards listed above. In some cases, we have grouped several hazards into a 
single model element. For example, the sub-net in the lower left-hand corner of the Figure 5 models 
hazards 1-3. The “Runway Sensor” sub-net models hazards 4 and 5. The “Pilot’s Awareness” sub-net 
models hazards 6-8. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Petri net diagram of non-towered airport [PN-11] 
 
The following Table 1 gives probability estimates for hazards in the model. Since this is a 
proposed system, little data are available for these parameters, so at this point, they are estimates. 
Later in this section we give sensitivity analysis on these parameters to understand which parameters 
most affect the system safety. 
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A Landing airplane does not exit runway (Hazards 1-3) Pr(A) = 5 x 10-3  
B Runway sensor is not working (Hazards 4-5) Pr(B) = 1 x 10-4  
C Pilot fails to notice warning from sensor (Hazards 6-7) Pr(C) = 1 x 10-3  
D Pilot fails to see airplane on runway (Hazard 8) Pr(D) = 1 x 10-2  
E Runway is slick (Hazard 9) Pr(E) = 5 x 10-2  
Table 1 – Parameters used in the model [PN-11] 
  
 
Just to further clarify the simulation logic, if airplane i  reaches the decision point (indicated as 
A in the next Figure 6) and airplane j  is disabled on the runway, then airplane i  will land if the 
following happens (otherwise i  will fly a missed approach): 
 
• Pilot i  does not receive or react to warning from runway sensor (due to any one of hazards 4-
7), and 
• Pilot i  fails to visually see airplane j  while between points A and B (hazard 8). 
 
 
Figure 6 – Airplanes landing on runway [PN-11] 
 
Also in this case, of course, Stochastic Differential equations govern the airplane trajectory for 
each phase of flight. 
In general, these are second order response models where the pilot tries to maintain a target 
speed (different for each airplane) along a constant heading or glide slope, subject to random 
perturbations due to wind or pilot control. 
 
We will also make the following assumptions: 
 
• An airplane which fails to exit the runway remains on the runway for a random amount of time 
(following an exponential distribution). 
• At touchdown, the pilot immediately sees a disabled airplane on the runway. At this point, the 
pilot decelerates the plane at the maximum possible rate. 
• The runway may be wet (hazard 9) or dry. If the runway is wet, the maximum deceleration rate is less 
than the normal deceleration rate. 
 
In addition, we will make the following assumptions regarding weather, approach paths, and airplane 
types: 
 
• Weather conditions are IMC. 
• The visibility ceiling is 250 feet. 
• The Runway Visual Range (RVR) is ¾ mile. 
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• Pilots fly a 3 degree approach path. 
• All airplanes have the same flight characteristics and onboard equipment. 
• The airport has a single runway with a separate taxi-way. The runway is 5,000 feet in length. 
 
Following the methods suggested by Blom, Klompstra, et. al (2003), we define ijτ  to be a time 
such that there is zero probability of a collision between airplane i  and j  prior to time ijτ . 
Since we are only interested in collisions on the runway, we can define: 
 
ijτ  = time airplane i  lands (at B in Figure 6) while airplane j  is on the runway Eq. 11 
 
We also define ∞=ijτ  if j  exits the runway before i  lands, or i  flies a missed approach, or i  
lands before j . We will define too: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise  0
j airplane with collides i airplane if   1
ijB  Eq. 12 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that airplanes are indexed in order of their arrival, 
and we only consider collisions when ji >  (so, 0=ijB  for ji ≤ ). Since (by assumption) there is zero 
probability that airplane i  collides with airplane j  prior to ijτ , the total probability that airplane i  
collides with airplane j is: 
 
)Pr()|1Pr()1Pr( ∞<∞<=== ijijijij BB ττ  Eq. 13 
 
To compute the collision rate, we compute the right-hand side of the previous equation. The total 
expected number of collisions )(NE is then: 
 
∑
>
==
ji
ijBNE )1Pr()(  Eq. 14 
 
First, to evaluate )Pr( ∞<ijτ , we run the simulation (Petri net in Figure 5) and count the number of 
occurrences that ∞<ijτ  (that is, the number of times that some airplane  i  lands while another 
airplane j  is disabled on the runway). 
 
To evaluate )|1Pr( ∞<= ijijB τ , we first observe: 
 
∫∞ ∞<=∞<=
ij
dttB ijijijij
τ
τϕτ )|()|1Pr(  Eq. 15 
 
We assume here that there is a one-to-one correspondence between incrossings and collisions. This is 
reasonable, since airplane j  is stationary. Since airplane i  is always moving forwards, there is no 
possibility of more than one incrossing. 
To compute this, we have run the simulation with parameters adjusted to achieve an artificially high 
number of instances where ∞<ijτ . In other words, we suppose that there is a very high probability 
that: 
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(a) airplanes become disabled on the runway, and 
(b) that pilots and sensor systems fail to observe the disabled airplane. 
 
Each time that ∞<ijτ  , the simulation collects data on ),( vrft rr , the relative position and velocity of 
the landing airplane with respect to the disabled airplane. The subscript t  denotes the dependence of 
this density on time, where t  represents the time after ijτ . (In other words, 0=t  refers to the time 
when airplane i  lands, while j  is still on the runway). Using the generalized Reich model, we compute 
)|( ∞<ijij t τϕ  using the equations described before. Then, we integrate as in the previous equations. 
Next Figure 7 shows the results of the preceding analysis and simulation. The figure shows the collision 
probability on the runway as a function of the arrival rate. The confidence intervals (95%) show 
potential errors due to the finite number of simulation replications [PN-11]. 
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Figure 7 – Collision Probabilities on the Runway [PN-11] 
 
Other sources of errors in the safety estimates include inaccuracies in parameter estimates, 
omissions in modelling safety hazards, and simplifications in modelling system dynamics. Since this is a 
proposed system and little data are available to populate some key parameters, the estimates in Figure 7, 
while calculated in an absolute sense, should be viewed in a relative sense. That is, the trend is more 
reliable than the absolute numbers. 
The shape of the curve in Figure 7  is explained from the terms in 
)Pr()|1Pr()1Pr( ∞<∞<=== ijijijij BB ττ . First, )|1Pr()1Pr( ∞<=== ijijij BB τ  is relatively 
constant as a function of the arrival rate. In other words, given airplane i  lands while airplane j  is 
disabled on the runway, the probability of a collision does not depend much on the background arrival 
rate. )Pr( ∞<ijτ , on the other hand, does depend on the arrival rate. As the arrival rate gets large, the 
probability of a trailing airplane to arrive (gets to point A in Figure 6) while another airplane is on the 
runway levels off and goes to 1, which contributes to the basic shape in Figure 7. 
While in this chapter we evaluated collisions on the runway, the same model can also be used to 
evaluate collisions at the top of the “T” and during the approach, and on the airport surface. The key 
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output of the simulation is the relative separation and relative velocity PDF ),( vrf rr  of adjacent 
airplanes as a function of time. For example, to estimate the probability of a collision during the 
approach, we can collect data from the simulation to estimate ),( vrf rr  when airplanes are in this phase 
of flight. We then enter the resulting distribution into the generalized Reich collision model. A collision 
at the intersection presents a new challenge, since the airplanes are turning. Although the Petri net 
model in this chapter provides equations of motion for the turn, we have observed that the distribution 
of ),( vrf rr  in this area is not well described by a normal distribution. Since the efficient methods for 
integrating the equations in Blom and Bakker (2002) require a mixture of normals, there are further 
numerical issues with doing this computation. 
 
In [PN-11] two techniques to increase the efficiency of simulation (similar to techniques used in Blom, 
Klompstra, and Bakker 2003) were used: 
(a) Conditioning on hazardous events (so the probability of a simulated collision is higher) and 
(b) the generalized Reich collision model to enhance the results of simulation. 
 
Performance using these techniques was good, since we were able to get statistically significant results 
without excessive computer time (several hours on a PC). 
Of course, simulation output can only be as good as the model generating the output. In safety 
modelling, it is impossible to account for all hazards that might lead to a collision. For example, in this 
analysis we won’t consider hazards related to improper initial separations due to controller errors. This 
omission biases the collision probability estimate to be lower than actual. On the other hand, some 
parameter estimates are likely conservative, biasing the estimate in the other direction. Thus, 
conclusions based on the absolute results are tentative. 
Nevertheless, we feel that such analysis has the following benefits. First, the spirit is to reveal 
general trends. In particular, the analysis reveals a levelling off of the runway collision risk as a function 
of arrival rate, contrary to an expected quadratic or exponential growth. Second, the analysis identifies 
critical parameters that have the highest impact on safety. In this case, pilot awareness is more critical 
than the reliability of the runway sensing device. 
Although initially there are little data to populate the model, we can use such a model to intelligently 
guide the design of data and flight tests. That is, a new system must be proven to be safe, and a critical 
step in this process is a demonstration of the system with real flight tests. The model can help to 
determine what data are most important to collect and how much data should be collected in such 
tests. A general iterative procedure is: First, build a preliminary model to identify parameters that most 
affect safety. Then, design experiments to collect an appropriate amount of data on those parameters. 
Then, revise the model using the new data. These steps can be repeated until a sufficiently accurate 
safety estimate is achieved. 
 
 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 10 
 
1 Collision Prediction Models............................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1 The Reich Collision Model......................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Generalized Reich Model ........................................................................................................................... 5 
2 Simulation Methods: Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets................................................................................ 5 
3 Application: Non-towered Airport (i.e. no ATCo intervention).................................................................. 8 
4 Analysis and Results for the case of Airplanes Landing at small, non-controlled airport. ....................... 9 
 
  
XIX ciclo di Dottorato in Ingegneria Elettrica 
DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA 
 
 
 11-1
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 11 
AIRPORT TRAFFIC FLOW 
USING TIMED 
COLOURED PETRI NETS 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is the core of the thesis work. It describes a Timed deterministic Coloured Petri Net 
(TCPN) model of a single runway airport, that is capable of analyzing the effects of failures of A-
SMGCS equipment on the capacity of the runway and on the timing of a given scheduled traffic, with 
respect to the Safety Level of the airport. 
The developed TCPN model is governed by elementary Air Traffic Control (ATC) principles 
(one aircraft at a time on runway, arrivals priority on departures, etc.), and takes into consideration the 
effect of different Aircraft Speeds, Low Visibility Procedures, and so on. 
 
1 STATECHARTS AND STATEFLOW 
 
The literature [SC-1], [SC-2]on software and systems engineering is almost unanimous in 
recognizing the existence of a major problem in the specification and design of large and complex 
reactive systems. A reactive system in contrast with a transformational system, is characterized by being, to a 
large extent, event-driven, continuously having to react to external and internal stimuli. Examples 
include telephones, automobiles, communication networks, computer operating systems, missile and 
avionics systems, and the man-machine interface of many kinds of ordinary software. The problem is 
rooted in the difficulty of describing reactive behaviour in ways that are clear and realistic, and at the same 
time formal and rigorous, sufficiently so to be amenable to detailed computerized simulation. The 
behaviour of a reactive system is really the set of allowed sequences of input and output events, 
conditions, and actions, perhaps with some additional information such as timing constraints. What 
makes the problem especially acute is the fact that a set of sequences (usually a very large and complex 
one) does not seem to lend itself naturally to ‘friendly’ gradual, level-by-level descriptions, that would fit 
nicely into a human being’s frame of mind. 
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For transformational systems (e.g., many kinds of data-processing systems) one really has to specify 
a transformation, or function, so that an input/output relation is usually sufficient. While 
transformational systems can also be highly complex, there are several excellent methods that allow one 
to decompose the system’s transformational behaviour into ever-smaller parts in ways that are both 
coherent and rigorous. Many of these approaches are supported by languages and implemented tools 
that perform very well in practice. 
Several people [SC-4] are of the opinion that for reactive systems, which present the more difficult 
cases, this problem has not yet been satisfactorily solved. Several important and promising approaches 
have been proposed. However, the general feeling is that many more improvements and developments 
are necessary. 
Much of the literature [SC-5] also seems to be in agreement that states and events are a priori a 
rather natural medium for describing the dynamic behaviour of a complex system. A basic fragment of 
such a description is a state transition, which takes the general form “when event (Y occurs in state A, 
if condition C is true at the time, the system transfers to state B”. Indeed, many of the informal 
exchanges concerning the dynamics of systems are of this nature; e.g., “when the plane is in cruise 
mode and switch x is thrown it enters navigate mode”, or “when displaying the time, if button y is 
pressed the watch starts displaying the date”. Finite state machines and their corresponding state-
transition diagrams (or state diagrams for short) are the formal mechanism for collecting such 
fragments into a whole. State diagrams are simply directed graphs, with nodes denoting states, and 
arrows (labelled with the triggering events and guarding conditions) denoting transitions. Figure 1 
shows a simple self-explanatory state diagram. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Simple self-explanatory state diagram 
 
However, it is also generally agreed that a complex system cannot be beneficially described in 
this naive fashion, because of the unmanageable, exponentially growing multitude of states, all of which 
have to be arranged in a ‘flat’ unstratified fashion, resulting in an unstructured, unrealistic, and chaotic 
state diagram. To be useful, a state/event approach must be modular, hierarchical and well-structured. It 
must also solve the exponential blow-up problem by somehow relaxing the requirement that all 
combinations of states have to be represented explicitly. A good state/event approach should also cater 
naturally for more general and flexible statements, such as: 
 
(1) “in all airborne states, when yellow handle is pulled seat will be ejected”, 
(2) “gearbox change of state is independent of braking system”, 
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(3) “when selection button is pressed enter selected mode”, 
(4) “display-mode consists of time-display, date-display and stopwatch-display”. 
 
Clause (1) calls for the ability to cluster states into a superstate, (2) introduces independence, or 
orthogonality, (3) hints at the need for more general transitions than the single event-labelled arrow, 
and (4) captures the refinement of states. 
Statecharts constitute a visual formalism for describing states and transitions in a modular 
fashion, enabling clustering, orthogonality (i.e., concurrency) and refinement, and encouraging ‘zoom’ 
capabilities for moving easily back and forth between levels of abstraction. Technically speaking, the 
kernel of the approach is the extension of conventional state diagrams by AND/OR decomposition of 
states together with inter-level transitions, and a broadcast mechanism for communication between 
concurrent components. The two essential ideas enabling this extension are the provision for ‘deep’ 
descriptions and the notion of orthogonality. The approach is described solely in its diagrammatic 
terms, although the reader should be able to provide a textual, language-theoretic or algebraic 
equivalent if so desired. In a nutshell, one can say: 
 
ioncommunicatbroadcastityorthogonaldepthdiagramsstatesstatechart // +++=  Eq. 1 
 
Stateflow is an interactive graphical design tool that works with Matlab Simulink to model and 
simulate event-driven systems, also called reactive systems. Event-driven systems transition from one operating 
mode to another in response to events and conditions. These systems are often used to model logic for 
dynamically controlling a physical device such as a fan, motor, or pump: in our case an entire Airport. 
Event-driven systems can be modelled as finite-state machines. 
Finite-state machines represent operating modes as states. For example, a house fan can have 
states such as High, Medium, Low, and Off. To construct finite-state machines, Stateflow provides 
graphical objects that one can drag and drop from a design palette to create state-transition charts in 
which a series of transitions directs a flow of logic from one state to another. Stateflow also allows to 
add: 
 
• Input and output data. 
• Events for triggering Stateflow charts 
• Actions and conditions, which can be attached to states and transitions to further define the 
behaviour of the Stateflow chart. 
 
Stateflow allows to extend the capabilities of traditional state charts by: 
 
• Adding hierarchy to charts 
• Modelling parallel states 
• Defining functions graphically, using flow diagrams; procedurally, using the Matlab language; and 
in tabular form, with truth tables 
• Using temporal logic to schedule events 
• Defining vector, matrix, and fixed-point data types 
 
Furthermore, Stateflow performs simulation by generating a C code implementation of the 
Stateflow chart. The simulation code is generated from a simulation target. One can also generate 
portable C code from Stateflow charts automatically using Stateflow Coder. Stateflow Coder also works 
with Real-Time Workshop to generate C code for Simulink models that include Stateflow charts. 
The fact that in this work we will make extensive use of Statecharts, implemented in Stateflow is 
based upon a number of theses: 
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• Reactive systems differ from transformational systems, and require different approaches to their 
specification. 
• An essential element in the specification of reactive systems is the need for a clear and rigorous 
behavioural description, to serve as the backbone of development from requirements specification all the 
way to user documentation. 
• Statecharts provide one possible fitting formalism for specifying reactive behaviour. 
• The future lies in visual languages and methodologies that, with appropriate structuring 
elements, can exploit all the obvious advantages of graphical man-machine interaction. 
 
As a matter of fact, we are convinced that people working with complex systems have for a 
long time appreciated the simplicity and appropriateness of the state/event approach but have lacked a 
formalism for it that possesses certain elementary properties (such as depth and modularity) that are 
provided by most programming languages and by many conventional approaches to the physical and 
functional aspects of system description. The lack of these, as well as the exponential blow-up 
syndrome and the inherent sequentiality of conventional state machines, seem to have hindered serious 
use of states and events in the design of really large systems. 
We also believe that before long scientists and engineers will be sitting in front of graphical 
workstations with large (blackboard size?) displays of fantastic resolution, carrying out their everyday 
technical and scientific chores. It is quite fair to say that most existing visual description methods in 
computer science are predominantly intended as aids. The ‘real’ description of the object is usually 
given in some textual, algebraic form, and the picture is there only to help see things better, and to 
assist in comprehending the complexity involved. Here we are suggesting that visual formalism should 
be the name of the game; one uses statecharts as the formal description itself, with each graphical 
construct given a precise meaning. The language does not consist of linear combinations of icons or of 
one-level graphs, but of complex multi-level diagrams constructed in nontrivial ways from a few simple 
constructs. Textual representations of these visual objects can be given, but they are the aids (e.g., for 
users lacking graphical equipment, or for applications requiring textual reports), and not the other way 
around.  
 
1.1 STATECHARTING PETRI NETS WITH STATEFLOW 
 
Petri nets and statecharts are two popular visual formalisms for modelling systems that exhibit 
concurrency. As already stated in the related chapter, Petri nets were introduced in 1962 by C.A. Petri. 
Since the 1980’s Petri nets found their way in practical applications like manufacturing, workflow 
modelling and performance analysis. On the other hand, Statecharts were introduced in 1987 by D. 
Harel [SC-3], [SC-4], for use in the structured analysis method Statemate. Soon after their appearance, 
statecharts were adopted in several object-oriented methods, and their successor Unified Modelling 
Language. Thus, both Petri nets and statecharts have found widespread use in both academia and 
industry. Both formalisms are supported by various tools, like CPN tools and GreatSPN for Petri nets, 
and Statemate and Stateflow for statecharts. UML tools are a special case, since they support not only 
statecharts but also activity diagrams, a Petri-net like notation. Tools supporting Petri nets are strongly 
focused on analysis of both functional and stochastic properties, while tools supporting statecharts are 
usually more focused on the software design process, for example offering the facility to generate code 
from a statechart. 
Given this wide tool support, it is interesting to have well-defined translations between Petri 
nets and statecharts. Such translations could facilitate the exchange of models in different notations 
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between tools, thus allowing designers to use the best of both worlds. Ideally, such translations are 
correct and structure preserving. A translation is correct if the original and translated model are 
equivalent. 
 
concept  Petri Net  Statechart  
state  place  node (state)  
transition  transition  hyperedge (full compound transition)  
active state  place containing a token  active node (active state)  
global state  marking  configuration  
Table 1 – Relating Petri Nets and Statecharts terminology 
 
Correctness guarantees that operations done with a tool on a particular model are meaningful, 
even if the original model was expressed in another formalism. Preservation of structure ensures that 
the syntax of the original and translated model are alike, making it easier for designers to understand 
the translated model. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Petri net with balanced forks and joins and equivalent statechart 
 
The goal here was to define a translation from Petri Nets to Statecharts, (and not necessarily vice 
versa), that is correct and structure preserving. Before giving any details on this translation, it is useful 
to discuss the similarities and differences between Statecharts and Petri nets. Both formalisms are 
generalisations of Finite State Machines. Finite state machines model sequential processes as states 
connected by transitions. Mathematically, finite state machines are represented as directed graphs, 
consisting of nodes (representing states) and directed edges (representing transitions). The global state 
of such a machine at a certain point in time is always one single state, i.e., only one node of the graph is 
active at a time. 
Both Petri nets and statecharts generalise finite state machines by using transitions that can 
enter and leave multiple states. Sources and targets of such transitions are concurrent: a transition can 
only be taken if all its sources are active in parallel, and if a transition is taken, all its targets become 
active in parallel. 
Mathematically, a transition is represented as a hyperedge. Consequently, the underlying 
mathematical model is a hypergraph rather than a graph. The global state of a Petri net or Statechart is 
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therefore distributed and typically consists of multiple states, i.e. multiple nodes of the hypergraph can 
be simultaneously active. 
 
Figure 3 – Petri net with unbalanced forks and joins and equivalent statechart 
 
Even though Petri nets and Statecharts share these concepts, the terminology is somewhat 
different (see Table 1). To clearly distinguish between the two formalisms, for statecharts we use the 
terms ‘node’ and ‘hyperedge’ rather than the more common ‘state’ and ‘transition’. 
Though both Petri nets and statecharts are based on hypergraphs, statecharts have as additional 
feature an AND/OR hierarchy on nodes to explicitly model concurrency. This hierarchy is visualised 
by node containment, where nodes that contain other nodes are called composite. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Unbounded Petri net and non-equivalent statechart 
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There are two kinds of composite nodes: AND and OR, each imposing its own constraint on 
the global state of the statechart. An AND node denotes concurrency: If an AND node is active, all its 
immediate subnodes must be active as well. An OR node denotes exclusiveness: If an OR node is 
active, one of its immediate subnodes must be active as well. (So OR is actually XOR.) 
 
 
Figure 5 – Unsafe Petri net and inequivalent statechart 
 
The constraints imposed by the Statechart hierarchy imply that leaf nodes of the hierarchy, basic 
nodes, are not active more than once in the same global state. This seems to suggest that statecharts 
correspond to safe Petri nets (nets in which in each marking every place has at most one token; see Figure 
5 and Chapter 9 regarding Petri Nets). However, there is no known structure-preserving translation 
from safe Petri nets to statecharts. The difficulty in defining such a translation lies in constructing an 
appropriate AND/OR hierarchy. On the other hand, to translate a statechart into a Petri net, simply 
dropping composite nodes from the statechart seems to suffice. 
In this thesis we have adopted a structure-preserving algorithm that translates a Petri net into an 
equivalent (bisimilar) statechart. The algorithm is structure-preserving in the sense that it maps each 
place to a basic node and each transition to a hyperedge. Thus, loosely speaking, the algorithm imposes an 
AND/OR hierarchy of nodes on the Petri net structure. Key property of the algorithm is that it is 
structural and does not use any Petri net analysis techniques, like place invariants or reachability graphs. The 
correctness of the algorithm has been already formally proven. However, it is not complete: it fails for 
some nets that do have a statechart equivalent. But statecharts which it fails to construct are not likely 
to be drawn by statechart designers, so this non-completeness does not appear to be a severe limitation 
in practice. 
For the reverse direction, not every statechart can be translated into an equivalent Petri net, so 
omitting composite nodes from a statechart does not always yield an equivalent net. 
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2 AIRPORT LAYOUT 
 
The airport that we have chosen to study has a very simple, but sufficiently flexible layout, 
letting us to explore the most important issues related to many Airport Air-Side Operations: 
 
• One Runway with two opposite headings, that for our purposes will be called Heading One and 
Heading Two: these will be obviously used for take offs and landings, according to wind directions. 
The Runway will be split in five different Places (we will see later that these Places will coincide with Petri 
Nets Places, assuming that aircrafts will be considered as Tokens), according to the possible exits ad 
junctions that feed the Runway itself. 
• Four Junctions, two of them are Rapid Exits: this is a very realistic assumption for the kind of 
airport that we are going to study: each junction will be considered as a single Place. 
• One High Speed-Taxiway, for aircraft high-speed taxiing purposes. According to what has been 
already done with the Runway, the High Speed-Taxiway will be split too into five different Places, 
according to all the junctions available. 
• Two normal Taxiways, for taxiing to and from the Apron (each one, as per the junctions, will be 
considered as a single Place). 
• One Apron for aircraft docking purposes onto Stands. Apron will be described in details later, 
according to the definition of stands and of Time Slots on the Land-Side. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Airport Layout 
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This kind of Airport layout is very similar to most of all medium size Italian airports, such as 
Bologna “Guglielmo Marconi” or Torino “Sandro Pertini”. Of course, all the considerations on the 
following pages can be extended to major airports with more complex layouts, such as Milan Malpensa 
or Rome Fiumicino hubs, by building a more complex net of possible places for aircrafts. 
In the following Table 2 and Table 3, all the possible aircraft paths along the “sample” airport 
that we have decided to study, will be presented, according to wind directions, aircraft sizes and 
scheduled departures/arrivals. 
 
Arrivals Departures 
Light-Medium Heavy Light-Medium Heavy 
Wind Coming from 
Heading One 
A B C D A B C D 
Runway         
HeadingOne2Alpha - - - - 7 8 9 10 
Alpha2Bravo - - 4 4 6 7 8 9 
Bravo2Charlie 3 3 3 3 5 6 7 8 
Charlie2Delta 2 2 2 2 - - 6 7 
Delta2HeadingTwo 1 1 1 1 - - - - 
Junctions and Rapid Exits         
Alpha - - 5 5 - - - - 
Bravo 4 4 - - - - - - 
Charlie - - - - 4 5 - - 
Delta - - - - - - 5 6 
High Speed Taxiway         
Alpha2Bravo - - 6 6 - - - - 
Bravo2Juliet 5 5 7 7 - - - - 
Juliet2Kilo - 6 - 8 - 3 - 3 
Kilo2Charlie - - - - 3 4 3 4 
Charlie2Delta - - - - - - 4 5 
Taxiways         
Juliet 6 - 8 - - 2 - 2 
Kilo - 7 - 9 2 - 2 - 
Apron         
Apron/Stands 7 8 9 10 1 1 1 1 
Table 2 – Possible Sequences for places occupation, wind coming from Heading One 
 
As one can notice from Table 2 and Table 3, descending from the choice of the layout of the 
airport, only four possible path are allowed for each operation, depending on the wind, thus letting us 
consider simple airport traffic control management. The shortest paths will be realistically assigned to 
light/medium weight aircrafts, since they will have the possibility to take off and land with shortest 
distance available. Heavy aircrafts will be assigned to longest path, which coincide with longest runway 
distance available. 
All of the paths described in Table 2 and Table 3 are shown in detail also in Figure 7 and Figure 
8. It is interesting to underline some clever considerations coming from Figure 7 and Figure 8. As a 
matter of fact one can notice that: 
 
• for this kind of layout, Leading Circulation of the traffic along the airport (e.g. clockwise for wind 
coming from Heading Two) is mainly dictated by the prevailing wind. That’s the reason why prevailing 
wind direction will be the first parameter that we will take into consideration inside our model. 
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Arrivals Departures 
Light-Medium Heavy Light-Medium Heavy 
Wind Coming from 
Heading Two 
A B C D A B C D 
Runway         
HeadingOne2Alpha 1 1 1 1 - - - - 
Alpha2Bravo 2 2 2 2 - - 6 7 
Bravo2Charlie 3 3 3 3 5 6 7 8 
Charlie2Delta - - 4 4 6 7 8 9 
Delta2HeadingTwo - - - - 7 8 9 10 
Junctions and Rapid Exits         
Alpha - - - - - - 5 6 
Bravo - - - - 4 5 - - 
Charlie 4 4 - - - - - - 
Delta - - 5 5 - - - - 
High Speed Taxiway         
Alpha2Bravo - - - - - - 4 5 
Bravo2Juliet - - - - 3 4 3 4 
Juliet2Kilo - 6 - 8 - 3 - 3 
Kilo2Charlie 5 5 7 7 - - - - 
Charlie2Delta - - 6 6 - - - - 
Taxiways         
Juliet - 7 - 9 2 - 2 - 
Kilo 6 - 8 - - 2 - 2 
Apron         
Apron/Stands 7 8 9 10 1 1 1 1 
Table 3 – Possible Sequences for places occupation, wind coming from Heading Two 
 
• given the layout and the prevailing wind direction, there are only two Places among all of the 
Places of the air-side where the Circulation has two possible ways, in particular Taxiways Juliet and Kilo. 
Hence, if one would like to improve safety, of course reducing capacity, can decide to use Taxiways 
Juliet e.g for Arrivals and Kilo for Departures flights if Leading Wind is coming from Heading One and 
vice versa. In this way also Juliet and Kilo are one way Places, thus segregating in-bound and out-bound 
traffic and leaving the possibility of collision very remote. This choice corresponds to eliminating all B 
and D paths from Table 2 and Table 3. This policy may be safer, but not necessarily the most efficient 
in terms of capacity. 
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Figure 7 – Wind coming from Heading One 
 
 
Figure 8 – Wind coming from Heading Two 
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3 PETRI NET MODEL OF THE AIRPORT 
 
The Airport Layout chosen leads to a well defined Petri Net. Because of the timed discrete event nature 
of the problem, Timed Coloured Petri Nets (TCPNs) have been chosen as a modelling tool. The 
structure of a Petri net is a Bipartite Directed Graph describing the structure of a Discrete Event System, 
while the dynamics of the system is described by the execution of the Petri Net. A Petri net is coloured 
if the tokens are distinguishable. 
For real systems it is often important to describe the temporal behaviour of the system, i.e. we 
need to model durations and delays. The CPN extended by Time gives a possibility to describe the 
dynamic properties of a system in the time space. The time concept of TCPNs is based on the 
introduction of a global clock. The clock values represent the model time and they are discrete (e.g. 
integers). Each token carries a time value, also called a time stamp. The time stamp describes the 
earliest model time at which the token can be used, i.e., removed by the occurrence of a binding 
element. 
 
The inputs of the model are: 
• the desired original scheduling, 
• the expected occupancy time of every place, 
• every information connected to aircrafts paths. 
The outputs of the simulation are: 
• occupancy graphs, 
• text file with simulation results. 
 
The Timed CPN model of the airport that obeys our modelling assumptions has been built in 
Stateflow. The model is shown in Figure 9 as it appears in the program package. The model is 
replicated into 10 layers, each one reading the input scheduling from a Simulink interface. The main 
part of the model realizes the simulation of airport operations (i.e. simulates aircraft moving along the 
airport as function of time). The modelling time is handled by the TCPN simulator. One unit in the model 
time is set to be one second. 
To model the traffic flow as a Discrete Events System, we need to define Events that are relevant, 
such as Clearances (for landing, take-off) and passing some positions by the aircraft. 
 
The first assumptions that we made about this Airport Petri Net are: 
 
• The Aircrafts will be considered as Coloured Tokens; the colour, given by the Air Traffic 
Controller, contains all the necessary information for the Aircraft to move along the Airport (ID, 
speed, waypoints, holding points, runway heading, and so on…) 
• The Airport Layout will be split into 18 different Places (including ‘idle’) 
• No more than 10 aircraft can populate the Net contemporarily 
• Therefore the Stateflow implementation of the Petri Net will have 10 different Layers, one for 
each aircraft. The single Petri Net Layer implemented in StateFlow is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Having considered the modelling assumptions and goals, a timed stochastic CPN model with the 
elements below have been constructed. 
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Figure 9 – Airport Petri Net 
The chart in Figure 10 shows the detailed Stateflow implementation of the Petri Net Place 
representing the segment “Bravo2Charlie” inside the Runway. Firstly, StartTime is sampled from global 
clock, together with the calculation of ExpectedTime and forcasts on ReleaseTime. Then, Engaging 
time is calculated and updated at each sample time. The transition to the next place will be fired when 
local EngagingTime will be more than Expected Time. Note that the place is highlighted in blue by 
Stateflow since, when the simulation was running, that place was engaged by an aircraft. The reader 
should also note from Figure 10 that each time a transition is fired, the token is stored into the next 
local place variable, like in classical Petri Nets. 
Stochastic disturbances have been taken into account to make more realistic the results. As a 
matter of fact, the aim of the simulation includes to handle the effect of uncertainty of occupancy time 
(due to weather, integrity of communications, etc.) on the airport capacity. So the developed model 
puts some uncertainty into the desired original scheduling. In addition, there are possibilities to change 
the aircrafts orders into the queues, and change the colour of any tokens during the simulation. 
 
In order to model operations around an airport, we need a couple of elements to work with. In 
this case the most important elements are: 
• Runway (RWY) 
• Taxiways (TWY) 
• Aircraft (A/C) 
• Rules that govern the interaction between A/C and use of the RWY, of the Stands, and of the 
TWYs. 
 
The characteristic properties of each of the model elements are as in the following paragraphs. 
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Figure 10 – Detail of Petri Net Place “RWY_Bravo2Charlie” StateFlow implementation 
 
3.1 THE RUNWAY 
 
The runway to be modelled is simple and yet has a potential containing most of the elements 
important in runway dynamics. In order to obtain a relatively simple model for simulation and dynamic 
analysis purposes, the following modelling assumptions have been made: 
• It is assumed that the time value of reaching a definite position by an A/C can be pre-
calculated. 
• Only basic ATC laws are applied (no wake turbulence separation is taken into account, but the 
model is open to take into account also that; for numerical values of inter-arrival separations in terms 
of time see figure). 
• Only visual flight rules (VFR) operations are considered (this condition is closely related to the 
previous assumption because in VFR pilots are able to maintain own separation). 
• Pilots are assumed being familiar with airport configuration (this is important because runway 
occupancy times can be influenced by pilots but their performance depends on their awareness that 
they have to urgently exit the runway and on the knowledge where they can do it). 
• The possibility of speed adjustment can be considered, but won’t be implemented yet (this 
assumption ensures some stability into the planned sequences caused by the deviation in runway 
occupancy times). 
• A single 4000 m Runway (RWY) is considered with two 90° TWY on both ends and two rapid 
exit taxiways, located at 1300 m from approach end threshold, thus leading to a completely symmetric 
configuration (see Figure 6). 
• Aircraft Speed on the Runway is on average 150 knots. 
• A dedicated Runway Monitoring System manages all clearances queues to landing and departing 
aircrafts, virtually solving all conflicts, but realistically relying on real (i.e. subject to failures) sensors. 
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3.2 THE TAXIWAYS 
 
The assumptions are very similar to the ones already made for the runway. In particular 
• It is assumed that the time value of reaching a definite position by an A/C can be pre-
calculated. 
• Only visual flight rules (VFR) operations are considered (this condition is closely related to the 
previous assumption because in VFR pilots are able to maintain own separation). 
• Aircraft Speed on the Taxiway is on average 25 knots into taxiway links and 50 knots into high-
speed taxiways. 
• No specific monitoring is performed on the taxiways except from visual and SMR. 
 
3.3 THE AIRCRAFTS (A/C) TOKENS 
 
The difference between aircraft is based on ICAO threshold speed categories (A to E). Only 
aircraft with categories A, B and C are considered. The tokens are composed of 20 elements (some of 
them are spare fields): 
 
 % Arrival Information 
AIRCRAFT_ID=0; %index of Aircraft Call-Sign 
ETOA=1; %index of Estimated Time of Arrival field 
ARR_DEP=2; %index of Arrival/Departure field 
SPARE_0=3; %index of SPARE_0 field 
SPARE_1=4; %index of SPARE_1 field 
A_RWY_ID=5; %index of Runway ID field 
A_RWY_HDG=6; %index of Runway Heading field 
A_RPTTWY_ID=7; %index of Rapid Exit/Link ID field 
A_HSTWY_ID=8; %index of High Speed Taxiway ID field 
A_APTWY_ID=9; %index of Apron Taxiway ID field 
ST_ID=10; %index of Stand ID field 
SLOT=11; %index of Slot Time field 
SPARE_2=12; %index of SPARE_2 field 
% Departure Information 
D_APTWY_ID=13; %index of Apron Taxiway ID field 
D_HSTWY_ID=14; %index of High Speed Taxiway ID field 
D_RPTTWY_ID=15; %index of Rapid Exit/Link ID field 
D_RWY_HDG=16; %index of Runway Heading field 
D_RWY_ID=17;%index of Runway ID field 
SPARE_3=18; %index of SPARE_3 field 
SPARE_4=19; %index of SPARE_4 field 
 
Table 4 – Token Vector Fields 
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3.4 GOVERNING RULES 
 
The following rules are used to control the interactions between A/C and the use of the airport places. 
• Arrivals have priority on departures. 
• A landing aircraft will not normally be permitted to cross the runway threshold on its final 
approach until the preceding departing A/C has crossed the end of the runway, or has started a turn, or 
until all preceding landing A/C are clear off the RWY. 
• Communications Clearances queues are managed stochastically 
 
3.5 SCHEDULING STRATEGIES 
 
Due to uncertainty of arriving exactly on estimated time to the threshold, the input schedule of 
the model is calculated from the original schedule by adding or subtracting a random number to the 
times of estimated arrival on the threshold. 
The input schedule contains A/C with estimated time of reaching the threshold (for arrivals) 
and scheduled time of reaching the runway on taxiways. The priority of arrivals law is applied with use 
of the philosophy departures between arrivals not arrivals between departures. 
The model gives a clearance the latest time possible i.e. one clearance is valid at a time and a new 
clearance is given after the preceding A/C is off the previous place. 
 
3.6 CLEARANCES 
 
The scheduling method at a given model time is to select the next time an A/C arriving at the 
threshold and calculates, whether departing A/C scheduled to depart earlier are clear off the runway 
before this time. It is done by adding the time the A/C vacates the runway for departing (that depends 
on category) to the actual time or to the scheduled time of the aircraft reaching the runway on taxiway 
A, whichever is greater. When this value is smaller or equal to the estimated time the landing A/C 
reaching the threshold, the clearance is issued to the departing aircraft, otherwise not. This planning 
method can be considered as a small scale window method proposed in [PN-12]. 
 
3.7 SHORT‐TERM CONFLICT ALERTS (STCA) 
 
Time for conflict detection, identification, and resolution ranging from: 
• Detection and identification up to 2 seconds 
• Resolution ranging between 2 and 12 seconds 
The reaction time is assessed by an ‘observer’ who measures the time between the initiation of a 
conflict and the reaction of the ATCO in charge. The reaction of an ATCO is defined by the time 
when the ATCO contacts the pilots to resolve the conflict.  
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4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
The proposed TCPN model was verified against qualitative engineering expectations by using 
simulation experiments. The effects of varying reliability parameters of systems affecting safety such as 
SMR False Alarm Rates, ADS-B Probability of Detection and Clearances Communication Integrity 
have been studied extensively. 
For the TCPN model simulation Simulink Realtime Workshop and Stateflow Coder program 
packages have been used. 
The simulation outputs are Occupancy graphs and Output text files. 
Some of the outputs of the simulation are graphs showing the taxiing occupancy vs time (see 
Figure 11, Figure 12 and Figure 13). It shows either low (i.e. runway is free in time interval on 
horizontal axis) or high level (i.e. runway is occupied). Airport and Stand occupancy times too have 
been investigated (Figure 14 and Figure 15).  
The other output is a text file that includes the following data: 
• type of the aircraft 
• aircraft path followed 
• scheduled operations time (e.g. scheduled time of departure) 
• estimated PDs, CFAR and CI 
• times of clearances (e.g. clearance was given at time 160 though scheduled time was 140) 
• delays (i.e. the difference between the scheduled and the real clearance time) 
 
4.1 TAXI TIMES 
 
The taxi time is measured automatically for each aircraft starting from the gate (velocity > 0 kts) 
until the wheels leave the ground (take-off) for outbound movements. For inbound movements the 
time measurement starts when the wheels touch the ground (touch down) until the velocity is 0 at the 
gate or stand. Since the aircrafts always have a constant speed level, Taxi Time differences can only be 
interpreted as being caused by a more efficient control by the ATCOs using ASMGCS. 
 Some delays (see Figure 11 and Figure 12) are due to reduced or simplified performances (even if 
Safety is compliant) of some of the equipments (e.g. with reference to False Alarm Rates that were 
incremented from 1% to 10%): these delays can lead to previously unexpected economical 
consequences, thus requiring more accurate systems to be installed, in order to meet also Airport 
economical constraints. On the other hand, as one may expect easily, some other delays are due to the 
increase of Safety functions; one example is reported in Figure 13, where the RWY Monitoring 
function has been implemented: conflicts are drastically reduced (see also Figure 19), but delays 
increase further. 
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Figure 11 – Taxi Time Analysis (CFAR 1%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, No RWY Monitoring) 
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Figure 12 – Taxi Time Analysis (CFAR 10%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, No RWY Monitoring) 
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Figure 13 – Taxi Time Analysis (CFAR 10%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, With RWY Monitoring) 
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4.2 AIRPORT OCCUPANCY TIMES 
 
 
Figure 14 – Airport Occupancy Analysis (CFAR 1%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, With RWY Monitoring) 
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4.3 STAND PERMANENCE TIMES 
 
 
Figure 15 – Stand Permanence Analysis (CFAR 1%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, With RWY Monitoring) 
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4.4 RELIABILITY  PERFORMANCES  OF  SMR,  ADS‐B  AND 
COMMUNICATION INTEGRITY 
 
 
Figure 16 – Reliability Performance Analysis (SMR Radar, ADS-B, Communications Integrity) 
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4.5 A‐SMGCS TRAFFIC VOLUME ANALYSIS 
 
 
Figure 17 – Traffic Volume Analysis (CFAR 1%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, With RWY Monitoring) 
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4.6 A‐SMGCS SAFETY ANALYSIS 
 
 
Figure 18 – A-SMGCS Safety Analysis (CFAR 10%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%, With RWY Monitoring) 
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4.6.1 EFFECTS  OF  RUNWAY  MONITORING  SYSTEM  ON  THE  LEVEL  OF 
SAFETY 
 
 
Figure 19 – Effectiveness of Runway Monitoring (CFAR 10%, PD 95%, ICOMM 95%) 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
 
 
 
 
A detailed analysis of State of the Art Technologies and Procedures into Airport Advanced-
Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems has been provided in this thesis, together with the review of 
Statistical Monte Carlo Analysis, Reliability Assessment and Petri Nets theories. 
This practical and theoretical background has lead the author to the conclusion that there is a 
lack of linkage in between these fields. At the same of time the rapid increasing of Air Traffic all over 
the world, has brought in evidence the urgent need of practical instruments able to identify and 
quantify the risks connected with Aircraft operations on the ground, since the Airport has shown to be 
the actual ‘bottle neck’ of the entire Air Transport System. 
Therefore, the only winning approach to such a critical matter has to be multi-disciplinary, 
sewing together apparently different subjects, coming from the most disparate areas of interest and 
trying to fulfil the gap. 
The result of this thesis work has come to a start towards the end, when a Timed Coloured Petri 
Net (TCPN) model of a ‘sample’ Airport A-SMGCS has been developed, that is capable of taking into 
account different orders of questions arisen during these recent years and tries to give them some good 
answers. 
The A-SMGCS Airport model is, in the end, a parametric tool relying on Discrete Event System 
theory, able to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system itself, that: 
 
• uses a Monte Carlo Analysis applied to a Timed Coloured Petri Net, whose purpose is to evaluate the 
Safety Level of Surface Movements along an Airport 
• lets the user to analyse the impact of Procedures and Reliability Indexes of Systems such as Surface 
Movement Radars, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, Airport Lighting Systems, Microwave Sensors, and 
so on… onto the Safety Level of Airport Aircraft Transport System 
• not only is a valid instrument in the Design Phase, but it is useful also into the Certifying Activities 
an in monitoring the Safety Level of the above mentioned System with respect to changes to Technologies 
and different Procedures. 
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This TCPN model has been verified against qualitative engineering expectations by using 
simulation experiments and occupancy time schedules generated a priori. 
Simulation times are good, and since the model has been written into Simulink/Stateflow 
programming language, it can be compiled to run real-time in C language (Real-time workshop and 
Stateflow Coder), thus relying on portable code, able to run virtually on any platform, giving even 
better performances in terms of execution time.  
 One of the most interesting applications of this work is the estimate, for an Airport, of the kind 
of A-SMGCS level of implementation needed (Technical/Economical convenience evaluation). As a 
matter of fact, starting from the Traffic Volume and choosing the kind of Ground Equipment to be 
installed, one can make predictions about the Safety Level of the System: if the value is compliant with the 
TLS required by ICAO, the A-SMGCS level of Implementation is sufficiently adequate. Nevertheless, 
even if the Level of Safety has been satisfied, some delays due to reduced or simplified performances (even if 
Safety is compliant) of some of the equipments (e.g. with reference to False Alarm Rates) can lead to 
previously unexpected economical consequences, thus requiring more accurate systems to be installed, 
in order to meet also Airport economical constraints. 
Work in progress includes the analysis of the effect of weather conditions and re-sequencing of 
a given schedule. The effect of re-sequencing a given schedule is not yet enough realistic since the 
model does not apply inter arrival and departure separations. However, the model might show some 
effect on different sequences based on runway occupancy times. A further developed model containing 
wake turbulence separation conditions would be more sensitive for this case. 
Hence, further work will be directed towards: 
 
• The development of On-Line Re-Scheduling based on the available actual runway/taxiway 
configuration and weather conditions. 
• The Engineering Safety Assessment of some small Italian Airport A-SMGCSs (Model validation 
with real data). 
• The application of Stochastic Differential Equations systems in order to evaluate the collision risk 
on the ground inside the Place alone on the Petri Net, in the event of a Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA), 
by adopting Reich Collision Risk Model. 
• Optimal Air Traffic Control Algorithms Synthesis (Adaptive look-ahead Optimization), by 
Dynamically Timed Coloured Petri Nets, together with the implementation of Error-Recovery 
Strategies and Diagnosis Functions. 
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